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Preface 
 
 
This book is one of three books from the research project, "Internationalisa-
tion of the energy markets, and its influence on the Danish energy policy, 
with special focus on the Danish-German connection".  
 
The project was financed by the Ministry of Environment and Energy within 
the program for Energy and Society, and Aalborg University. 
 
This book "Electricity Reforms, Democracy and Technological Change" 
deals with a description of the dynamics of the Danish energy system and its 
public regulation processes, with special focus on the electricity sector. 
 
Another book "Current corporate strategies of the German Electricity Supply 
Industry" written by Lutz Mez and Annette Piening, Freie Universität, Ber-
lin, deals with the development within the German energy sectors, focusing 
on public regulation processes and the electricity sector. 
 
In the third book, "Renewable Energy Governance Systems", I compare the 
new German renewable energy law with the Danish renewable energy legis-
lation from 1999. 
 
Without intending to escape a personal responsibility for the written English, 
I want to thank both Gwen Bingle (first two chapters) and Juliana Felkner 
(the rest of the book) for their competent and patient work with correcting 
and improving my English. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Annelle Riberholt for doing the layout work on 
the book. 
 
 
Frede Hvelplund  
June 2001 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Energy policy background 
The background for this analysis is the process of change that the energy 
systems all over the world, and especially in Europe, are undergoing within 
the following fields: 
 
a. Mainly since the mid 1980ies, new energy policies are in the preliminary 
stages of being established, in order to reduce the growth in greenhouse 
gases and decrease dependence upon fossil fuels. 
b. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the first shaky steps have been made 
towards a technological paradigm shift, from fossil fuel- and nuclear 
technologies to renewable energy- and energy conservation technolo-
gies. 
c. As a consequence of these developments (a and b), an organisational and 
technological battle has been taking place these past years between the 
old nuclear and fossil fuel ”sunset” technologies/organisations and the 
renewable energy and energy conservation ”sunrise” technolo-
gies/organisations. 
d. In the midst of this technological transition/battle, a world-wide move-
ment promoting new public regulation regimes, often named ”liberaliza-
tion” or ”privatisation”, has had substantial success in introducing and 
implementing these changes into the former public regulation frame-
work. These new public regulation regimes are usually justified by clas-
sical arguments saying that increased competition will increase cost effi-
ciency, and result in decreased energy prices. The rationale behind these 
reforms is not, has never been, and cannot really be linked to environ-
mental goals. 
e. The typical ”liberalization” version is being linked to the privatisation of 
ownership, consumer access to buy electricity from various suppliers, 
the introduction of tradable greenhouse gas permits and in some coun-
tries, like Denmark for instance, and the introduction of quotas for re-
newable energy, combined with a market for ”Green Certificates”. 
 
Until the 1999 electricity reform in Denmark, technological innovation in 
certain fields met with considerable success. The use of cogeneration, re-
newable energy- and energy conservation technologies proliferated, resulting 
in an absence of increase in CO2 emissions since 1975, and that, despite a 
GNP rising by 70% during the same period of time. The last decade has 
brought extensive introduction of cogeneration and wind power, where co-
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generation now accounts for around 50% of the heat consumption and wind 
power for more than 15% of electricity consumption. The export of energy 
technologies has been booming with a growth of 500% between 1992 and 
2000, where it reached 20 billion Danish crowns.  
 
The Danish energy system has so far been characterised by a high proportion 
of municipal and consumer ownership. The electricity system has succeeded 
in supplying electricity at the lowest prices in EU Europe, and at prices 
which, for many consumer groups, have been only 35-40% of, for instance, 
the German electricity prices. At the same time, Denmark has had the most 
egalitarian electricity price structure in EU Europe, with small industrial 
consumers and farmers paying almost the same kWh price as large industrial 
consumers. The Danish system has been financially consolidated with al-
most no debt within the electricity system, but also without any free financial 
funds1. The German electricity system is a shareholder owned system, which 
has had, and still have, considerable political power, and very high electrici-
ty prices. Furthermore, the German electricity system has been allowed un-
taxed accumulation of huge funds for the decommissioning of nuclear plants.  
 
At the end of the 1990s, Danish energy policy reached a turning point be-
cause of technical challenges due to the high proportion of fluctuating wind 
power production and the increased cogeneration share, and because of new 
regulation regimes being introduced in Denmark and its neighbouring coun-
tries. In this specific historical situation, with the above background, the 
questions that will be analysed in this publication are as follows: 
 
1.Which governance systems2 are most efficient, with regard to achieving 
optimal goal performance by means of the present typical uranium/fossil fuel 
electricity supply systems? 
 
2. Which governance systems are the most efficient in the transformation 
process from the present uranium/fossil fuel electricity supply systems to re-
newable energy-/conservation based electricity system? 
 
                                                 
1 The Danish electricity system has a debt amounting to around 10-15% of the total 
value of its fixed assets. At the same time the law has not allowed any accumulation 
of free financial liquidity. 
2 “Governance systems“ is a relatively broad concept which here includes public as 
well as private regulation at the “first order” as well as “second order“ level. See 
figure 5. 
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3. Which changes in goal performance of the Danish electricity supply sys-
tem has the 1999 Danish electricity "liberalization" reform induced? 
  
4. Will the Danish electricity supply system be able to maintain its consumer 
ownership institutions and remain independent of the "third party" share-
holder ownership structure after the 1999 Danish "liberalization" reform? 
 
a. Are the Danish electricity companies able to compete on the Danish 
electricity market with foreign suppliers?  
b. Will the Danish energy companies be able to compete on the market for 
energy capital goods, or will foreign companies, for instance German 
power companies, buy them? Will the Danish consumer ownership 
model survive? 
c. Will the Danish ”flat” price structure survive on the future electricity 
market? 
d. Will the 1975-2000 energy technology innovation process survive under 
the new market conditions? How will conditions on the German market 
influence this development? 
 
The relevance of these questions is particulary enhanced when seen in rela-
tion to the goals of international, and especially Danish, energy policy. The 
main question  therefore, is: will the development outlined under 1,2,3 and 
4a, 4b, 4c and 4d strengthen or weaken the possibilities of achieving the 
Danish energy policy goals?  
 
 
1.2 The interrelationships between Danish and North Eu-
ropean second order3 energy systems 
When analysing what happens to the Danish energy system, once it is con-
fronted with the external influences from Northern European and especially 
the German energy systems, it is necessary to see this situation in relation to 
the goals of Danish energy policy.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to realise that the energy systems in industrial-
ised countries such as the Scandinavian countries and Germany are con-
fronted with a stagnating energy market. Consequently, energy companies 
are seeking markets for know-how and power plant technology outside these 
areas, in Eastern Europe and in developing or transition countries, such as 
China, for instance. This is indicated here by the big arrow on top of Figure 
                                                 
3 The "Second order Governance system" is here defined as the governance system, 
which governs a sector of the economy. See comment linked to Figure 5. Page 28. 
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1 pointing at boxes (4), (8) and (9). It is worth keeping in mind that these 
markets represent a very important technological “battlefield”, where the 
main direction of technological innovation is designed and decided upon. 
This area of analysis is not the main focus area in this publication, but it is 
worth being aware of the fact that the “technology battle” might be won or 
lost outside our main focus area. 
 
It is obvious that when wanting to analyse the interrelationship between 
Danish and German energy systems, one needs to have a macro-structure de-
scribing the energy systems within these two countries. It is also reasonable 
to expect that the analytic macrostructure should contain a description of the 
public regulation mechanisms within Germany and Denmark, as well as EU 
influences. Due to the impact of the Scandinavian energy systems on the 
Danish and North European energy systems, one cannot omit including a de-
scription of the Scandinavian energy systems as an important element of the 
macro-structure.  
 
1.2.1 The channels of influence 
The influence that we analyse is a function of both the ”sender system” in 
the rest of Scandinavia, Germany and EU, ”the receiver system” in Den-
mark, and the effects of technology export to Eastern Europe and developing 
countries.  
 
The messages from one focal “sender”, such as Germany, are: 
a. Market power development resulting from potential electricity sales 
from Germany to Denmark and from Denmark to Germany, including 
here “transit” movements of electricity between Germany and Scandina-
via. 
b. Power and ability to buy electricity systems. Here also including discus-
sions of alliances and fusions between German and Scandinavian elec-
tricity companies. 
c. Power related to innovation influence, linked to the general energy poli-
cy in Germany, which influences the Danish export and import of new 
technologies. 
d. The direct relationship between German and Danish public regulation 
processes and their outcomes. 
e. The expansion of German companies to Eastern Europe and developing 
countries and its influence on the direction of technological innovation. 
 
By “Germany” is meant mainly the German fuel-, power-, transmission- and 
distribution companies, and their interrelationships with political and public 
regulation processes. 
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We want to examine how the above factors, a-e, might influence the Danish 
electricity system and the Danish energy policy as a whole, especially the 
development of cogeneration, technological innovation within renewable en-
ergy and conservation, the price level and price structure, etc.  
 
We are naturally aware that the ”message” goes both ways, but in these 
analyses we mainly focus on Denmark as the ”receiver system”. 
 
From these analyses, it should then be possible to analyse the influence of 
the interactions between boxes (2), (6), (10), (3), and (1), and how these in 
turn act upon the goals of Danish energy policy. 
 
 
Figure 1. Analytical macro-structure of second order energy systems 
 
Second order Governance systems and the political process
a. Market
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Energy
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d. Direct
influence
(9) ”Public” inter-
national financing
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bank, IMF, etc)
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(3) Energy
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Germany
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(Eastern Europe
and developing
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e. Technology export to eastern Europe and developing countries
l
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N
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Figure explanation:  
The above macro-structure deals with second order sector energy systems 
and includes: 
a. The relationship between four “country” categories, namely Denmark, 
the other Scandinavian countries, third countries and Germany, boxes 1, 
2, 3 and 4.  
b. The relationship between goals and energy systems in each “country 
category”. 
c. The governmental public regulation level, boxes 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
d. The EU and “international” organisational level, boxes 9 and 10. 
 
The channels of influence are supposed to be: 
market power from electricity sale, 
e. power to buy other electricity systems, 
f. innovation influence, 
g. direct public regulation interdependence and  
h. innovation influence through “ third countries”. 
 
Basing oneself on the above, the macro-structure described further on in 
Figure 6, and on the channels of influence described here, it is then possible 
to combine the knowledge about the influence from the EU as well as the 
Scandinavian and German systems with the knowledge concerning the dy-
namics built into both the Danish and the German energy systems. 
 
This combination requires the development of a theory regarding the struc-
ture and dynamics of the microstructures within the Danish and German en-
ergy systems, and their interrelationships with the political process and the 
public regulation process in both Denmark and Germany.  
 
This book mainly deals with the development of an adequate description of 
the Danish energy system, Figure 1, boxes (2), (6) and (10). 
 
Another book made by Lutz Mez and Annette Pienning, 20014 deals with the 
development of the German energy system, Figure 1, boxes (3),(7) and (10). 
 
Finally, the book "Renewable Energy Governance Systems" (Hvelplund, 
2001), deals with the interrelationship between German and Danish public 
regulation (boxes (7) and (6) and the arrow d.  
 
                                                 
4 Mez,L, Piening,Annette, (2001) "Current corporate strategies of the German Elec-
tricity Supply Industry." Freie Universität, Berlin. 
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2. The theoretical approach: Goals, “organi-
sation of action” and adequate analytical lev-
els of aggregation 
 
 
“What enables man to know anything at all about the World around him?” 
Knowing demands the organ fitted to the object”, said Plotinus (d. AD 270). 
Nothing can be known without there being an appropriate “instrument” in 
the makeup of the knower. This is the Great Truth of adequatio (adequate-
ness), which defines knowledge as adaequatio rei et intellectus: the under-
standing of the knower must be adequate to the thing to be known.” (Schu-
macher, 1977). 
 
The above quotation has inspired this chapter in the sense that it underlines 
the need to establish adequateness in the “knower” regarding the areas and 
questions to be analysed. The “knower” here is the analyst together with the 
theory and structure of reality being established in order to perform the anal-
ysis, in other words, the process to reach a better understanding. The ap-
proach is thus inspired by the concept of adequateness, but it should be em-
phasised that it aims at being far more “concrete” and action oriented than 
the above quote seems to imply. To clarify this, it should be mentioned that 
Schumacher further on dissociates himself from the scientific reductionism 
of Descartes and calls the subsequent scientific tradition a “science for ma-
nipulation” as opposed to a “science for knowledge and enlightenment”, 
which he advocates (Schumacher, 1977, p.65). The approach here within the 
second order governance evaluation does not partake of either category. 
What is characteristic of the present perspective is a constant endeavour to 
establish “knowledge and enlightenment” in order to establish a non-
reductionistic knowledge base for conscious decisions. But it could also be 
described as a “science for open ‘manipulation’” by a knowledgeable public. 
Before engaging with the specific analysis, we will elaborate on the theoreti-
cal and methodological considerations guiding the analysis by means of a 
simple “bicycle tour example”. 
 
 
2.1 The “adequate” macro-structure 
A person (a) wants to get to a village, Sønder Tranders, in time and in good 
health (b) from another village, Visse (c), riding a bicycle (d) on a road (e), 
without hurting or getting hurt by other road-users (f) or suffering from the 
cold or rainy weather (g). 
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First of all, we find it important to point out, that a set of governing policies 
has constructed the basic elements underlying these particular circumstances. 
These basic conditions are the existence of bicycles, roads, cars on the road, 
and the need to go from Visse to Sønder Tranders, etc. Here, the system that 
has established this “structure” is called the first order governance system 
with its first order macro-structure. This first order macro-structure repre-
sents the societally constructed institutional structure and governance sys-
tems (see Figure 1). The person wanting to go from Visse to Sønder Trand-
ers cannot change these conditions in the specific “tour” decision process. 
They can only be changed through political processes influencing the struc-
ture and basic conditions in society on a longer-term basis. 
 
Here we will focus on the resulting second order system and the following 
important characteristics of the situation. We have: 
1. A person (a)  
2. A goal hierarchy established by the person (b) 
3. A starting point (c) 
4. A transport medium (d) 
5. A road (e) 
6. Other road-users (f) 
7. The weather conditions (g) 
 
In order to make a successful trip, and reach Sønder Tranders in time and in 
good shape and health, the person (a) must have a general perception of the 
relevant macro-structure. The above 1-7 categories can be said to form a ra-
ther relevant perception of the macro-structure. It is crucial to be aware of 
one’s abilities, the destination, the starting point, which transport medium to 
use, the surface one is riding on, and which other types of road users could 
be encountered during the trip, as well as the weather conditions. Naturally 
one could add other elements to the macro-structure, or describe other mac-
ro-structures, such as possible occurrence of dangerous animals, eager but 
untrained hunters, etc. etc., but the above seven categories might be seen as 
a rather reasonable second-order macro-structure linked to the trip. The ex-
istence of other potential macro-structures is symbolised in Figure 1 by the 
dotted ‘shadow’ boxes in the background. 
 
Nevertheless, nobody would find it unreasonable to want to have knowledge 
regarding one’s own abilities, the goal of the trip, the transport medium, the 
road, other road users or weather conditions. Lack of knowledge regarding 
any of these categories might entail  deadly danger. 
 
The above first and second order macro-structures are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The bicycle tour and the adequate analytical macro-structures 
 
Figure comments: It is worth noting that we have not yet established any 
theory regarding the relationships between the 7 components of the macro-
structure (the character and contents of the lines). Neither have we estab-
lished any theory regarding the internal dynamics of each of the 7 compo-
nents of the macro-structure. The stippled boxes in the background indicate 
that there are other macro-structures that could also be described. One 
might claim that the number of possible macro-structures is infinite, and that 
the interrelationships between these macro-structures are also limitless. The 
one chosen here is not incidental, but governed by the combination of a 
specified goal hierarchy and a particular action organisation.  
 
It important to state that there is an infinite number of potential macro-
structures, and that the ones selected are chosen by means of the specifica-
tion of a spectre of goal hierarchies as well as a spectre of possible action or-
ganisations. If we had no goal hierarchy, it would be senseless to demand the 
description of the transport medium, other road users, weather conditions, 
etc. What lends meaning to the inclusion of these components is the exist-
ence of a goal hierarchy and an “action organisation”: in this case, the per-
son. When this “action organisation” and its goal hierarchy is included in the 
system description, there is a spectrum of feasible descriptions and theories 
and there are other descriptions and theories which are not feasible, seen in 
relation to the goal hierarchy and the abilities of the “action organisation”. 
Here it is considered a basic and very important observation, and from it, we 
also derive/assert that any system description and system theory has a de-
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clared (conscious) or undeclared (unconscious) in-built goal hierarchy and 
action organisation. 
 
 
2.2 An “adequate” analytical micro- structure 
When wanting to obtain useful action advice, having knowledge about po-
tentially adequate macro-structures is not sufficient. One also should have 
detailed knowledge concerning the characteristics and dynamics of the mi-
crostructure within each component of this macro-structure. Furthermore, 
one should try to establish a useful model of the dynamics within the macro-
structure, which is a function of the combined dynamics of seven different 
components of the macro-structure, in this case. 
 
Concretely, the cyclist needs to know something about the other road-users, 
such as their speed and varying competencies when it comes to watching out 
for other cyclists, their ability to brake, etc. S/he need not be aware, howev-
er, of how cars and wheels are manufactured, or how a petrol engine func-
tions. So, as far as other road-users are concerned, adequate knowledge is 
that which is relevant to the aims of the trip, especially the goal of reaching 
Sønder Tranders in good health. S/he should also know something about the 
road, such as how broad and how slippery its surface is, perhaps also how 
these parameters interact with meteorological conditions (e.g. rain or frost), 
which could make the road icy. There again, knowledge about the specific 
plants growing in the ditch, the way asphalt roads are made or their price, is 
hardly relevant to reach the intended destination, whereas the knowledge and 
theory about roads outlined higher, is more adequate for this specific situa-
tion and these goals. As to the bicycle, how to use the pedals and the brakes, 
keeping one’s balance and steering safely, are certainly prerequisites. Need-
less to say, information about how the bicycle frame, the tires and the wheels 
have been produced or about the molecular structure of steel and rubber is 
beside the point here. There is, nevertheless, an appropriate type of 
knowledge linked to the “action” of using a bicycle under these specific 
conditions combined with the particular cyclist’s existing potential (his/her 
strength, eyesight, hearing and ability to react, etc.). 
 
When elaborating a useful microstructure and theory linked to this micro-
structure, it is important to consider the purpose/goals of the macro-structure 
and the “action organisation” of the latter. In Figure 3, the establishment of a 
microstructure within each of the components in the macro-structure is illus-
trated by the squiggly pattern within each of the a-g ellipses. 
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Figure 3. The adequate microstructures within the adequate second or-
der macro-structure 
 
Figure comments: The figure illustrates that there is a “road”, ”weather”, 
a “starting point”, a ”person/organisation”, “other road users”, a “bicy-
cle”, and a “goal hierarchy” microstructure. This microstructure is illus-
trated by the squiggly pattern within each component of the macro-structure. 
This microstructure combined with the theory that outlines relevant micro-
dynamics, is linked to the macro-structure through the interrelationships 
within this macro-structure. Systematic thoughts (theories) have to be devel-
oped regarding the dynamics of these microstructures and their connections 
to the other components of the macro-structure. This results in theoretical 
fragments outlining parts of the dynamics within the macro-structure. Clear-
ly, it will never be possible to develop a dynamic model of the macro-
structure without huge inherent elements of uncertainty, both with regard to 
the feasibility of the model and with regard to the difficulties of accessing the 
necessary information for the implementation of the model. 
 
What this example illustrates is that there is an adequately relevant “area” 
regarding the level of aggregation in the description, once the goal hierarchy 
and the “action organisation” have been defined. Once the purposes of a trip 
have been decided upon, and the organisational and technical means have 
been secured, the appropriate levels of description and spectres of relevant 
theories are then framed within a certain area. Without knowing why one 
should describe the above macro-structure, but only knowing that one should 
provide descriptions regarding roads, other road-users, the weather, bicycles 
d.Transp.
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and persons, etc., one would be unable to either select an “adequate” theory 
or an “adequate” description. 
 
Likewise, one can state that any aggregation level-, and type of description 
linked to any theory regarding the dynamics of a system, has a con-
scious/overt or unconscious/hidden spectre of action linked to covert5 and 
not necessarily even existing potential agents of action. 
  
So there is no one DESCRIPTION or one THEORY, but only theories that 
are only relevant when seen in relation to a hierarchy of goals and a specific 
set- and type of action organisations (actors). 
 
Furthermore, it should be underlined that anybody can construct new system 
descriptions and new theories about everything, as the spectrum of possible 
descriptions and theories is infinite. The real “scientific challenge”, there-
fore, is to develop theories and descriptions that are relevant to certain goal 
hierarchies and organisations of action, and to describe the character of this 
adequateness thoroughly for the reader. 
 
In parallel, it should also be pointed out that this by no means suggests that 
the descriptions and theories should be linked to existing goal hierarchies 
and existing organisations of action. Particularly during periods when tech-
nical and organisational changes are needed, these descriptions and theories 
should be linked to totally new or marginally powerful organisations.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that it is the apprehension here that 
there are no other possibilities than to link theories and description with goal 
hierarchies and organisations of action, since any consciously/open or un-
consciously/covert theory and description is, by logical necessity, linked to a 
specific spectre of goal hierarchies and organisations of action.  
 
The scientific “democratic obligation”, therefore, is to also elaborate the 
above descriptions and theories in such a way that it is possible for the read-
er to uncover the spectrum of action organisations and goal hierarchies 
linked to given theories and analytical levels of aggregation.  
 
                                                 
5 Combining the expressions ”covert” and ”not existing” might sound contradictory, 
but just indicates that ”covert” can also mean ”not entering the societal agenda at 
all”, which is in fact the most efficient conscious or unconscious way of hiding any- 
and hindering the arrival of a potential future organisational competitor on the socie-
tal scene. 
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It is worthwhile to observe that by establishing the scientific procedures 
needed for the implementation of this “democratic obligation”, the hitherto 
occult organisational and goal conservatism built into many existing descrip-
tive methods and theories will be exposed. 
 
 
2.3 Analytical adequateness and the time dimension 
The time dimension is not directly illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, but is, as it 
will be illustrated here, crucially important for the selection of adequate the-
ories and the contents and levels of aggregation in the description of macro-
structures. 
 
With a very short time horizon, there is a tendency to develop extremely 
static analyses and suggestions for action. In the bicycle example, the deci-
sion framed within a very limited time horizon will, for instance, only deal 
with short term “action questions” such as, “it is raining, I should wear a rain 
coat”, “it is icy, I should be cautious and wear a bicycle helmet”, “it is 
windy, I should start five minutes earlier”, “it is dark, I should take the bicy-
cle light”, etc.  
 
With a longer time horizon, a few months for instance, the decision will also 
include considerations regarding the potential acquisition of other transport 
mediums, such as a moped, roller skates, a car, etc. 
 
As we extend the time horizon even further, the next question to arise could 
be whether to continue working in Sønder Tranders, or to work somewhere 
else. 
 
The above examples just illustrate the link between various types of actions 
and the time horizon considered, in other words, the link between the time 
horizon and adequate first and second order macro-structure(s). Thus, if the 
time horizon is extended, and the decision process includes the potential ac-
quisition of a car, a totally different second order macro-structure should be 
elaborated on. 
 
When establishing the adequate analytical macro-structure, it consequently is 
necessary to lay down an approximate time horizon. If this is not done, indi-
viduals and societies risk getting trapped by their “short term” projection, 
without being able to establish strategies for long term change. 
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2.4 The action dimension and analytical adequateness 
Giddens (1979) deals with “Action, Structure and Contradictions in Social 
Analysis”. One of his conclusions, based upon his critical literature study of 
the work of other sociologists, is the one shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
    Unacknowledged   Reflexive monitoring of               Unintended    
    conditions of action            action                          conseqences 
                   Rationalisation of action               of action 
                   Motivation of action 
        
 
 
 
Figure 4. Conditions and consequences of action  
Source: Giddens (1979), page 56. 
 
In this figure, Giddens purports that we know neither all the preconditions of 
action, nor all the consequences of our actions. Therefore, history is, though 
guided by reflexive actions, not an ongoing rationalisation process. Few ana-
lysts would contest this conclusion. Nevertheless, he does not deal with ana-
lysing the conditions and processes determining the amount- and character 
of “unacknowledged conditions of action” and of “unintended consequences 
of action”. Logically, the character and amount of unacknowledged condi-
tions and unintended consequences are also, according to Giddens above, a 
function of the strength and type of reflexive monitoring, rationalisation, and 
motivation for action. Thus, the amount- and character of unacknowledged 
conditions and unintended consequences will vary according to whether the 
reflections, rationalisations and motivations are analysed by sociologists, 
like Giddens, or by other types of sociologists focusing more on the structur-
al bindings in society, such as sociologists and industrial economists empiri-
cally examining the “action processes” in society, or by neo-classical econ-
omists who hardly analyse the impacts of institutions upon the economic 
processes.  
 
Giddens’ study in this book is characterised by an absence of empirical stud-
ies, and by being mainly developed on the basis of critical studies of the 
work of other sociologists. This naturally results in conclusions such as those 
to be found in Figure 4, where there is no information about the impact on 
history and the direction of development, as a function of the character of the 
reflexive processes, etc., being influenced by the actor. Also it shows where 
there is, as a consequence of the “literature analysis” method used in the 
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book, a theoretical discussion of “Action, Structure and Contradiction in So-
cial Analysis”, but no concrete development or description of potential ac-
tions in various concrete situations. 
 
Our opinion here is that there is a need to develop theories of action based 
upon concrete studies of concrete events and linked to the analysis of exist-
ing and potential future organisations in society, mainly because such studies 
might increase the amount of qualified “reflexive actions” made available 
for public reflexive decision processes. This opinion is based upon experi-
ence from Danish energy policy since 1976, where the concrete analysis of 
technical and organisational alternatives has been one of the important cata-
lysts of change. Seen in relation to Figure 4 above, this type of analytical 
practise decreases the amount of unacknowledged conditions and unintended 
consequences of publicly open and well-informed reflexive decision pro-
cesses. 
 
Therefore, the intention in this study is to establish an analytical adequate-
ness, which makes it possible to decrease the amount of unacknowledged 
conditions of action and unintended consequences of action. Hence, it is a 
must to begin with empirical studies of change processes. 
 
Another interesting aspect, when dealing with an analytical level of aggrega-
tion where concrete action potentials are developed, is that the character of 
the unacknowledged conditions of action and the unintended consequences 
of action might be described as various categories of uncertainty, against 
which it is possible to take some action precautions. Clearly, when cycling 
from Visse to Sønder Tranders on any given day, there are a lot of 
unacknowledged conditions of action. The road might be unforeseeably icy. 
If we analyse the situation concretely, our precaution against this type of 
“unacknowledged condition” might be a bicycle helmet. There might be 
nails on the road, potentially leading to a puncture. Here the precaution 
might be to always carry a tire repair kit, etc. An unintentional consequence 
could, for instance, be to hit other road users. Being aware of this uninten-
tional dimension means that one can take preventive measures such as, for 
example, a good lamp, efficient brakes and careful riding. 
 
Hence the combination of: 
a. Concrete empirical analysis combined with a demand for the description 
of concrete actions might decrease the amount of unacknowledged con-
ditions for- and unintended consequences of action. 
b. The integration of “reflexive monitoring of action and rationalisation of 
action” with the “design of action” might represent a further reduction of 
 24 
the negative consequences of the above “unacknowledged and unintend-
ed” features. 
 
 
2.5 Action and descriptive/theoretical adequacy, a method-
ological summary 
When wanting to analyse the influence of the German Energy Scene trajec-
tory on the development of Danish Energy Policy, the following recommen-
dations may therefore prove effective: 
 
1. Outline the goal hierarchy and relevant organisations of action. 
2. Define the relevant time horizons.  
3. Develop the adequate first and second order macro-structure linked to 
the problem, taking into account the above goal hierarchy, organisations 
of action and time horizon. 
4. Analyse and find the adequate microstructures and accompanying theo-
ries for each of the components in the macrostructure. 
5. Analyse and develop an adequate theory linked both to the macro-
structure and to the organisation of action. This is the first type of basic 
knowledge used for the construction of action alternatives. 
6. Analyse and describe the character and amount of unacknowledged con-
ditions for action and unintended consequences of action. Describe the 
elements of analytical uncertainty. This is the second type of basic 
knowledge used for the construction of action alternatives. 
7. Design a spectre of action alternatives on the basis of relatively certain 
and relatively uncertain knowledge. It should be underlined that this is 
the main result of the analysis, the main purpose of which is to develop 
an increased array of carefully elaborated action possibilities for the 
public (the action organisation).  
 
With regard to the character of the analysis, the following should be empha-
sised: a. It should be underlined that almost anybody can construct new sys-
tem descriptions and new theories about everything, as the spectrum of pos-
sible descriptions and theories are infinite. 
 
The real “scientific challenge”, however, is to develop theories and descrip-
tions that are adequate to certain goal hierarchies and organisations of action, 
and to be conscious regarding the character of this adequateness. 
 
b. It is important to state that it is the understanding here that there are no 
other possibilities than linking theories and description with goal hierarchies 
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and organisations of action, as any theory and any description conscious-
ly/open or unconsciously/covert by logical necessity is linked to a specific 
spectrum of goal hierarchies and organisations of action.  
 
The scientific ”democratic obligation”, therefore, is to describe the above 
descriptions and theories in such a way that it is made possible for the 
reader to uncover the spectrum of action organisations and goal hierar-
chies linked to given theories and analytical levels of aggregation.  
 
In the present analysis we will be inspired by the above eight main points re-
garding “action and descriptive theoretical adequacy”. In this process we 
are dealing with the electricity system as the “point of departure” energy sys-
tem, but we are always perceiving this system as an integrated part of a larg-
er energy system, comprising, for instance, heat as well as transportation. 
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3. The electricity system and its societal con-
text 
 
 
3.1 Goal hierarchy  
What happens within the Danish electricity supply service system, when it is 
confronted with liberalization reforms and interactions with the neighbour-
ing electricity systems, has to be evaluated against a set of energy policy 
goals, which can be listed as follows, as far as the Danish case is concerned. 
 
The general goals of Danish energy policy are to decrease the CO2 emission 
within the 1988-2005 period, whilst at the same time increasing the share of 
renewable energy to 12-14% of the total energy supply. It also is a general 
goal to maintain openness of information and to both use and encourage 
democratic participation in the development and implementation of the 
above energy policy. Within the electricity sector, these general goals can, 
according to our understanding here, be made operational by dividing them 
into in the following sub-goals: 
  
a. Ensuring supply security, viewed within a world-wide perspective, and 
more lately a New Zealand and California deregulation perspective, is by no 
means a natural reflex or automatism. 
 
b. Cost- and price efficiency 
We find it very important to distinguish between cost and price efficiency, as 
one can easily end up in a situation with high cost efficiency and low price 
efficiency, due to the establishment of monopolistic and/or oligopolistic 
markets. 
 
c. Environmental and innovation efficiency 
 
d. System efficiency 
This goal deals with the discussion of how wind turbines, cogeneration 
plants, large coal-fired plants, etc., fit together with the other system compo-
nents in a low energy system; a problematic area, which is also usually total-
ly absent from the deregulation discussion.  
 
e. Democratic efficiency 
This goal focuses on a question that is seldom asked, namely: “which organ-
isation of the energy system is the most governable”? 
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f. Competitive efficiency 
This goal is centred around the future ability of the Danish electricity system 
to compete on the so-called “open" electricity market. 
  
Taken together, when establishing the “adequate” mode of description and 
“adequate” theoretical tools, the above goals are important in the process of 
defining adequateness. And it is, amongst others, with this aim in mind that 
they are developed. 
 
 
3.2 The organisations of action, and time horizon  
The analyses here are developed as part of a public energy policy generation 
and planning process. This means, that the primary organisations of action 
are the public administration, the public media and the grassroots groups 
dealing with the development and implementation of new organisational and 
technical ideas aiming to pursue and elaborate on the general goals of the 
energy scene.  
 
In principle, the time horizon has to extend far enough for it to be possible to 
discuss techno-organisational solutions that are profoundly different from 
existing solutions. By this it is meant that the discussion forum has to be able 
to deal seriously with radical technological changes, that is changes that not 
only encompass new techniques, but also include the arrival of new organi-
sations on the energy scene. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, at 
the end of the day, these new organisations might make existing energy or-
ganisations obsolete. 
 
The time horizon should therefore reach out from the present to 30-50 years 
from now. What is important here is that this choice of time scale includes 
proposals for action from day one and onwards, and should not be consid-
ered as a discussion regarding potential actions to be promoted in a distant 
future. Considerations linked to the long-term horizon are consequently built 
into the decision(s) from day one. 
 
To conclude, one can say that the present analysis is a “public service” anal-
ysis designed to develop action possibilities to be selected by the public 
through open and informed democratic processes.  
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3.3 The electricity system and its first and second order 
macro-structures 
The aim of this discussion is to circumscribe the societal system in which the 
electricity system acts. This is important, as it should not be taken for grant-
ed that problems linked to the electricity system should necessarily be solved 
within this system. For example, the use of electricity for electronic commu-
nication could be replaced by another socio-economic structure with increas-
es person-to-person communication. The use of electricity for cooling and 
freezing purposes could be partially replaced by a production structure in-
creasing possibilities of getting fresh food from neighbouring producers, etc. 
Consequently, it is important to view the electricity sector as an integrated 
part of a specific socio-economic development. The pollution consequences 
it generates, for instance, could be reduced not only by introducing more 
ecologically efficient electricity production equipment and/or electricity con-
servation measures, but also by means of more ecologically efficient and 
sensible production structures. It is therefore worth having some understand-
ing of the socio-economic system that surrounds the electricity system.  
Figure 5 illustrates these questions. 
 
 
Figure 5. The electricity system and its first and second order govern-
ance systems 
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Figure comments: The figure consists of two main systems, namely the first 
order socio-economic and governance system, and the electricity supply ser-
vice system and it second order governance system. Arrows indicate influ-
ence/impact. Black arrows represent the influence of existing fossil fuel en-
ergy companies. 
 
Macrostructure I (first order system): socio-economic development and po-
litical economy of the first order governance systems represented in grey 
boxes IX-XV. At this level, the structural development of society is deter-
mined by means of man-made trade rules, investment rules, etc., decided up-
on/influenced by the WTO, the EU, multinational corporations, national 
governments, NGOs, and so on. 
 
Macrostructure II (Second order System): Electricity supply service sys-
tems and their second order governance systems represented by white boxes 
I-VIII. This system consists of the Electricity Supply Service System (ESS) 
boxes V,VI,VII and VIII, and its governing system, the second order nation-
al governance system, boxes I, II, III and IV.  
 
In this paper, we will mainly deal with the second order macrostructure , but 
will, nevertheless, quite thoroughly describe its relationship to its “super-
structure”, i.e., the first order macrostructure.  
 
We call macrostructure I the first order system, because it determines the 
main conditions under which the electricity system works. It determines the 
level and type of GNP development to which the electricity supply service 
system delivers its electricity-based services. It determines the costs of pro-
duction factors such as fossil fuels, windmills, transportation, etc., the socio-
economic structures and the needs (amount and character) for electricity 
supply services.  
 
Generally speaking, there are three main areas in this first order system, 
where the need for electricity supply services and the ways of providing for 
them are determined: 
a. The political construction of the quantitative service needs for transpor-
tation, cooling, communication, entertainment, mechanical movements 
in production processes, etc. 
 
b. The political construction of the competitive relationship between elec-
tricity based fulfilment of service needs, and other non-electrical ways of 
providing for such needs. This competition relationship is determined on 
the market, box IX in Figure 5. 
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c. The international rules for investment, influencing the specific way elec-
tricity based service is performed and the competition between renewa-
ble energy based electricity production and fossil fuel and uranium based 
power supply. 
 
It is important to view the electricity supply service system together with its 
superstructure, the first order governance system, which determines the 
needs for electricity services. It is, for instance, probable, that electricity will 
supply a growing proportion of transportation energy, by the increasing use 
of electrical cars and the production of hydrogen to fuel-cell based transpor-
tation. The need for transportation is, to an increasing degree, determined in 
the first order governance system, therefore the type of governance within 
this system will also be increasingly important for the electricity production 
system. The need for electronic communication devices such as mobile 
phones, computers, etc. and electronic entertainment devices such as TVs is, 
to a large extent, a function of the division of labour and the social structure 
in a given society. Generally speaking, lifestyles determine the level of elec-
tricity consumption, and they are mainly designed at the first order govern-
ance level. Consciousness regarding the link between the first order govern-
ance level and the electricity supply service level is more and more crucial, 
when the necessary 80% decrease in greenhouse gas emission is to be 
achieved. 
 
 
3.4 The electricity service supply system and its Second 
Order macrostructure 
One can describe the electricity supply service system and its internal and 
external governance structures in many ways. The system description here is 
designed so that the institutional dynamics within the electricity service sup-
ply system can be analysed, and the relationship between the electricity ser-
vice supply system and the political system are visible, and can be contrasted 
with a set of goals for the electricity service supply system. Furthermore, it 
should be visible how the dynamics also are a function of the specific socio-
technical situation of change within the energy area in these decades, and the 
influences from the interrelationship with the development in other coun-
tries. 
 
Any system description has its strengths and weaknesses, not to mention 
overlooked aspects, but the important point here is that the description re-
veals both how the system is being envisioned and what perspective presides 
over the analysis as a process. This can then lead to a fruitful discussion re-
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garding the macro description of the system and development of the ade-
quate levels of system aggregation in the analysis. 
 
First of all, it should be emphasised that it is rewarding for our purpose to 
see the system as producing services and not electricity. We therefore are 
dealing with an electricity service supply system. Consequently, the equip-
ment and institutions needed to transform electricity into means which fulfil 
service needs, such as cooling (refrigerators etc.), entertainment (TVs, radi-
os, computers, etc.), communication (telephones, computers, etc.), clean 
clothes (washing machines etc.), are defined as a part of the electricity sup-
ply service system, here called the electricity receiver system. The electricity 
supply service system, therefore, is a system which supplies services such as, 
cooling, heating, light, clean clothes, entertainment, communication, trans-
portation, etc. The need for these services is determined outside of this sys-
tem, as we shall see below.  
 
The macrostructure which should be scrutinised  
Here we deal with the macro system structure encompassing the organisa-
tions and themes that are important to observe, and the relevant interrelations 
between actors mutually and between actors and themes (Figure 6). The 
macrostructure system categories are in Figure 6 below, described by Box A, 
the ”Electricity supply service system and its second order Governance sys-
tem”, Box B, the “Goals”, Box C, the “Historical situation” and Box 
D,”External relations”. 
 
The main characteristics within this macrostructure can be understood by 
means of the following four simple questions: 
(a) “Who are we?” which is illustrated by the large box A, Electricity sup-
ply service system and its second order Governance system”. 
(b) “What do we want?” which is illustrated by Box B “GOALS”. 
(c) “Where are we?” which is illustrated by Box C, ”Historical situation”.  
(d) “How are the others?” outside our system, which is illustrated by Box D 
”External interrelations”. 
 
Within (a), “who are we?”, or the Electricity Supply Service System and its 
second order governance system, we find it necessary to look at this system 
as a double system structure with two interrelated main subsystems: A.1. 
Electricity supply service system and A.2. The national second order gov-
ernance system and the political process. It is the understanding here that one 
cannot change one of these two main components without changing the oth-
er, given that we want an achievement of a certain set of goals within the 
goal hierarchy in Box B. 
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By including (c), “Where are we?”, we underline the need for describing the 
concrete historical situation within which energy systems in these decades 
are situated. If we had been in a situation with no pollution problems, and no 
approaching fossil fuel scarcity, no political problems linked to fossil fuel 
extraction, and no problems linked to use of nuclear power, the decision base 
would be totally different from the present. In this hypothetical situation, it 
would not be necessary to develop and implement comprehensive technolog-
ical changes towards the increased use of energy conservation and renewa-
bles. As there are widely recognised pollution, scarcity and political prob-
lems linked to the continued extensive use of fossil fuel and uranium, radical 
technological changes towards increased use of renewables and energy con-
servation is necessary. Naturally, new technological problems and challeng-
es are arising out of this technological development. One example is the 
challenges of co-ordination and regulation linked to the high and quickly  
growing proportion of wind energy and cogeneration in the Danish electrici-
ty system.6 When dealing with governmental modes of regulation and the in-
terrelationships to the external development, it is a must to include descrip-
tions of such historical organisational and technical challenges in the analy-
sis.   
 
Finally, Box D in the macrostructure symbolises the need for looking at the 
external interrelations, when analysing the possibilities of achieving the 
goals described in Box B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 In the year 2000, around 15% of the electricity in Denmark came from wind pow-
er, and 30-40% from cogeneration. Furthermore, the plan is that the wind power 
proportion shall be increased to 20% before 2010. This gives new system challenges 
to absorb the fluctuating wind power in the system. 
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Figure 6. The electricity supply service system, and its second order 
governance system 
  
Figure explanation: This figure describes the macrostructure of the elec-
tricity supply service system by means of Boxes A, B, C and D. Box A is di-
vided into Box A.1, the National Second Order Governance system, Box A.2, 
the electricity supply service system, and Box A.3 the EU energy sector regu-
lation. Within each of the Boxes, A, B, C, and D, there are underdivisions 
showing the microstructure, which will be explained and analysed in the fol-
lowing sections and chapters regarding the difference between “end of 
pipe” and “radical technological changes”.7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 By radical technological changes we mean such changes that are characterised not 
only by the need for technical changes, but also by a demand for institutional and 
organisational changes. ”End of pipe” technical solutions, by contrast, are character-
ised by being only technical changes such as, for instance, smoke abatement 
measures, but needing no fundamental organisational changes. 
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For our analytical purposes we have decided to describe Box A.1, the elec-
tricity supply service system, as consisting of: 
- The direct electricity supply system (VI), including fuel extraction, pow-
er production, transmission and distribution.  
- The indirect electricity supply system, (V), which is the production of 
capital equipment for the direct electricity supply system. 
- The direct electricity receiver system (ERS), (VIII), meaning the equip-
ment that receives the electricity and transforms it into energy services.  
- The indirect electricity receiver system, (VII), which produces the capi-
tal for the direct electricity receiver system. 
 
We have also chosen to describe Box A.2, the national second order govern-
ance system, and the political process, in the categories below: 
 
As we understand the historical situation as one of extensive radical techno-
logical changes in the energy scene, we also have to establish a description 
of the governance system and its political processes, which takes this “radi-
cal technological change” perspective into consideration. This is concretely 
done by including our experiences from many studies (Lund, 1994 and 
Hvelplund, 1995), which are reaching the conclusion that radical technologi-
cal changes require strong democratic forces which are economically inde-
pendent of the established fossil fuel and uranium based energy companies. 
As a consequence of this well documented conclusion and the specific his-
toric situation requiring radical technological changes, we find it adequate to 
establish a type of disaggregation, which distinguishes between “end of 
pipe” technological changes (Box IV.b.) and “radical technological changes” 
(Box IV.a), and between economically dependent (Box II) and economically 
independent lobby groups (Box III). 
 
In Box A.3, the EU energy sector regulation will be analysed under A.2.’s 
described analytical structure. 
 
Within the whole system, the electricity supply service system and its second 
order governance systems, we can divide the dynamics into the following ar-
eas. 
a) The organisational dynamics of existing energy companies. The question 
here is to what extent existing energy companies are motivated- and able 
to break away from their existing development paths. Box II, VII, I, and 
V, VI, and the links between these organisations.  
b) The organisational dynamics within the existing parliamentary process. 
The question here is to what extent the construction of the political pro-
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cesses has such a character that they support path breaking technological 
changes. 
c) The dynamics between lobbyists with direct economic interests in specif-
ic solutions (energy companies), and the political process. The question 
here is to what extent the political process is motivated and able to estab-
lish a public regulation that changes the development path in the direc-
tion of sustainable energy systems. 
d) The dynamics between new energy related organisations with no direct 
economic interest in specific solutions and the political process. The 
question here is to what extent new grassroots organisations and the 
general public can evolve to such strengths that they can influence the 
political processes. 
e) The competition between “end of pipe” technological solutions such as 
new improved coal-fired plants, smoke abatement equipment, etc., and 
radical technological changes represented by renewable energy technol-
ogies, energy conservation measures, etc. 
f) Dynamics of ideology production. 
 
This a-f description should improve our ability to establish a grounded 
knowledge base for analysing which political action spectre is the most ben-
eficial, when wanting to pursue the goals in Box B, under the historical con-
ditions in Box C and with the external interrelations induced by the process-
es in Box D.  
 
 
3.5 Aims of the electricity system 
What happens within the electricity supply service system and the outcome 
of the interrelations of power systems in countries around Denmark, and 
within the Danish power system, has to be evaluated against a set of energy 
policy goals. In Figure 5, Box B, we have listed an array of goals, which we 
already shortly commented in Section 3, and on which we will elaborate a 
bit.   
 
Price versus cost efficiency 
We find it very important to distinguish between cost and price efficiency. 
The Danish electricity system has, so far, been very efficient, when looking 
at the combination of price and cost efficiency, since Denmark has had the 
lowest electricity prices for fossil and nuclear based electricity systems in the 
EU and in all of Europe. Germany has had the highest electricity prices in 
the EU and in all of Europe, but not necessarily because of especially high 
production costs. The main cause of the high electricity prices is the monop-
oly strength of the German utilities, making it possible to achieve very high 
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profits. Moreover, it is quite certain that the UK utilities are, in many ways, 
as cost efficient as the Danish utilities. Nevertheless, the prices in the UK are 
40-50% higher than in Denmark, due to the low price efficiency caused by 
an oligopoly market situation. 
 
Environmental and innovation efficiency  
During the “liberalization” debate, the discussion of environmental and in-
novation efficiency has played a subordinate role. The focus has been on 
“cost efficiency” making this equivalent to lower prices (price efficiency). In 
this project it is important to evaluate the influence of the interaction be-
tween Danish and German electricity systems from the perspective of envi-
ronmental and innovation efficiency. 
 
System efficiency 
The discussion of how wind turbines, cogeneration plants, and large coal-
fired plants interact in a low energy system is also usually absent from the 
regulation discussion. In the given historical situation, we find this viewpoint 
of the system very important because there are many new “system prob-
lems/possibilities” linked to the growth of renewable energy technologies 
and the spread of cogeneration plants in the whole of the energy system. 
 
Democratic efficiency 
Which organisation of the energy systems is the most governable? In Figure 
1, this question is linked to the relationship between the second order Gov-
ernance system, (Boxes II II IV, A.3. and I) and the electricity service supply 
system (Boxes V, VI, VII, and VIII). The Danish power system has, so far, 
been relatively governable, thanks to the non-profit consumer ownership or-
ganisation. There were no shareholders losing money when the utility com-
panies lost markets. 
 
Competitive efficiency 
When and if the Danish electricity scene opens up for “competition” from 
outside electricity systems, it is worthwhile to determine whether it is able to 
survive within this new “competitive” context. A system might perform 
well, when seen in relation to all other goals, and may even be the most cost 
efficient producer in an area, but, at the same time, might not be able to sur-
vive the strain of competition processes in a region. The Danish system is 
cost efficient, but also small and without the financial reserves that could en-
able it to survive periods with electricity prices close to the short run mar-
ginal prices of fossil fuel (coal-fired) power plants. 
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Altogether, the interaction between the Danish and the German electricity 
systems has to be evaluated against an array of goals. Those we think are 
important are the ones we have just listed above. 
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4. Methodological considerations 
 
 
The analytical macrostructure in Figure 6 tells something about the general 
framework in which an analysis should be performed, namely which macro- 
components one should include in the analysis. Here we want to establish an 
analysis that is politically operational and in accordance with the demands 
set up in Chapter 1 and especially Section 2.5., regarding the main purpose 
of our study, which is to “develop an increased spectrum of carefully pre-
pared action possibilities for the public,(the action organisation)".  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop more disaggregated analytical catego-
ries within this macro-structure. It is also necessary to develop a microstruc-
ture within each of the components of the macrostructure, and to link these 
microstructures together in a theory for the whole macrostructure. Naturally, 
this methodology has to be regarded as an ideal, which we are trying to at-
tain, but which we will never reach.  
 
The above analytical macro-structure in Figure 5 might seem rather obvious, 
but, nevertheless, its analytical themes were not common, for instance, in the 
“liberalization” discourse which led up to the 1999 electricity reform. An ar-
ray of reports8 were produced for the Danish Government as a part of prepar-
ing the “liberalization” process, but this discourse gave no thorough consid-
eration to the following themes, which are “built into” the analytical macro-
structure as seen in Figure 5. These include the goal hierarchy, the potential 
threat from foreign acquisition of the energy infrastructure, the innovation 
                                                 
8 -Report to the Kingdom of Denmark on the Valuation of the Electricity Supply In-
dustry, Dec. 1998, N.M Rothschild &Sons Ltd. Report for the Danish Ministry of 
Finance. 
-Konkurrence i energisektoren”, Maj 1998, Konkurrencestyrelsen og Erhvervsmini-
steriet.  
-”Finansredegørelse 1997”, Finansministeriet. 
-”Dansk Økonomi, efterår 1997. Det Økonomiske Råd, Formandsskabet. Here it is 
covered broadly, but there is no detailed discussion of the goals and objectives with 
regulation models. 
-”Nyt lys på energisektoren”, En analyse af den danske el-og varmesektors interna-
tionale konkurrenceevne.  Oct. 1997. Report to the Danish Energy Agency. 
-”Rapport om sammenhængen mellem regulering og organisation af distributions-
selskaberne i forhold til deres varetagelse af forbrugerinteresser.  Andersen Man-
agement International A/S, May 1997. Report to the Danish Energy Agency. 
-”Strukturanalyse af den Jysk-Fynske kraftværkssektor”. PA Consulting Group, 
Dec. 1995.  Report to the Danish Power and Distribution Company ELSAM. 
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influences between countries, and the possible establishment of monopolistic 
and oligopolistic power in the energy markets. 
 
The steps in Chapters 6-11 will be, within the above analytical macro-
structure, to establish more specific descriptions and theories linked to the 
specific parts of this macro-structure. In that way, it is the intention to bring 
the analysis “down” to an “adequate” aggregation level, where it becomes 
operational, as seen from a political action (policy) point of view. Here, it 
must be mentioned once more that it is a well known art to establish “inter-
esting” macro-theories which can be used to give “peace” in our scientific 
minds by enabling us to “understand” events that have happened. Here, it is 
also the intention and ambition to seek and find fragments of an analytical 
level of aggregation, which enables the public and the politicians to make 
knowledgeable and conscious decisions before “things” have happened.  
 
One way of finding such fragments of an adequate analytical level of aggre-
gation is to establish empirical analysis of different types. The main methods 
used have been, and still are: 
 
A. Observant participation  
Here we have two main categories: 
 
The first category is the participation in the discussion of a concrete deci-
sion. This could be the building of nuclear power plants, as it was in Den-
mark in the early eighties, or the building of a specific new coal-fired plant, 
etc. One typical case is our participation in the 1991-1994 debate regarding 
the possible building of two new power plants (400 MW each) in Jutland-
Funen for five billion Danish Kroner (DKr) (Hvelplund et al, 1991) and 
(Hvelplund and Lund 1994). 
 
This type of “action research” can be regarded as a special type of question-
naire, where the questionnaire is made up of the statements brought to the 
debate. The characteristics of this type of “questionnaire” are: 
 
a. The discussion becomes very concrete, as a concrete project is dis-
cussed.  
b. The interest groups, especially, will become very distinct, as concrete in-
terests are for discussion. 
c. If performed in a sufficiently persistent manner, the “answer” from the 
Government institutions in particular will be “very honest”, as it repre-
sents how the Government regulates in practice, and not how they say 
they will regulate. The answer tells what they do, and not just what they 
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say they will do. In the above power plant discussion from 1991-1994, it 
was clearly shown that the Ministry of Energy, the Municipalities and 
the Regional Counties at that time were not able to follow the goals of 
the declared energy policy. Therefore, they were subordinated to the 
power company interests in combination with local and regional em-
ployment interests. 
 
The second category is the elaboration of an array of alternative energy plans 
for Denmark since 1975 (Hvelplund et al, 1976), and in 1993 an alternative 
energy plan for the Southern part of eastern Germany (Hvelplund et al, 
1993). By establishing coherent alternatives to the established energy policy 
in a region, a concrete debate has been established, as the alternative is con-
crete and draws a rather broad spectrum of interest groups into the debate. 
The constructed alternatives always contain technical scenarios, as well as an 
analysis of the necessary political reforms in order to implement the tech-
nical scenarios. The construction of coherent alternatives could be regarded 
as a special type of questionnaire having the following feature: 
 
d. They establish a general strategic discussion regarding the energy policy 
possibilities. 
 
The two above examination categories supplement each other, as the experi-
ence learned under the first category can be used when suggesting institu-
tional reforms in the second category. At the same time, alternative energy 
plans can affirm, during category one discussions regarding concrete pro-
jects, that alternative energy scenarios are possible. 
 
B. Discourse analysis by reading the reports and written material leading 
to the decisions made (often from Ministries and public institutions, in 
general) 
It is often linked to the discussion being performed under a, and often 
can only become fruitful in combination with the discussion under (A). 
 
C. Reading annual reports from energy companies 
This is good place to gather a concrete picture of the interests and cost struc-
ture of the energy companies. The big question here is to find methods of 
analysis which help in analysing “reality” in certain categories and which are 
adequate with regard to the goal hierarchy and action organisation for the 
specific analysis. The above three general empirical methods are well suited 
to gather information at an action oriented aggregation level. Using the ways 
outlined under A, B and C is one way of localising an action-oriented level 
of aggregation in the analysis. 
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This system includes Box A.1, the electricity supply service system, Box 
A.2, the national second order Governance system and the political process, 
and Box A.3, the EU energy sector regulation. 
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5. The general dynamics in an electricity sys-
tem 
 
 
We are now starting to describe the microstructure and its dynamics as a part 
of an analysis where we will end up by adding up the microstructures and 
their dynamics within the different components in Figure 6. The results will 
be a fragmented picture of the dynamics within Figure 6, the “Electricity 
supply service system and its second order governance system”. This frag-
mented picture will then be used when evaluating the effects of electricity 
reforms and the interrelations between the Danish and the surrounding elec-
tricity systems.  
 
The above effects should always be seen in relation to the goals of the elec-
tricity system, its specific governance situation with regard to the techno-
organisational system and its historical point of departure or context. 
 
Therefore, one should look at: 
1. The general characteristics of “sunset technologies” and organisations, 
the importance/market share of which will have to decrease in favour of 
“sunrise technologies” which should enter the market/ increase their 
market share.  
2. The general characteristics of the value-added change from fossil fuel 
energy systems to renewable energy systems.  
3. The specific historic situation of the techno-organisational change. 
4. The specific 1999 Danish organisational point of departure of the elec-
tricity supply service system, and its second order governance structure. 
 
1 and 2 will be dealt with in this chapter, whereas 3 and 4 will be discussed 
in the succeeding chapters. 
 
 
5.1 Some general characteristics of the technological 
change from uranium and fossil fuel (UFF) technologies 
to renewable energy and energy conservation technologies 
The alternatives to uranium-, large coal-, oil-, and gas-fired power plants are 
electricity conservation, renewable energy and cogeneration technologies. 
Some of the differences between these new “sunrise” technologies, and the 
old “sunset” technologies are described in Table 1 below. 
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Old techniques “Sunset technol-
ogies” 
New techniques “Sunrise technologies” 
1) Based upon a high level of 
fossil fuel and uranium con-
sumption. 
(1) Based upon energy conservation, re-
newable energy and integrated efficient 
energy supply systems.  
2) Technical solutions are not 
contextually adaptable. 
(2) Technical solutions differ from place 
to place. 
3)  Implementation in single 
purpose organisations. 
(3)  Implementation in multipurpose or-
ganisations. 
(4)  Sectored energy systems. (4)  Integrated energy systems. 
(5) High degree of asset speci-
ficity; long technical lifetime, 
high capital costs and large 
strong organisations.  
(5) High asset specificity, medium long 
technical lifetime, moderately strong or-
ganisations. 
(6)  Historically strong from a 
political point of view. 
(6)  Historically weak from a political 
point of view. 
(7) Mostly using known tech-
niques. 
(7) Often demand new techniques. 
(8) Often linked to existing 
knowledge. 
(8) Often require new knowledge. 
(9) Often based upon existing 
organisations. 
(9) Often require new organisations. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the “Sunset” and “Sunrise” technologies. 
 
The alternatives shown in Table 1 indicate that the new technologies do not 
fit well in the organisation of the old fossil fuel and uranium technologies. 
This means that the organisations linked to these old technologies will be ill 
equipped to compete in the arena of the new technologies. 
 
Consequently, one might expect heavy organisational resistance from the old 
technologies against the new technologies. This assumption has been con-
firmed in the Danish case over the last 25 years. This conclusion will be en-
forced, when discussing the value added changes for old and new organisa-
tions, when participating in this radical technological change. 
 
 
5.2 The value-added chain and technological change 
A main theoretical cognition here is that the motivation for innovation varies 
from firm to firm, and that this variation amongst others is a function of cost- 
and value-added structure. 
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5.2.1 The value-added question and the prototype uranium and fossil fuel 
electricity supply service system 
 
 
Figure 7. The direct and indirect Electricity Supply Service system 
Source: Extracted from Figure 6. 
 
Figure comments: The structure of the figure has been discussed in Section 
3.4, but here the following should be underlined. We find it important to in-
clude the indirect electricity supply system consisting of capital investment 
(V and VII), and the electricity receiver system including the investment in 
the equipment at the consumer level (VIII and VII). Furthermore, it is very 
important to evaluate the electricity system against a set of goals (Box IX). 
 
The Electricity Supply system 
We are now dealing with the electricity supply system, Figure 7, Box V and 
VI. 
 
The question is, what are the general characteristics of that system? This is 
an interesting question, since that system, comprising the existing main fos-
sil fuel and uranium technologies, controls between 95% and 98% of the 
world’s electricity market. At the same time, it is also a crucial investigation, 
as we are dealing with a system which, to a very large extent, has to be re-
placed with energy conservation and renewable energy systems within the 
next 20-40 years. Figure 8 illustrates the value-added flow in these systems. 
Here they are represented by the Danish system based upon large coal-fired 
power plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.1. Electricity service supply system 
VI. Direct electricity supply system 
Power 
produc-
tion 
V. Indirect electricity supply system 
Trans-
mission 
Distri-
bution 
VIII. Direct 
electricity 
receiver 
system (e.r.s) 
Electricity 
supply 
service 
(ESS) 
VII. Indirect 
(e.r.s).system 
Fuel 
IX. Goals 
a. Supply security 
b. Price efficiency 
c. Cost efficiency 
d. Environmental efficiency 
e. Innovation efficiency 
f. System efficiency 
g. Democratic efficiency 
h. Competitive efficiency 
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Figure 8. Value added distribution in a coal-fired electricity system9, 10 
 
Figure explanation: We have an electricity supply system delivering elec-
tricity at the consumer level for 100 value units, for instance, 100 DKK. 
Looking at IV. Direct Electricity Supply System, it can be see that out of 
these 100 DKK, 53.3 DKK is paid to the direct electricity supply system as a 
whole, with 26 DKK paid for coal, 9.3 DKK paid to the employees the power 
production stations, 3.4 paid to the employees at the transmission system, 
and 14.6 paid to the employees of the distributions system. 
  
So out of 100 DKK, 27.3 DKK is paid to the employees in the direct elec-
tricity system. 
 
Looking at V, the Indirect Electricity Supply System, 46.7 DKK total is paid 
to the indirect electricity supply system, when combining the cost spent 
equipment for power production, transmission and distribution. Out of the 
46.7 DKK, 13+4+5.3= 22.3 DKK is paid to Danish equipment producers, 
while 14.6+4.6+5.2=24.4 DKK goes to employees of imported systems.  
                                                 
9  Source Calculated on the basis of SØ89-112, 10 April 1989 ELSAM, Statistic 
1991, DEF, and Statistisk tiårsoversigter 1980-1989. The cost distribution between 
production and transmission is calculated on the basis of SØ89-112, ELSAM. In this 
calculation an interest rate of 1% is used, which was the inherent interest rate in the 
cost structure at that time. With a higher interest rate, the indirect electricity supply 
system would have a higher proportion of the 100 value added units. 
10 It is worthwhile to remark that future electricity systems with no fuel use will ce-
teris paribus have a higher proportion of the value added chain within direct and in-
direct power production, transmission and distribution. Furthermore, it is probable 
that a higher proportion will be in the indirect electricity system. 
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Summarised, 22.3 DKK+ 27.3 DKK= 50 DKK is value-added within Den-
mark. This means that out of the 100 DKK, in this case 50% of the value-
added is produced in Denmark and 50% is imported. 
 
It should be mentioned, that Figure 8 does not distinguish between direct 
and indirect fuel production, and locates the whole fuel value added as a 
part of the direct electricity supply system. 
 
The general knowledge we can draw from this, is: 
 
1. An electricity service supply system has to be understood from the per-
spective of its organisational structure. A large part of the above-
mentioned value added is organised under the same organisational “um-
brella”, mainly defined as an “ownership umbrella”. If the same owners 
own the whole “Direct Electricity Supply System”, this system will be-
have differently from a system which, for instance, does not encompass 
ownership of the fuel extraction companies. A system with close owner-
ship links between the direct and the indirect electricity supply system 
will behave differently from a system without such links. The Danish 
system, until the electricity reform in 1999, was characterised as being 
vertically integrated between power production, transmission and distri-
bution, but there is almost no integration of the equipment producers (the 
indirect electricity supply system, and of the fuel producers). So the 
Danish electricity system only integrates around 27% of the added value 
built into the electricity prices. 
 
This is very different from the traditional German electricity system, 
where the fuel sector is often integrated in the electricity system, and 
where there is also often a certain integration of the equipment producers 
through common ownership. The traditional German system, therefore, 
will have between 50% and 75% of the added value under the same 
ownership organisations. 
 
2. Any talk about liberalization is usually linked to power production, 
transmission and distribution, or, in the coal-fired plant case in Den-
mark, around 27% of the value added built into the electricity prices. As 
transmission as well as distribution activities are not supposed to enter 
any free market competition, the liberalization reforms are, in practise, 
limited to the power production, which is 9.3% of the value added, or 
9.3 % of the electricity prices in Denmark. We will make a detailed 
analysis of this argument, when we describe the links between the Dan-
ish electricity system and the “liberalization” process in depth. 
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3. The indirect electricity system represents the fixed cost, when seen from 
the viewpoint of the owners, which are the organisations at the direct 
electricity scene. This system has a rather long life span linked to the 
plants, often between 20-35 years. Simultaneously, this system is charac-
terised as having rather high fixed costs, which means that fuel costs 
plus personnel costs linked to the production are around 50% of the elec-
tricity prices “ab” power plant. The other 50% of the costs are linked to 
the initial investment and cannot be done away with if consumption de-
creases. 
 
It should be emphasised that this is only the case in a system, like the 
Danish one, where there is no ownership integration between power 
plants and fuel extraction activities. If such an ownership exists, like in 
Germany, a very large proportion of the fuel costs can also be regarded 
as fixed costs. This changes the orientation of the cost structure, as up to 
70% of the costs in fuel extraction and power production become fixed 
costs. This also changes the behaviour of electricity companies, as their 
cost structure will differ on a short-term basis, according to the degree of 
vertical integration. 
 
The electricity receiver system 
When having the goals in Figure 7 in mind, it is important to acknowledge 
the fact that consumers do not consume electricity but services. The follow-
ing example illustrates the importance of this observation. We now imagine 
that a consumer wants to buy 100 DKK worth of cooling at 7 degrees C in a 
box, a so-called ‘refrigerator’. Figure 9 illustrates the “value-added” implica-
tions of this situation. 
 
Figure 9. The value added chain for an electricity-based refrigeration 
service supply system 
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Figure explanation: The same general assumptions as in Figure 7, plus the 
following assumptions regarding the costs of refrigeration: 5000 DK refrig-
erator, 10 year life span, 300 l capacity, 200kWh annual consumption, elec-
tricity price: 1 DKK/kWh, 5% p.a. interest rate.  
 
The figure shows that the transformation of electricity to cooling service rep-
resents more than 77% of the total cooling service costs in this specific case. 
Naturally, the proportion would be different if the refrigerator used 400 kWh 
instead of 200 kWh/year.  
 
From Figure 9 we can observe that the direct electricity supply system only 
accounts for 6.3% of the price for cooling services and that the direct power 
production system only accounts for 2.14% of the price for cooling services. 
In regard to cooling services, this puts the whole Danish “liberalization” into 
perspective, as the only part of the value added chain that is to some extent 
liberalized is the “Direct power production”, which, in the Danish case, rep-
resents only 2.14% of the price of cooling services.  
 
So when we look at the goals of the electricity supply service system, it is 
important to recognise that these goals, in many cases, are only achieved if 
also the electricity receiver system is working efficiently. This is especially 
important where the electricity receiver system, as in the above refrigerator 
case, represents about 70-80% of the value-added in the whole electricity 
supply service system. Thus, it is quite possible to have a direct electricity 
supply system which functions efficiently as far as the goals of the electricity 
supply service system are concerned. But at the same time, the electricity 
supply service system as a whole can function very badly if there are prob-
lems within the institutions governing the development of the electricity re-
ceiver system. The opposite could also be the case with a poorly functioning 
direct electricity supply system and a well functioning direct electricity re-
ceiver system, resulting in an acceptable performance of the electricity sup-
ply service system as a whole. 
 
5.2.2 The value-added chain of upcoming electricity systems 
The present electricity system in Denmark includes wind power production 
amounting to 12% of the total Danish electricity consumption as well as 
some development of biomass-based electricity production. Upcoming de-
velopments will probably also include the extensive use of photovoltaic and 
wave energy-based electricity production. Further use of windpower will re-
quire the introduction of regulation facilities synchronising the wind power 
production with the consumers consumption needs. But what are the typical 
features of these “new” non-fossil fuel and non-uranium technologies, when 
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described with the same “value-added chain” methodology, as we have used 
above? Figure 10 deals with this question. 
                                                                                                        
 
Figure 10. The value added chain of upcoming renewable energy and 
conservation systems 
 
Figure explanation: The assumption is that the renewable energy system 
can produce energy at the same price and with the same transmission and 
distribution grid as the current network system. A further assumption in this 
example is that the renewable energy technologies are distributed in such a 
way that one-third of the indirect electricity supply system will be linked to 
the central transmission level, one-third to the decentralised distribution 
level, and one-third to the household level. With these assumptions, the val-
ue-added distribution will be as shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 8 shows thevalue-added chain in a typical "sunset" coal/uranium 
based electricity production system. Figure 10 illustrates a typical "sunrise" 
renewable energy conservation value-added chain at the energy scene. In the 
following sections we will analyse the consequences of establishing a transi-
tion between the "sunset" technology value-added chain in Figure 8 and the 
"sunrise" technology value-added chain in Figure 10. 
 
 
5.3 The neo-classical "dot firm" paradigm 
In neo-classical economic theory firms are “dots” with no described internal 
organisational life. The firms are solely characterised by their outcome, prof-
it maximisation, which usually is not discussed in depth with regard to the 
I. The  Direct Electricity Supply System
II. The Indirect Electricity Supply System
(6 ) Sale
100
III. Consumer level
(1 ) Transmission
3.4
(2 ) Distribution
14.6
(3 ) Centralised
renewable energy
equipment 27.3
(4) Decentralised
renewable energy
   equipment    27.3
(5) Consumer
organised
conservation and
renewable energy
 equipment 27.3
 51  51 
exact meaning of profit maximisation. In neo-classical economic theory, 
there is no difference in the internal political and economical incitement 
mechanism between an established power company owning large coal-fired 
power plants and a newcomer organisation with regard to their motivation 
for investing in new renewable energy and conservation technology. 
 
These firms are all viewed as identical “dots” with the following character-
istics: 
 
- Having the same pollution abatement costs. The costs and value of pro-
duction of a windmill is the same within an organisation producing coal- 
or uranium based electricity as in a firm, which is independent of coal 
and uranium. 
- Pursuing profit maximisation. More importantly, the outcome of this 
profit maximisation motivation will be the same, independently of the 
cost structure, culture, and institutional context of the firms in question. 
- Having the same organisational dynamics and relationship to the outside 
world. 
 
It is when such basically identical (with regard to motivation dynamics) “dot 
firms” meet each other on the market that the “curve exercise” with margin-
al cost-, supply- and demand curves can get started. 
 
Figure 11 shows a typical neo-classical perception of the supply and demand 
situation. This then can be influenced by means of a general public regula-
tion policy, which does not differentiate between the different motivation 
structures of different industries. 
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Figure 11. The neo-classical supply and demand thinking 
 
Figure explanation: There is a demand curve and a supply curve for re-
newable energy. The firms and consumers will buy renewable energy as long 
as its marginal costs are lower than the marginal costs of the present alter-
natives. In this case, the amount M1 will be bought at a price that is a bit 
above 2 EUR/C/kWh. It is typical for this type of economical modelization 
that detailed institutional conditions are not analysed. They are kept in the 
black box B.  
 
The interesting characteristics linked to this way of thinking are that there is 
no discussion of any differences in the motivation structure from firm to 
firm. It is via the focus of the “model” supposed, that all firms are demand-
ing renewable energy technologies, when these have long run marginal costs 
(LRMC)11 which are lower, than the LRMC of the present technoorganisa-
                                                 
11 Usually, LRMC is defined with a given technological development and thus not 
including the innovation potentials usually linked to newcomer technologies. Since 
around 1980, the LRMC has decreased by 80% for wind power. This type of cost 
changes cannot be analysed by means of the above supply and demand curve meth-
odology.  
Box A: Renewable energy and conservation (REC) supply and
demand curve
 6
4
2
M1 KWh produced  REC  electricity
REC demand from uranium and
fossil fuel  (UFF) companies
(SRMC within UFF companies)
Supply of renewable energy
and conservation (REC).
(LRMC of REC technologies)
EUR/ C/
kWh
Box B. Institutional context/framework
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tions. There is no analysis of the different motivation structures of different 
companies as a consequence of differences in the amount of investments and 
organisational engagement already undertaken (sunk costs) or as a function 
of organisational cultures already established12.  
 
 
5.4 The "institutional economy" paradigm and firms as 
differentiated organisms  
It is one of the major conclusions in this publication that for our purposes it 
is not of use to consider firms as identical and neutral “dots” behaving in a 
similar way on the market13. Methodologically, this is illustrated in Figures 
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, where it is demonstrated as necessary to be aware of the 
following. 
 
Firms should be regarded as different with regard to: 
- Internal dynamics illustrated by different value added structures in dif-
ferent situations and in different firms (Figures 7,8,9,10). 
- Internal organisational dynamics in different situations of change and 
different types of firms. 
- Lobbyist ability and links to the regulators (Figure 5). 
- Motivation for new renewable energy- and conservation technology, 
where fossil fuel firms are mainly attracted to “end of pipe/end of chim-
ney” solutions, whereas new firms, which are independent of fossil con-
nections, have a stronger interest in totally innovative technologies (Fig-
ure 6). 
 
Lobbyists should, as underlined in the Figure 6 structure, be divided between 
the ones who are economically bound to the old fossil fuel and uranium solu-
tions, and the ones who are economically independent of these connections. 
 
The Parliament should be regarded as an organisation which is able to estab-
lish a process of innovative democracy, making it possible for the “majori-
ty”, which is economically independent of narrow economic interests on the 
energy scene, to design, choose and implement new technological solutions, 
if necessary, against the interest of the “minority”, consisting of strong and 
                                                 
12 This should not be considered as any attack upon neo-classical thinking, but rather 
as a defence. The really dangerous attack upon a (and any) theory is usually per-
formed by its "friends" by not considering its assumptions, character end area of use. 
13 We still believe that firms are pursuing a profit maximization strategy, and  that 
"at the end of the day", the winners will be the firms having the most successful 
"profit maximation" practice. 
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concentrated economic interests in specific fossil fuel- or uranium-based 
technologies.  
 
Some short examples will show the consequence of looking at firms as dy-
namic and differentiated organisms. First we will look at the combination of 
the supply demand curve thinking, and the institutional analysis linked to 
looking at firms as being different with regard to culture, and economic in-
citement structure. 
 
5.4.1 Value added, cost structure and the dissimilarity of investor behav-
iour 
 
Figure 12. Cost structure and a "synthesis" of the institutional and neo-
classical approach 
Figure explanation/discussion:  
Box. A.      REC demand functions and technological change
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  2
M1 M2   KWh produced REC electricity
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kWh
REC  demand from newcomer orga-
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Box B. Coal based power production: Example regarding institutional context and behaviour of
uranium/ fossil fuel ( UFF)companies at the market
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Box A: We have the same renewable energy supply curve as in Figure 11. 
But now we have two REC demand curves, namely the lower one coming 
from a market with excess capacity, and showing the short-run marginal 
costs (SRMC) of existing energy technologies. In this case, it is the same as 
in Figure 11. The upper curve represents the long-run marginal costs of ex-
isting production technology (LRMC).  
 
The figure represents a situation where the established uranium and fossil 
fuel companies are the only-, or at least, the totally dominant investors at the 
energy plant investor market, and are characterised by the cost structure of 
uranium and fossil fuel companies. These companies have relatively low 
short-run marginal costs (SRMC), high capital costs, and a very long lifetime 
once the investment has been made)14. For these potential investors, it gener-
ally does not pay to invest in REC technologies, as they already have invest-
ed in uranium and or fossil fuel technologies. The lower demand curve, men-
tioned as representing their short-run marginal costs in many periods, there-
fore, will be the costs they are saving if they invest in REC technologies. 
The result of this demand curve is an investment in M1 REC capacity, and a 
price on REC electricity on around 2 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
The upper demand curve represents the long-run marginal cost function 
(LRMC), which, seen from independent investors is the crucial one, when 
investing in new REC technologies, and resulting in the invested amount 
M2, and a price on REC electricity on around 3.5 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
The link between Box B and Box A: The vertical arrow, illustrating the lo-
cation at the two curves of a coal-based electricity system, represents the link 
between Box B and Box A. The lower curve represents, as mentioned above, 
the actual market behaviour of the UFF companies with M1 as the demanded 
amount of REC technology (Amount M1 and price S, which is a bit above 2 
EUR/C/kWh). When dealing with the long run marginal costs of the coal-
based electricity system, it is found at the upper curve, and is L (in this case 
a bit more than 4 EUR/C/kWh). In this theoretical figure, we imagine that 
there are UFF technologies which can produce cheaper than the shown coal 
case, and that the LRMC line of the UFF technologies is crossing the LRMC 
of the REC technologies for an amount of M2 kWh REC based electricity 
production and a price around 3.5 EUR/C/kWh. 
  
Seen from the point of view of society as a whole, the LRMC function is 
representing the socio-economic costs of electricity production (excluding 
                                                 
14  Often 30-40 years for large coal or uranium based power plants. 
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environmental costs), which is why the M2 amount and a price around 3.5 
EUR/C/kWh is closest to the socio-economic optimum situation. 
 
Box B: Here the value-added chain in a typical coal-based electricity system 
is shown to have the characteristics discussed under Figure 8. Here we are 
emphasising its connection to the concepts of long and short-term marginal 
costs. 
 
Seen from the perspective of an electricity system, like the present Danish 
system, which is only organising production, transmission and distribution, 
and not fuel extraction, the short-run marginal costs will be found within the 
Direct Electricity Supply System (Boxes 1,2,3,4). From the perspective of 
the management and the employees in the company, the short-run (1-2 years 
sight) marginal costs will only be fuel costs plus some part of the labour 
costs, mainly at the power plant level (Box B (2)). In the Danish system, this 
amounts to around 30-35% of the electricity price.  
 
The rest will be capital costs and necessary labour costs linked to the produc-
tion, transmission and distribution of electricity. The fixed costs encompass 
from this viewpoint 65-70% of total costs. The investments in fixed capital 
are, for our purposes, especially interesting, and are shown in the indirect 
electricity system in Boxes 5,6,7,8,9,10. These investments, often having a 
lifetime of 30 years, constitute in the Figure 12, Box B, 46.7% of the final 
electricity price.  
 
In Figure 12, Box B we have described the specific economic characteristics 
of a specific way of producing electricity, namely coal-based power produc-
tion in the Danish structure of vertical integration, at a given historical time. 
In Example 1, Table 2, some of the consequences of the Figure 12 descrip-
tion are illustrated. 
 
Example 1. The different motivation between uranium-fossil fuel based in-
vestors (UFF investors) and independent investors for investing in renewa-
ble energy and conservation (REC) technologies.  
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 UFF investors Independent in-
vestors 
% of 
value-
added 
EUR/C 
kWh 
% of 
value-
added 
EUR/C/ 
KWh 
A. LMRC for 1 kWh coal-
based electricity produc-
tion.  
100 %        6.6 100% 6.6 
B. SRMC 1 kWh coal-
based electricity produc-
tion. (fuel + some labour 
costs) 
 35 % 2.3 100% 6.6 
C. LMRC of  1 kWh REC 
(Renewable ener-
gy/conservation) 
120% 7.9 120% 7.9 
D. Needed minimum REC 
subsidy 
120-35 =  
85% of 
coal 
LMRC 
5.6 
120-100= 
20% of 
coal 
LMRC 
1.3 
 
Table 2. Necessary minimum subsidy for the implementation of renewable 
energy/conservation (REC) technologies. 
 
Assumptions: The value-added distribution is basically taken from Figure 
12, Box B. One kWh of coal-based electricity is produced with total costs of 
6.6 EUR/C/kWh including transmission and distribution. The short-run mar-
ginal costs linked to this production are 2.3 EUR/C/kWh, as shown in Figure 
12, Box A., and, as discussed above, within a realistic range of SRMC for 
coal-based systems around 2000. The specific REC technology in this case 
costs 7.9 EUR/C/kWh, which is 1.3 EUR/C/kWh more expensive than pro-
ducing electricity at a coal-fired plant (excluding environmental costs). Nev-
ertheless, it is a parliamentary goal to decrease electricity consumption by 
one unit in this case. The question now is how this new REC technology can 
be furthered with the least possible public expenditures/subsidies? 
 
If we want the coal-based electricity supply system to invest in one kWh 
REC production, we will have to pay a (7.9- 2.3)EUR/C/kWh in subsidy. 
The UFF company has “sunk costs”, since it has invested in power plants, 
distribution and transmission lines, and only has 2.3 EUR/C/kWh in short-
run marginal costs. Consequently, the company produces electricity at a 
short-run marginal price of 2.3 EUR/C/kWh. As the specific conservation 
and renewable energy technology in question costs 7.9 EUR/C/kWh, the 
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coal-based company only has an investment motivation, if the subsidy is 
higher than 5.6 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
The new independent organisation is paying 6.6 EUR/C/kWh for 1 kWh of 
electricity, while its potential customers for conservation units or REC pro-
duction units also pay this price. The new independent REC technology pro-
ducer, therefore, would start producing REC based electricity, if the subsidy 
were above 1.3 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
Therefore, it is much cheaper for public funding to encourage independent 
production of energy conservation than to motivate the coal-based company. 
Example 2. Economic losses and decrease in green innovation, due to short 
run marginal pricing 
 
At present, the establishment of the Nordpool and Leipzig markets for elec-
tricity, in combination with excess power plant capacity, results in electricity 
prices, which are around 1.6 EUR/C/kWh (2000 average at Nordpool), and 
close to the short-run marginal costs of coal-fired power plants. At the same 
time, the long term costs, including capital expenses but excluding external 
pollution costs, are around 3.3-3.5 EUR/C/kWh/kWh for large coal-fired 
power plants. So on a long term basis, any technology which can produce 
electricity at a price lower than around 3.3 EUR/C/kWh represents an eco-
nomical improvement for society. However, the 1.6 EUR/C/kWh price sig-
nal is massively present on the actual Nordpool market, which means that 
any new technology that could, for instance, produce electricity for between 
1.6 and 3.3 EUR/C/kWh, will not be able to enter the market. We, therefore, 
are currently in a situation where excess uranium and fossil fuel capacity 
hinders the development of new technologies, if these new technologies are 
forced to sell at the Nordpool market price. This is illustrated by Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Production distribution in period 1 with excess capacity. 
 
Comments: The total consumption is M2 TWh at a given point of time. This 
consumption then has to be produced by a combination of technologies. We 
are in a situation where the short-run marginal costs (LRMC) are 1.6 
EUR/C/kWh for the existing coal-based power systems, and the long run 
marginal costs (LRMC) 3.3 EUR/C/kWh. The long-run marginal cost func-
tion of renewable energy and conservation technologies in this case goes 
from 6 EUR/C/kWh down to 1.6 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
As there is excess capacity, the market behaves according to the short run 
marginal costs. In the prevailing situation, the coal-based production will be 
an amount of M2 at a price of 1.6 EUR/C/kWh. No REC-based electricity 
will be produced. The potential renewable energy and energy conservation 
producers are producing nothing, although this technology, in the particular 
case, is supposed to be able to produce the difference between the M2 
amount and the M1 amount at long term marginal costs, which are lower 
than the long term marginal costs of coal-based electricity production. As 
there is surplus coal-based capacity, the society gains15, in period 1, area B, 
                                                 
15 It should be underlined that the bare exixtence of excess capacity represents a loss 
  M1                                                                Total consumption=  M2
     3,3
        2
Short run marginal costs
 ( SRMC) coal based system
LRMC renewable
energy and
conservation.
B
EUR/C/ kWh REC
LMRC  for coal  based  technology
   1.6
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by not building new REC capacity, and instead uses the surplus coal-based 
capacity. The loss is lack of technological development, as, during period 1, 
no new technology has been developed. We will now look at period 2 in 
Figure 14. 
 
                         
Figure 14. Production costs and production method in period 2 without 
excess capacity 
 
Comments: As we did not develop the cheaper REC in period 1, when the 
coal system had excess capacity and “dumped” the prices with short run 
marginal cost based prices, we also have to use coal in period 2. The main 
investment problem here is that one never has a "clean blackboard" from an 
investment point of view. The coal power plant investments are interlinked 
over time, and the alternative REC technologies were, due to the SRMC 
pricing in period 1, not developed. Therefore, we have to build a new gener-
ation of coal-based technology, and for reasons of simplicity, we assume that 
                                                                                                                   
due to investment in over-capacity. This means that before, the start of the above 
"case" the owners of the coal-fired plants have charged society with the costs of es-
tablishing excess capacity. This- for instance- is the present case in Denmark, where 
the established excess capacity was paid for by the consumers during the nineties. 
M1 Total consumption= M2
    3,3
2
LRMC renewable
energy and
conservation.
Innovation loss
EUR/C/ kWh
REC
LMRC  for coal  based
technology
1.6
B
SRMC coal technology
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the new coal-fired power plants have the same long run marginal costs, 3.3 
EUR/C/kWh, as the old coal-fired plants. The area below the long run coal 
marginal cost curve of coal power, above the dotted LRMC REC curve, and 
between M1 and M2, now shows the loss due to lack of investment in the 
new REC technologies. In this case, the innovation loss in period 2 is higher, 
than the gain16 linked to using surplus coal capacity in period 1, as shown in 
the area here called B.  
 
In reality, there is an almost automatic retaliation from old technostructures, 
when newcomer technologies are successful on the market.  
 
The sequences of automatic reaction are the following: 
 
a. Newcomer technologies are successful and the market decreases.  
b. There is surplus capacity on the market. 
c. Prices are based upon short-term marginal costs on the markets. 
d. Newcomer technology markets decrease/ are extinguished. 
 
This automatic reaction is to a large extent built into the present "liberaliza-
tion" regime, where the public regulation does not hinder market "dumping" 
by means of SRMC pricing. A "liberalization" regime, which should be suc-
cesful from an innovation point of view, should include public regulation 
measures that are securing a LRMC pricing regime at the market when pay-
ing for electricity sold from new REC technologies. 
 
5.4.2 Technological change and the value-added loss of fossil fuel and 
uranium based companies 
The characteristics of the value-added change from fossil fuel and uranium 
based to renewable energy systems 
 
One way of describing this situation of change is to combine Figure 8 with 
Figure 10, as it is done in Figure 15 below. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Once more, it should be emphasised that this gain is a result of historical " "over-
investments" in capacity, which have been expensive for society. 
Formateret: Indrykning: Venstre:  0 cm, Flere niveauer +
Niveau: 1 + Nummereringstypografi: a, b, c, … + Begynd med:
1 + Justering: Venstre + Justeret:  0,63 cm + Tabulator efter: 
1,27 cm + Indrykning:  1,27 cm, Tabulatorstop: Ikke med 
1,27 cm
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Figure 15. The change in value-added profile connected to the change 
from uranium and fossil fuel -, to renewable energy and energy conser-
vation systems. 
 
Figure explanation: In the old fossil fuel based system a 100 Dkk sale at 
consumer level will have the value added divided between the different levels 
of vertical integration as shown in the upper figure.  
 
The figure at the bottom shows the value-added distribution in an energy 
conservation and renewable energy system. 
 
From Figure 15 we can observe that the value-added chain of renewable en-
ergy and conservation (REC) technologies differs clearly seen in relation to 
the value-added chain in a fossil fuel based system within two areas: 
 
a. In the REC value-added chain, the fossil fuel value-added part has dis-
appeared, and is replaced by investment in renewable energy capital 
equipment. 
b. In the REC value-added chain, the power production value added in a 
specific direct electricity supply system organisation has been replaced 
by “renewable energy system automation”, where it is probable that the 
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maintenance, at least at the decentralised and consumer level, will be 
performed by the suppliers of the windmills, the photovoltaic cells, the 
hydrogen production system, the electricity battery charging system, etc. 
The need for a specific power production organisation might decrease or 
disappear, as the day to day work on a power plant has been replaced by 
automatons requiring maintenance from, for instance, the windmill fac-
tory. 
 
It is naturally possible that the existing power company organisations 
will take over the maintenance of the renewable energy automatons, es-
pecially those connected with the large renewable energy plants at sea. 
But even in this case, the added value directly linked to the power sector 
will only be halved compared to the present day. 
 
As a consequence of (a) and (b), the direct electricity supply system organi-
sation might therefore decrease until it only consists of the transmission or-
ganisation and the distribution network organisation. 
 
Consequently, a main characteristic of technological change, as illustrated in 
Figure 15, can be that the part of the indirect electricity supply system which 
directly relates to equipment for power production. Transmission and distri-
bution might increase from today’s 46.7% of the total value added in the fos-
sil fuel system to, in this Figure 15 case, 81 % of the added value in a renew-
able energy system. This is mainly due to the fact that fuel import is replaced 
by renewable energy equipment/capital. 
 
An electricity system, like the German one, with its ownership integration of 
fuel extraction, power production, transmission and distribution would de-
crease in value-added share from 50-60% of the electricity price to around 
20%, if successfully introducing REC energy automatons. This might heavi-
ly reduce the profit base of these companies, and reduce the share value con-
siderably. 
 
In an electricity system like the Danish, the value-added decrease would be 
considerably lower, from around 27% to around 18% of the electricity price. 
 
We can conclude that the people and organisations linked to the old system 
are simultaneously losing value-added, since their organisations have no 
comparative advantage, when dealing with the new technologies. The jobs 
and profit thus go to new technological systems with very different value 
added profiles and organisational “needs”. Because of this, the old fossil fuel 
organisations can be expected to fight against the new green energy technol-
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ogies. REC technology, therefore, certainly does not motivate the uranium 
and fossil fuel companies for any expansion of the REC technologies at the 
market. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion regarding the resistance against renewable 
energy and energy conservation from the existing uranium 
and fossil fuel (UFF) companies  
 
5.5.1. The causes of UFF resistance against renewable energy and conser-
vation 
There are two main lessons, when going from the "dot firm" understanding 
to an understanding of firms as different "personalities" with regard to cost 
structure and business culture. The first is that these differences result in 
very different behaviour with regard to acceptance of new technologies. The 
second lesson is that this has important consequences, when designing an in-
novative energy policy.  
 
When one changes from a Neo-classical “dot firm” understanding to an or-
ganic view dissecting the culture and internal cost structure of firms, it be-
comes perceptible that different firms will react differently to the introduc-
tion of renewable energy and conservation technologies. In general, new 
firms, which are politically and economically independent of the old urani-
um and fossil fuel based energy companies, will display a much higher de-
gree of cultural and economical acceptance of the new REC technologies 
than the old uranium and fossil fuel based energy companies. In most cases, 
the old uranium and fossil fuel companies have exerted a systematic re-
sistance against the "innovation risk" which is coming from the new REC 
technologies. 
  
When concluding about the causes behind the resistance of old fossil fuel 
and uranium based technologies against renewable energy and conservation 
(REC) technologies, the following can be stated.  
 
(a) The decrease in value added and profit 
The new REC technologies represent a development towards energy automa-
tons17. This shifts the value added away from the traditional electricity sector 
                                                 
17 Automatons in the sense, that almost the whole value-added is produced at the 
equipment producer level. In this sense, a better insulation standard in refrigerators 
can be considered as an energy automaton. 
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towards the renewable energy and conservation equipment producers. Con-
sequently, this type of technological change will decrease the value added in 
existing power systems by 50-80%. The turnover linked to the area of elec-
tricity production, transmission and distribution will decrease and be trans-
ferred to the "energy automaton" manufactories. See Figure 11, where the 
turnover in an electricity sector of the Danish type is decreased from 27.5% 
of the electricity price to 18.2%. Furthermore, in a German type of electricity 
system, where coal extraction is integrated as a part of the large power com-
panies, the turnover will fall from around 50-60% of the value-added chain 
to the above mentioned around 18%.  
 
The above decrease in value added will result in considerable profit losses in 
the existing uranium and fossil fuel based electricity companies. It therefore 
is understandable that these companies are working systematically against 
the new REC technologies. 
 
(b) REC shows a bad economy within the uranium and fossil fuel companies. 
In many periods, the uranium and fossil fuel companies have their own 
short-run marginal costs as opportunity cost. When these companies are con-
sidering implementing renewable energy and conservation technologies, the 
REC technologies, therefore, will often be evaluated against these SRMC 
opportunity costs. Consequently, the long-run marginal costs of the REC 
technologies are compared with the short-run marginal costs of the UFF 
companies, and REC technologies therefore will show up as economically 
not feasible within UFF companies.  
 
(c) REC technologies require another technical regulation infrastructure, 
than UFF technologies. 
This question is discussed in (Hvelplund, 2001), (Lund, 2000). The uranium 
and fossil fuel technologies represents large production units, which requires 
a considerable "high tension grid system". REC technologies, in general, are 
fluctuating in accordance with the used natural resource (wind, sun, waves, 
etc.). Therefore, an infrastructure that can handle these fluctuations is need-
ed. This REC infrastructure is very different from the "high tension grid sys-
tem", which is the infrastructure system of the large UFF power plants. REC 
technologies, consequently, are getting economical problems, when forced 
into the "high tension grid" infrastructure of the UFF power system. 
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(d) The UFF companies have neither any organisational nor a know-how-
based comparative advantage, when implementing REC technologies. 
A transition from UFF to REC technologies, therefore, represents a change, 
where the UFF companies are losing their present comparative advantage 
with regard to technical as well as organisational know how (see Table 1). 
 
It is important to realise that it is the synergistic effects of the above re-
sistance causes which constitutes the accumulated resistance from the UFF 
companies against the REC technologies. Theoretically, one could maintain 
that UFF companies will invest in REC technologies when their LRMC is 
lower than the LRMC for their UFF technologies, once the excess capacity 
situation had ended. The argument would then be that the UFF companies 
might very well act according to their short-term marginal costs during a pe-
riod of excess capacity, but after this period, they again would invest in new 
technology in accordance with their long-term marginal opportunity costs. 
However, in this process they would tend to invest in technologies, which 
could secure a continuation of the present value-added distribution in elec-
tricity production. This would result in a continued investment in UFF tech-
nologies. Therefore, when combining the SRMC opportunity cost problem 
with the "decrease in value-added problem", the UFF companies basically 
have no long-term interest in a transition to REC technologies. They rather 
would use the SRMC problem as a political tool in order to convince the pol-
iticians, that they should not support REC technologies at present, as " there 
is excess capacity". 
 
In Table 3 the "causes of UFF resistance" against renewable energy and con-
servation technologies are summarised. The table, furthermore, is listing the 
core factors that might increase the resistance coming from the UFF compa-
nies. This is done in order to underline that there are also difference between 
different UFF companies, depending on their specific capital and ownership 
structure. 
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I. Categories of resistance II. Factors increasing resistance 
(1) Loss of value-added share 
(Figure 15) 
a. Degree of automisaton of electricity 
production. 
b. Degree of transition from energy 
supplies to energy conservation. 
c. Degree of vertical ownership inte-
gration. 
d. Degree of ownership integration 
between electricity system and 
equipment producers. 
(2) Short run marginal costs as op-
portunity costs. (Figure 12,13 and  
2) 
e. Periods with excess capacity. 
f. Long power plant lifetime. 
g. High capital costs. 
h. High degree of vertical ownership 
integration. 
i. High degree of ownership integra-
tion of electricity system and equip-
ment producers. 
(3) Different electricity regulation 
infrastructure18 
j. Degree of political power linked to 
"old" transmission line infrastructure. 
(4) Loss of organisational and 
know how based comparative ad-
vantage. ( 1) 
k. The higher degree of automisation. 
l. The higher degree of transition from 
supply- to conservation technologies. 
(5) Type of profit dependency  m. The higher degree of "financial 
market" sensitivity. 
 
Table 3. Causes furthering resistance from UFF organisations against REC 
technologies. 
 
Comments regarding factors which are increasing UFF resistance against 
REC technological innovation:  
-The loss of value-added share is high, if the value added goes down from 
the direct to the indirect electricity system. It is even higher, if there is a shift 
away from the supply side to conservation investments at the consumer lev-
el. Seen from a "loss of value-added" perspective, renewable energy tech-
nologies are bad for the UFF companies, but electricity conservation is 
worse. Whether a loss of value-added is resulting in a big profit loss, de-
pends upon how much a company has to lose. The Danish electricity system 
neither has the fuel value-added, nor the equipment producer value-added 
within its organisation. It therefore from the start has only around 27% of the 
                                                 
18 See: "Renewable energy Governance systems", (Hvelplund 2001). 
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total value added share to lose. The German electricity companies mostly 
have very close ownership connections to the coal production, and to some 
equipment producers, and therefore have a value-added share of around 50-
60% of the electricity price. They consequently have more to lose than the 
Danish electricity system. 
 
- The Short run marginal cost (SRMC) problem is most serious in periods 
with excess capacity. It is increasing for power plants with relatively 
high capital costs and a long lifetime. This would be large modern coal 
fired- and nuclear power plants, with a life time of 30-40 years, and 
capital cost amounting to around 50-60% of total costs. It is even higher 
in hydropower systems and in coming renewable energy systems (wind-, 
solar- and wave power). The short run marginal costs are lower the larg-
er a part of the total value-added chain Electricity Company owns. This 
means, that the German electricity system has lower short term marginal 
costs, than the Danish electricity system, due to the German ownership 
structure with coal extraction firms being owned by the electricity com-
panies. So one should expect a tougher resistance against REC technolo-
gies from the German power companies, than from the Danish electricity 
companies. 
- The type of profit dependency is a function of the concrete ownership 
structure. The present Danish consumer- and municipality owned elec-
tricity system does not at all have the same profit pressure, as the Ger-
man shareholder ownership structure. The Danish electricity system lost 
30% of its market during the nineties to wind power and small cogenera-
tion plants without it giving serious problems. No shares lost their value, 
as there was no shares. 
 
5.5.2 The institutional context of the UFF resistance against renewable 
energy and conservation. 
Figure 16 shows the macrostructure or context in which we find it worth-
while to place the above concrete “micro level” institutional conditions. The 
figure is identical with figure 6. 
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Figure 16. The context of technological rivalry 
Source: Identical with Figure 6. 
 
In Chapter 5.4. and section 5.5.1., we have dealt with the dynamics within 
the boxes V, VI,VII and VIII, by mainly analysing the electricity supply sys-
tem. This discussion culminated in the conclusion that existing uranium and 
fossil fuel companies have an array of cultural and especially economic rea-
sons to counteract the development and implementation of renewable energy 
and conservation technologies. In Figure 16, the black arrow coming from 
the direct electricity supply system, box VI, passing through box II, the lob-
byists, and then influencing the national Parliament and the EU, is the essen-
tial one here. Through this channel of influence, the perception of reality in-
fluenced by the economical incitements discussed in Chapter 5.4. are for-
warded to the politicians. As seen illustrated in the figure, the contents of 
this influence has been, and as seen in the preceding chapters, will have to be 
supporting "end of pipe" uranium and fossil fuel based technological solu-
tions. The "radical technological changes" will need to have other support-
ers. That is why we are dividing the lobbyist group in Figure 16 into eco-
nomically dependent and economically independent lobbyists. So the design 
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of the macrostructure in Figure 6/16 is also a consequence of the analysis in 
Chapter 5.4. The above macrostructure/context is describing a situation of 
technological rivalry, where it is necessary to establish a sort of double gov-
ernance system with economically independent groups influencing the long 
term innovative policy at- in this case-the energy scene. 
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6. General principles of regulation and the 
characteristic electricity systems around the 
year 2000 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish a consciousness regarding the different 
channels of regulation that can be used when governing large infrastructure 
projects like the electricity system. This is important as a counterweight to 
the present stereotypical discussion dealing with market contra public regu-
lation. When this discussion is a bit more advanced, it deals with the “dou-
ble” regulation of the “adequate” combination of market and public regula-
tion.  
 
What is needed, as will be argued here, is a three-line regulation strategy 
comprising public regulation (Parliament), the marketplace, and consumer 
ownership, all placed in a context with an open communication policy com-
bined with an independent press. This conceptualisation of the regulation 
question is illustrated in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17. “ Four - line” consumer power. 
Figure explanation: The figure shows that the consumers have four main 
lines through which they can exercise consumer power, namely through the 
Parliament, the marketplace, consumer ownership and the public communi-
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cation spere. Combined, these channels of power become the “resultant con-
sumer power” (Box 5). Whether this type of four-line consumer power sys-
tem will be efficient or not depends on the communication context as it is de-
veloped in the public space (Box 6). 
 
The specific feature linked to Figure 17 above is the introduction of owner-
ship power, which often is not included in economic textbooks or the scien-
tific models dealing with the development of the energy sector. The inclu-
sion of ownership power is closely linked to the Danish experience, as Den-
mark has a long tradition of consumer ownership in many sectors, and also 
in the energy sector. When linking our discussion of liberalization to the 
above three-line power division, it is interesting to note that the ongoing lib-
eralization policies only use one of the regulation lines, market power regu-
lation. Moreover, the ongoing liberalization policies also only deal with 
around 10% of the value-added chain, namely, power production, as shown 
in Figure 8. None of the current liberalization models suggests liberalizing 
transmission and distribution services. If we consider the deeper purpose of 
liberalization to be consumer control via purchasing power, then the 10% of 
the value-added chain mentioned above, power production, is the only part 
of the electricity supply system that can potentially be liberalized through the 
market channel (Box 2 in Figure 17)19.  
 
Consumer power over transmission and distribution monopoly networks, 
amounting to 18% of the added value of the direct electricity supply system, 
can then, logically, only be exercised by means of consumer ownership con-
trol or public regulation (Boxes 1 and 3 in Figure 12). The Danish system 
has, so far, been characterised by the use of consumer ownership power as 
the control mechanism hindering the development of monopoly profit in the 
transmission and distribution networks, as well as in the power sector. 
 
The conclusion here is that only the “right” balance between public regula-
tion power, market power and consumer ownership power makes it possible 
to pursue the goals for electricity production, as they are shown in Figures 6. 
The value-added chain requires the skilled use of all three governing mecha-
nisms at the same time. But this is not sufficient; it is also a necessity that the 
                                                 
19 It should, though, be mentioned that even these 10% will represent huge difficul-
ties, due to the cost structure, long lifetime and asset specificity of power plants. 
These characteristics make it extremely risky to invest in power plants on a free 
market with many mutually independent producers. Thus, the ongoing tendency will 
be to establish different types of market cooperation such as mergers, “strategic col-
laboration” (the new word for cartels), etc., with the intention of controlling market 
forces and decreasing competition. 
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communication context in which these governing mechanisms are used be 
endowed with a certain democratic standard, including extensive public ac-
cess to information regarding costs and price levels and structures. 
 
In Table 4, the strengths and weaknesses of the three governing mechanisms 
are succinctly listed in order to show how and why they each have a role to 
play. 
 
 Strengths Weaknesses 
Parliament 
 
Public regula- 
tion power 
 
a. Can include “ex-
ternal effects” out-
side the direct buy-
er/seller relation. 
b. Can remove barri-
ers to entry and sup-
port new technolo-
gies by mobilising 
the public. 
c. Not precise, when dealing with 
the specific communication be-
tween buyer and seller. 
d. Strong tendency to be captured. 
The strong actors on the market can 
control the regulator, i.e. the State. 
Market 
 
Buyers’ and  
sellers’ power 
e. Provides a precise 
tool for quick day to 
day regulating of the 
specific communica-
tion between buyer 
and seller. 
f. Cannot include external effects. 
g. Tendency to degenerate into 
short-term prices monopolies/ oli-
gopolies.  
h. Easily degenerates into long 
term technological system mo-
nopoly hindering the introduction 
of “radical new” technologies.  
Ownership 
 
Consumer own-
ership power 
i. Ensures that there 
is no third agent be-
tween the consumer 
and the producer. 
This can counterbal-
ance the “capture” 
weaknesses of both 
public regulation (d) 
and the market (g).  
j. Favours the im-
plementation of con-
crete technical solu-
tions. 
k. Some owners can make alliances, 
and, in that way, achieve price priv-
ileges. 
l. If democratic channels prove too 
weak to ensure democratic control, 
it could result in cost inefficiency. 
m. Tends to be unable to change the 
techno-organisational direction and 
work against “radical new tech-
nologies”. 
 
Table 4. Weaknesses and strengths linked to different governance dimen-
sions 
The importance of these weaknesses and strengths are determined by the 
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specific situation of governance: 
 
1. The characteristics of the “sunset technologies” and organisations, which 
have to decrease their importance/market share. 
2. The characteristics of the “sunrise technologies” which have to enter the 
market/ increase their market share. 
3. The value added characteristics of the change from fossil fuel energy 
systems to renewable energy systems, 4. The characteristics of the goals 
which the electricity supply system has to fulfil. 
 
The prominent feature in the above table is that consumer power, through 
ownership, supplements the overall governance structure in areas where the 
market and the public regulation display obvious weaknesses. The two main 
weaknesses of the present liberalization process with its "dualistic“ market 
plus public regulation” paradigm are: 
 
- That the strongest interests in the market can capture the regulator, i.e. 
the Government. 
- That the market degenerates into a monopolistic or oligopolistic struc-
ture. 
 
This can be counterbalanced, if consumers are in a position to use their own-
ership power. 
 
But it is important to combine this postulate with the discussion of goals and 
the description of the general dynamics in the electricity system.  
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7. The Danish energy policy and energy situ-
ation around 2000  
(Specific historical situation) 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6, it is, when designing an energy policy, necessary 
to have an extensive knowledge of the dynamics in the “point of departure” 
or historical situation. One should be able to answer the question from sec-
tion 3.4. “where are we ” from an analysis dealing with the dynamics of the 
present institutional, technical and organisational conditions. In Chapter 5 
we started this analysis by describing some characteristics linked to the par-
adigmatic change from fossil fuel and uranium to conservation and renewa-
ble energy technologies. 
 
In this chapter we will deal with the specific Danish historical situation of 
the techno-organisational change linked to this transformation at the energy 
scene.  
 
 
7.1 Some important characteristics of the Danish second 
order governance system (public regulation system) 
The goals of Danish Energy Planning include a 20% reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions between 1988 and 2005, and 50% before 2030. Technical sce-
nario analyses have shown that achieving these goals requires the introduc-
tion of massive energy conservation measures, renewable energy technolo-
gies and combined heat and power systems (CHP systems). The conse-
quence, as shown in Chapter 5, is that the necessary techniques do not “fit” 
into the organisational structures and economic motivation of today’s energy 
system, with its links to the fossil fuel organisations and techniques, and its 
sectored divisions of heat, power and transport organisation.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the new techniques linked to combined 
heat and power (CHP) and renewable energy did not develop within the ex-
isting fossil fuel based energy organisations. On the contrary, these tech-
niques, like wind turbines and decentralised CHP plants, were introduced 
and implemented by grassroots organisations and local heat companies, de-
spite strong resistance from the established energy companies. The pro-
cess/strategy was that grassroots movements and local small heat co-
operatives “lobbied” for the establishment of new reforms at the central level 
to support these new techniques and were argued for in the media. Subse-
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quently, the Parliament became inspired by these suggestions and made new 
laws that supported the introduction of the new techniques. After the intro-
duction of these new reforms, the local heat and wind turbine co-operatives 
would then implement the techniques. The process can be named a “bottom-
up –top-down-bottom action” process, which has nothing to do with a rigid 
central planning procedure, but is more of a procedure, by means of which 
the grassroots organisations and local heat companies are given the oppor-
tunity to introduce and implement innovations in the energy scene through 
parliamentary intervention. We call this process a process of innovative de-
mocracy.  
 
 
7.2 Danish Energy Policy since 1980, a case of innovative 
democracy 
The following description contains two demonstrations of the policy evolu-
tion: Wind power development and the development of decentralised CHP 
(combined heat and power) systems. 
 
7.2.1 Wind power development 
The Ministerial plan is that wind power should cover around 20% of the 
electricity production in 2005, and 50% around 2030. 
 
The wind power production in Denmark has developed as shown in Figure 
18. 
 
Figure 18. Wind power production in Denmark 1983-1998. 
Wind Power Production in Denmark
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
GWh/year
 77  77 
Source: Wind power Note 21. February 1999. Danish Association of Wind 
Turbine Manufacturers. 
 
In 1998, which was an average year with regard to wind resources, the pro-
duction of wind power constituted 9% of the total Danish electricity con-
sumption. The proportion in 1999 was around 10% and in 2001 it will be 
around 15%. 
 
Wind turbines owned by co-operatives and other private owners produce 
around 80% of this production. Wind turbines owned by the Utilities pro-
duce the rest, 20%. 
 
Figure 19 shows the total production by Danish Wind Turbine manufactur-
ers. 
Figure 19. Total production in MW capacity by Danish Wind Turbine 
manufacturers 1983-1997 
Source: Wind Power Note. No. 21. Feb. 1999. Danish Association of Wind 
Turbine Manufacturers.  
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Figure 20. Wind power costs per produced kWh 1981-1997 in US 
C/kWh. 
Source: Risø 1997. From “Ingeniøren”, December 24 1998. 
 
The wind power regulation regime has been of the type where buyers of 
windmills receive a fixed price from the electricity companies and a fixed 
public service payment for CO2-free electricity production from the Gov-
ernment. This is here termed a “Political price-/amount market" system. 
This system motivated the producers to lower their production prices, as they 
were in a situation where more windmills could be sold if the prices of wind 
turbines decreased. Thus, the system has been able to decrease the wind 
power price by around 75% within a period of 16 years, as shown in Figure 
20. 
 
The wind turbine industry did not develop out of a situation that allowed the 
existing monopoly market to act on its own. If anything, there was a system-
atic public interference in this monopoly market, breaking its “barrier to en-
try” institutions and opening the door for the wind power technology. By 
means of an array of institutional reforms, an increased freedom to enter the 
market was established. Examples of such reforms include the following: 
 
The reforms and their political background can be shortly described within 
the wind power field. Initially there was:  
 
- A 30% investment subsidy 
- Utility obligation to buy wind power at a price equal to 85% of the price 
paid by consumer using a 20,000 kWh/year 
- A right to produce up to 7000 kWh wind power without income tax 
payment 
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- The establishment of a public wind power test station at Risø Research 
Centre 
- Spare capacity in the machine industry 
- A motivated population 
 
In this phase, lasting until around 1992, more than 3000 cooperative wind 
turbines were installed. Typically, a cooperative wind turbine has between 
20 and 40 owners. This means that around 1990, there were between 
100,000 and 150,000 owners of wind turbines in Denmark. Among other el-
ements in the process, this was the result of a discussion in the organisation 
for renewable energy (OVE), a green grassroots organisation (NGO), which 
fought for this cooperative model. This model managed to secure very stable 
public support for wind power and it made this very vulnerable industry sur-
vive during the lean years, with very low export between 1987 and 1991. 
 
Since 1992, the development has been supported by a steady increase in the 
export markets, combined with the development of larger wind turbines 
(600-1500 kW) and a 30-40% decrease in kWh prices. 
 
The preconditions for the above development were: 
 
At the political level, 
- Efficient grassroots movements: especially the Organisation for Renew-
able Energy (OVE), and the anti nuclear movement (OOA). 
- A rather open and active public debate. 
- A specific balance in the Parliament, with small non-corporate parties 
having some power. 
- A situation where the energy companies systematically worked against 
innovative renewable energy technologies. 
 
At the cultural level, 
- A tradition for wind power. The “modern” 200 kW Gedser Wind Tur-
bine was closed down in the late 1960’s, so the technology was still “re-
cent”. Prior to this, Poul La Cour had established 2-6 kW direct current 
electricity generating wind turbines around 1900. By 1916, there were 
1300 of these turbines in Denmark (Clark, 1974).  A successful tradition 
for consumer cooperatives followed within many sectors. 
 
At the industrial basis level 
- An industrial structure, with many small (agricultural) machine factories. 
- Collaboration between the State financed Risø Test Centre and private 
industries. 
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7.2.2 Decentralized CHP in Denmark 
By around 1988, all cities in Denmark with a population above 60,000 in-
habitants had combined production of electricity and heat. These CHP sys-
tems are largely coal based. Back in 1975, there had been a discussion on ex-
tending cogeneration of heat and power for the smaller cities. But the utili-
ties, in agreement with the Ministry of Trade, which at that time was in 
charge of the energy area and opted for nuclear power, did not want to take 
this possibility into consideration.  
 
The grassroots organisations, OVE and OOA, argued for cogeneration, as it 
was an alternative to nuclear power. The Utilities, the Ministry of Trade, and 
later, the Ministry of Energy argued that cogeneration in small cities was not 
technically possible, and if at all possible, it would be too expensive. Fur-
thermore, even if it were technically possible and economically feasible, the 
potential was so small that it would be a waste of time to discuss it. 
 
As late as 1988, the potential for decentralised cogeneration in Denmark was 
considered by the authorities and the Utilities to be, at most, 450 MW. In 
1989, a new Minister of Energy came into office, and “suddenly” the next 
energy plan, “Energy 2000” (Ministry of Energy, 1989), showed a potential 
of between 1400 and 2000 MW with regard to decentralised cogeneration 
and industrial cogeneration. 
 
Different institutional preconditions were established, including the utility 
obligation to buy electricity from cogeneration plants according to “avoided 
cost” pricing for electricity sold to the grid based upon the principle of long-
run marginal costs (LRMC). Furthermore, a public CO2 subsidy of 1.4 
US/Cent/kWh sold electricity from cogeneration plants based on natural gas, 
and a municipal warranty linked to financing the plants was introduced. 
 
These institutional reforms had an enormous effect. From 1990 to 1997, the 
power productions from decentralised cogeneration units increased from 1% 
of total electricity consumption to 20%. Of these decentralised cogeneration 
units, 60% are organised as co-operatives owned by the residents in a small 
town or village. The units have between 0.5 and 5 MW electrical capacity 
and are mostly fueled by natural gas.  
 
7.2.3 A turning point situation 
When discussing how different regulation mechanisms work in relation to 
specific goals, it is not sufficient to know only the general characteristics of 
the technologies and organisations which should be regulated. It also is nec-
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essary to circumscribe the specific historical configuration that fosters 
change, as we will attempt to do. 
 
Innovative democracy, as described above, has resulted in some remarkable 
developments within wind power and CHP in Denmark, with wind power 
supplying 15% of the total electricity consumption and more than 50% elec-
tricity coming from combined heat and power plants (CHP). Furthermore, it 
is a part of the official energy plan that the electricity supply from renewable 
energy plants, mainly wind power, should be increased to 20% before 2004. 
Such a large percentage of wind and heat-bound renewable energy and CHP-
based electricity cannot just be sold on the electricity market at an acceptable 
price. Therefore, Denmark is approaching a turning point, where it is neces-
sary to implement techniques that can handle the combination of a high per-
centage of wind and heat-bound CHP and fluctuating wind power resources. 
 
Figure 21 shows in the “lower curve” that in the existing technical govern-
ance structure, having 10% wind power as a proportion of the total electrici-
ty production for the Danish market results in a need to export 2.8% of the 
total electricity production, which is more than 25% of the wind power pro-
duction. The official Danish energy policy is to raise the proportion of wind 
power to around 20% in 2005. The “upper curve” represents a “ decentral-
ised flexible cogeneration system designed to integrate the wind power pro-
duction. That type of system often has a heat pump and water heating stor-
age system, which makes it possible to store wind power for heating purpos-
es without excessive loss of thermodynamic efficiency. This system makes it 
possible to absorb all the wind power in Denmark, even when wind power 
supplies up to 25% of total electricity consumption. When wanting to inte-
grate a higher percentage of wind power around the year 2010, it will be 
necessary to combine the heat and power sector with the transportation sec-
tor, using electric cars and hydrogen.  
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Figure 21. ”Surplus Electricity” as Percentage of Total Electricity Pro-
duction. 
Source: “Feasibility Studies and Public Regulation in a Market Economy”. 
F. Hvelplund and H. Lund, Aalborg University, February 1998. 
 
At the “turning point” stage, we have two main types of possibilities:  
 
a. A ”forced” export strategy, where we stay at the “lower curve” and ex-
port the surplus wind power at presumably very low prices, or  
b. An integration strategy, where we move from the “lower curve” to the 
“upper curve” and use the “surplus” electricity regionally in heat pumps 
combined with heat storage systems and, later on, for transportation pur-
poses. This strategy enables the import and export of electricity when the 
prices are advantageous. 
 
When electricity service supply systems and their second order governance 
systems are assessed, it is also necessary to evaluate the potential to establish 
the integration strategy in the present historical situation. As Denmark has 
the highest proportions of wind power and CHP production in the world, 
Denmark is the first country, entering the “turning point” situation and hav-
ing to develop and implement the necessary technological and public regula-
tion measures. 
 
At the same time, all over the world, an array of reforms is introduced in the 
energy sector under the label of “liberalization”. These reforms are normally 
“marketed” as fostering increased competition and decreased energy costs 
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and consumer prices. On the renewable energy scene, the liberalization ver-
sion is linked to “green certificates”, and the development of a “Green (Quo-
ta) Market for Renewable Energy” (Hvelplund, 2000). 
 
7.2.4 Conclusion  
This section examines some of the dynamics which are still built into the di-
rect electricity supply system and are, therefore, forces that should be con-
sidered when designing energy policy in the Figure 6/16 context.  
 
Strong resistance from the utilities - and, for many years, also from the cen-
tral administration - has characterised the political process behind the intro-
duction of the necessary institutional reforms. The policy has been a “bot-
tom-up” generated policy established through considerable public pressure 
from grassroots movements, local heat cooperatives and some members of 
Parliament. 
 
The “bottom-up” generated policy established a “top-down” policy that has 
given economic possibilities and freedom for actions at the grassroots level. 
That is why we call the policy a “bottom-up, top-down-bottom action” poli-
cy, and that is also why we call the policy innovative democracy. 
 
The policy was not a centralist command policy. If anything, it was a policy 
which made it economically possible to invest in wind power and CHP 
plants, and where everyone wanting to invest would get subsidies and further 
institutional conditions without bureaucratic problems. It could be called a 
process of technical liberalization, where the institutional and technical “bar-
riers” for entering, historically established by the utilities, were removed in a 
Parliamentary process. 
 
Furthermore, general price rules based on the "LRMC avoided cost" princi-
ple, also in relation to payment for grid connection, ensured that the condi-
tions for investment were general, and not dependent upon bilateral negotia-
tions between strong utilities and weak CHP newcomers. 
 
Therefore, an innovative technological policy, which introduces technologies 
which break with the economic interests and organisational inertia of the old 
energy companies, can only be formulated and implemented by people and 
institutions/organisations that have a considerable degree of independence 
from the old energy companies. Therefore, we believe in the necessity of 
keeping this “bottom-up, top-down-bottom action“ policy alive during the 
existing and future “turning point” conditions, to keep a process of innova-
tive democracy alive. 
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8. The characteristics of the Danish electrici-
ty system before the 1999 electricity reform 
 
 
We are now entering the first section of the detailed system analysis, starting 
an analysis of the Danish energy systems with focus on the electricity supply 
sector. It is the first detailed study within the analytical macrostructure, as it 
is described and commented on in Chapter 1, Figure 1,which is shown be-
low. 
 
 
Figure 22. The analytical macro-structure. 
 
The aim of describing the dynamics of the Danish energy systems, especially 
the electricity systems, is to establish a “film” of the dynamics within this 
“point of departure system”. Within this film, any regulatory change or in-
fluence from outside, such as changes in the German energy system, is inter-
vening. It should be recognised here that it is not possible to make well-
grounded evaluations of the results of any new impacts on this “point of de-
parture system” without having some theories regarding the dynamics of this 
system.  It is also essential to be aware of the methodological need of estab-
lishing a “film” that describes the dynamics in such a way that it is adequate 
for the organisations of action, which in this case are the groups and organi-
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sations participating in the parliamentary processes. These groups include 
the parliament, economically independent grassroots groups, economically 
dependent organisations, the press, and the generally active and well-
informed public. The methodology to establish this adequacy is to start the 
analysis at the empirical level close to the decision processes of existing or-
ganisations and conceivable coming organisations. 
 
 
8.1 The organisation of the Danish Direct electricity sup-
ply system 1975-1999  
The period 1975-1999 is interesting because it is a period where the Danish 
electricity companies have shown what they stand for by making concrete 
decisions where large, strategic questions were at stake regarding nuclear 
power, wind power, decentralised cogeneration, energy conservation, etc. 
The year 1999 is used in this chapter, as it was the year when a new electrici-
ty reform introduced fundamental changes in the electricity system. This re-
form is described and discussed in a later section. 
 
8.1.1 Vertical integration and some remarks regarding the profit motiva-
tion 
The energy world is not just a “free flying” linguistic discourse where inde-
pendent persons and/or groups of persons are engaging in a peaceful, gener-
ous competition regarding the necessary future energy policy. People and 
groups of people are closely linked to their techno-structure and the organi-
sational and economical interests linked to the interests of this structure. This 
conclusion is, among others, the result of an array of analysis at the energy 
area performed at Aalborg University20. In discussions regarding the strategy 
at the electricity area we never experienced any open disagreement between 
the 11,000 employees within the electricity companies. When the electricity 
companies were against decentralised cogeneration, all 11,000 employees 
were against it. For when the electricity companies fought most intensely 
against wind power, none of the employees from the electricity companies 
                                                 
20 The contents and the discussion around amongst others the following publications: 
”Demokrati og Forandring,Energihandlingsplan 1996”, Frede Hvelplund, Henrik 
Lund, Karl Emil Serup, Henning Mæng, Aalborg Universitetsforalg 1995.  
”Offentlig regulering og Teknologisk Kursændring”. Henrik Lund og Frede Hvelp-
lund, Aalborg Universitetsforlag 1994. ”Erneuerung der Energiesysteme in den 
neuen Bundesländern-aber wie?” Frede Hvelplund, Niels Winther Knudsen, Henrik 
Lund. Netzwerk Dezentrale Energie Nutzung, Potsdam 1993. Especially the 20 page 
arguments against the above publication from Laubag, the East German 
”braunkohle” company is of interest. 
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took a stand against this fight. When the electricity companies pleaded for 
building an extra 800 MW capacity in 1992, which, at that time, was already 
recognised as future excess capacity, none of the 11,000 employees opposed 
the 5 billion Dkr. investment.  
 
But why are employees in these companies showing such political unity 
outwardly? One important cause is that if anybody, without asking his direc-
tor beforehand, expresses a diverging opinion publicly, he or she will proba-
bly get fired instantly. And if asking the director, he or she would probably 
not be allowed to express their true opinion. At the same time, there were no 
open disagreements at the Director level in these 30 years, which is difficult 
to explain by just talking about common organisational culture. We believe 
that the discourse being established in and around electricity systems is very 
much dependent on the concrete economic interests built into this specific 
type of technology as discussed in section 5.4. Here we will apply the sec-
tion 5.4. methodology to the concrete Danish situation. 
 
Figure 23. Value-added in a Danish coal based electricity system. 
Source: Same figure as Figure 8. 
 
The Danish direct electricity supply system was, until 2000, a system that 
vertically integrated activities within power production, transmission and 
distribution, amounting to 27% of the electricity price. Even today, it still 
operates in much the same way. 
 
To sum up, it may be said that the added value resulting from the production of 
electricity for 100 øre (1 DKr) is allocated as follows in Table 5: 
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Fuel imports      26.0 øre 
Plant import (indirect electricity system)      24.4 øre 
Danish plant (indirect electricity system)      22.3 øre 
Danish electricity operation costs (direct electricity system)      27.3 øre 
Total     100.0 øre 
 
Table 5: Allocation of an electricity supply of 100 øre to the consumer, on 
plant and operating costs, and on import to and production in Denmark.  
 
There is no significant integration between the direct and the indirect elec-
tricity supply system, neither of which has any significant integration with 
the fuel extraction system. The Danish direct electricity supply system in-
cludes boxes 2,3, and 4 in the above figure. 
 
Regarding the profit dynamics within the Danish direct electricity system: 
The electricity supply system has a formal direct consumer ownership (co-
operatives/limited companies) in the case of 53% of the distributions com-
panies and indirect consumer ownership (municipal ownership) for the re-
maining 47%. The latter form is common in the Danish cities. At the same 
time, it has been, until the electricity reform in 2000, a “consumer profit” 
system in the sense that it has not been allowed to accumulate profit for any 
other purposes than investment in the electricity system. If investments were 
not needed/justified, any surplus should be paid back to the consumers 
through lower prices. 
 
The Danish direct electricity supply system, therefore, is a comparatively 
small system21. It is not likely that any Danish coal miner will protest if it is 
                                                 
  21 It should be explained that the increased value of the Danish electricity system rep-
resents the wages of its 11,600 employees. The employees’ ability to produce the in-
creased value is a result of the education and training they have received prior to their 
employment in the system. This means that these costs should be deducted from the 
increased value of the electricity system, because the educational system is a subcon-
tractor of knowledge, attitudes, etc., to the electricity system. This thought may be ex-
tended, because the civil society’s education and care of the labour force for the elec-
tricity system is that part of the indirect electricity system. Thus, the direct system is, 
in reality, only a purpose (electricity generation and distribution), and a structure 
(organisation of electricity supply), which organises and directs the indirect electricity 
generation’s factors of production. In this presentation, in order to perform the analy-
sis, it has been decided to define the wages of the employees as a part of the direct 
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decided not to use coal-fired plants any longer. Moreover, no strong national 
producers of equipment to the large power plants will put pressure on the 
politicians if it is decided to move away from the coal technology. 
 
The strong resistance from the Danish electricity sector in the period 1975-
1999 against renewable energy was partly due to the loss of 9.3% of the total 
value added linked to the production at the power plants. This 9.3% of the 
total value added constitutes 34% of the value added linked to the power 
production, transmission and distribution activities built into the electricity 
organisation. They were, and still are, with regard to ownership, vertically 
integrated from power production via transmission to distribution of electric-
ity. The Danish electricity system consequently would lose 34% of its turno-
ver, if independent organisations replaced capacity at the power plant level. 
So if the organisation were not able to absorb these new technologies, their 
introduction would result in a decrease in turnover and massive dismissals of 
employees at the power plant level. 
 
8.1.2 Consumption, environmental effects and supply technology 
The Danish electricity consumption, in 1998, was 32.5 TWh, apportioned with 
19.2 TWh in the Jutland-Funen Region and 13.2 TWh in the Zealand Region. 
Between 1981-1998, the electricity consumption increased by 43%. 
 
The consumption in 1998 is apportioned, according to use, as follows: 
 
  Households           29.6% 
  Industry           30.1% 
  Commercial and Service     29.8% 
  Agriculture and Market Gardening          8.0% 
  Street lighting, electrified transport, etc.                   2.4% 
 
In the ‘80s, the resource base for the electricity system had been coal, repre-
senting more than 95% of the fuel consumption as late as 1990. In the ‘90s, this 
changed in the direction of wind power and biomass and natural gas based co-
generation units. In 2000, the wind power share of total electricity consumption 
was about 12%, versus 0.6% in 1990. And decentralised natural gas-based 
combined heat and power plants (CHPs) based on natural gas and biomass, 
were delivering 25% of the total Danish electricity consumption in 1998, versus 
2% in 1990. 
 
                                                                                                                   
electricity system’s increased value. 
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So within less than 10 years, the coal proportion of the Danish fuel supply has 
decreased from 95% to around 60%. This has happened as a consequence of a 
massive introduction of cogeneration plants in the small cities and larger villag-
es. The growth in cogeneration in this period was more than 50%, so that the 
cogeneration share of the heat market increased from 22% to 34% from 1990 to 
1998. 
 
In terms of environmental effect, the SO2 emission (corrected for import) de-
creased from about 200,000 tons p.a. in 1981 to about 45,000 tons in 1998. 
 
NOx emission has decreased from 100,000 tons p.a. in 1981 to 46,000 tons in 
1998. 
 
In the same period (1981-1994) CO2 emissions from electricity production has 
decreased from 29 million tons p.a. to 23 million tons p.a.. 
 
8.1.3 The organisation of the direct electricity supply system up until 2000 
With the 1999 power reform, substantial changes have been induced upon the 
Danish direct electricity supply system. The description below shows how this 
system was organised up to the reform, and also how the organisational “state 
of departure” was for the 1999 reforms. The organisational development natu-
rally contains main parts of the below-described organisational structure. In or-
der to understand the effects of the reform, one should understand the historical 
organisational “state of departure”. 
  
In Denmark, the direct electricity supply system is defined as the power, 
transmission and distribution system. The organisation of the direct electricity 
supply system is divided into two main regions; ELKRAFT, which is a co-
operation covering the area of the island of Zealand and neighbouring islands, 
and ELSAM, which is a co-operation covering the area of the Jutland peninsu-
la, the island of Funen and neighbouring islands. 
 
The electricity system is, in principle, hierarchic (“bottom up") which has a 
formal direct consumer ownership (co-operatives/limited companies), in the 
case of 53% of the distribution companies, and indirect consumer ownership 
owned by municipalities for the remaining 47%. 
 
The latter form is common in the cities. The "bottom" is the consumers dele-
gate power to hierarchical power systems. This power is controlled by open in-
formation and election procedures, where the consumers elect the board of di-
rectors at the different levels of the hierarchy. 
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In the ELKRAFT area only a minority of the distribution companies are co-
operatives with direct consumer ownership, municipal ownership is the rule. 
 
In the ELSAM area 30 out of 81 distribution companies are owned by the mu-
nicipalities, and the remaining 51 companies have direct consumer ownership 
via a cooperative organisation22. The 51 distribution companies organised in di-
rect consumer ownership accounts for 67% of the electricity sale in the Jutland-
Funen area.  
 
 
 
Figure 24. The organisation of the Jutland-Funen electrical power sys-
tem. 
 
The Jutland-Funen power system has six power companies, each owned by the 
distribution companies in their region. The largest, Midtkraft, produces 22%, 
and the smallest, Skærbækværket, 9% of the Jutland-Funen electricity sale. The 
81 distribution companies in Jutland-Funen, each have their area monopoly,the 
largest selling 700 GWh/year, and the smallest, an island, 1 GWh/year. 
 
                                                 
  22 This includes 10 distribution companies organised as private foundations with con-
sumer election of representatives and board of directors. 
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Regarding the distribution companies owned by the municipalities, the mem-
bers of the Town Council elect the representatives. In the consumer owned co-
operative distribution companies; the consumers elect their representatives in 
the distribution companies (a). These representatives elect their board of direc-
tors (b). This board of directors elects their representatives for their power plant 
company (c). From each power plant the director and the deputy director are 
automatically members of the power plant association for Jutland-Funen, 
ELSAM (d). ELSAM is the co-ordination unit and the organisation, which 
elaborates the political strategy for the electricity system in Jutland-Funen. 
 
The Danish electricity system is usually described as a non-profit system, be-
cause the Electricity Supply Statute does not permit the electricity companies to 
build up a surplus, or to use any surplus for non-energy purposes. An accumu-
lated surplus in any year must be returned to the consumers by means of lower 
prices in the following year. However, the system is profit driven, inasmuch as 
it is owned and administered by the consumers, who receive the reward from 
its cost effectiveness. From this point of view, we find it better to describe the 
Danish electricity system as a consumer profit system. 
 
To a great extent the electricity system is self-financing, as the consumers pay 
in advance via the electricity prices in a five-year period before a new power 
plant is ready for production. Due to the fact that the electricity system is an 
old, well-established system, it is so well consolidated that debt is limited to the 
value of its coal stocks, and the power plants and transmission and distribu-
tion lines are without debt. 
 
8.1.4 The dynamics of the Danish direct electricity supply system 
The most interesting questions for our purposes is the dynamics of the electrici-
ty system with regard to capability of change, inherent growth dynamics, cost 
regulation and abilities to influence the Parliamentary processes. 
 
As shown above the Danish direct23 electricity system is a relatively small sys-
tem providing only about 27% of the added value, which is represented in the 
price of the electricity24. Coordination within this system is not regulated by 
conditions of a traditional competitive market25. In this part of the direct elec-
                                                 
  23 Consisting of power generation, transmission and distribution. 
  24 The German system, e.g. RWE Energie, which owns lignite mines and the subcon-
tractors who deliver the power plant, organise 60-80% of the added value in the final 
price for the electricity. 
  25 There is no competition in the sense that a dissatisfied customer of an ineffective 
and expensive distribution company can choose another supplier. There is competition 
in the sense that the dissatisfied customer can compare the price of electricity from the 
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tricity system, the Danish system is vertically integrated and influenced by 
agreements made on the basis of a network of reciprocal ownership relation-
ships. 
 
Historically, it has been a very democratic organisation. Democratic election to 
the bodies responsible for transformer stations and distribution lines ensure 
consumer control. At the beginning of this development, where the plants were 
small, this control functioned well. The situation has now changed. This is the 
result of the development of the technical organisation towards larger and larg-
er power plants and larger electricity transmission system. This development 
has resulted in decreased consumer control and increased control at the director 
level in the power companies. The organisation’s combination of openness with 
regard to pricing, the system of profit repayment to the consumers and consum-
er ownership and management appear to ensure a high degree of cost effective-
ness in the electricity system. 
 
The hierarchic structure of the system, with a series of indirect elections, and in 
combination with the dominance of the power interests at the top of the system, 
results in a technological conservatism, which is bound to a certain centralist 
and supply orientated paradigm. 
 
The fact that there is no lobbying from coal miners and stock holders, and that 
the electricity system is very consolidated, makes it possible, although still dif-
ficult, to establish public regulation regimes when necessary against the inter-
ests of the power companies. 
 
8.1.5 The Danish direct electricity system and the capability for technology 
change (green innovation) 
The consumer representatives at the ELSAM/ELKRAFT level are not in 
harmony with the citizens’ desire for a more environmentally favourable 
electricity production. In terms of ability to incorporate radically new tech-
nologies, the organisation is far from being competitive. Minority interests 
are excluded in the series of indirect elections. Because new ideas are almost 
always minority ideas, they do not find a way through to ELSAM`s board of 
directors. Furthermore, ELSAM’s board comprises the chairman, vice-
chairman and managing director for the seven power plants and thus repre-
sents a certain technology, e.g. centralised power plants. In principle, new 
                                                                                                                   
distribution company with the corresponding price in another company. Thereafter, the 
dissatisfied customer, as one of the owners of the electricity system, can put pressure 
on the consumer representative, who has the possibility of changing the management 
of the company. 
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ideas may be pressed through the hierarchy of the electricity system, but oth-
er channels are quicker and easier to use. Thus, the democratic channels of 
the electricity system are bypassed by a combination of popular movements 
and the political channels through district, regional and national public au-
thorities and institutions. 
 
In a situation where there is a need for radical change of technological direc-
tion, the form of organisation of the power plants creates conflicts in relation to 
the rest of society. Their organisation is geared towards the efficiency norms of 
the 1950s and 1960s concepts of "expansion and centralisation". But times have 
since changed. Norms of today are "cost reductions” and “decentralisation”. 
The power companies have difficulties in developing new ideas. Therefore, 
there is a conflict in relation to parliamentary democracy, which still has this 
capability, to a certain degree. 
 
It is important to notice the following features: 
 
(1) The elected board of directors of ELSAM had a preference for large cen-
tralised power plants (currently coal plants). This is the case because the 
board consisted of the elected director and deputy director in each of the 
six large coal-based power plants. There was no independent administra-
tion linked to the elected board of directors.  
(2) Furthermore, the administrative directors of these companies had the right 
to meet (but not to vote) at the four to six committee meetings every year. 
There was no independent administration linked to the elected board of di-
rectors. 
(3) A set of indirect election procedures squeezed out, and in the unbroken 
consumer ownership system still squeeze out, any minority group, and new 
technology is always a minority at the initial stages of its development. 
(4) Until 1999, there was a high degree of openness with regard to accountan-
cy and tariff information. Every year information regarding these matters 
was published, and generally open for the public. Information regarding 
cost structure was generally available before the 1999 reform, but is now 
available to a much lesser degree after the reform. Exact information re-
garding the electricity prices was, until the 1999 reform, available at the 
power plant as well as distribution level for the vast majority of consumer 
groups. However, since the reform there is no clear public available price 
statistics regarding the prices at the power plant level. Until the 1999 re-
form, any consumer could see what other consumer groups and consumers 
                                                 
Someof the owners of the electricity system can put pressure on their consumer repre-
sentative, who has the possibility of changing the management of the company. 
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in there own area and in other areas paid for electricity. This openness with 
regard to costs and prices in combination with consumer ownership and 
public control, until 1999, seem to have caused a rather high cost-
efficiency in the Danish electricity system. As we shall see later, Denmark 
has the lowest electricity prices in the EU after Sweden and Finland. For 
smaller industries and large farms, the prices are even lower than the Swe-
dish and Finish electricity prices. 
(5) The Danish electricity system is consumer-owned, and it is stated by law 
that any payment for electricity has to be recycled to the electricity con-
sumers. This system ensures that the Danish electricity system has a very 
low debt ratio, amounting to less than 5% of the construction cost value of 
all assets.  
(6) There was no taxation on power company profit because by Statute power 
companies must pay back profit to the consumers. Also, a capital tax is not 
levied on company assets, which are calculated to be approximately 40 bil-
lion DKr. No concession royalties are levied. 
 
(1)+(2)+(3) results in an electricity organisation, which, in the period 1975-
1999, was very conservative concerning technological changes. The con-
served technology is a centralised coal-based system. Therefore, it is no wonder 
that this type of organisation has systematically worked against the introduction 
of decentralised cogeneration plants since 1975. 
 
(4)+(5)+(6) resulted in an organisation, which was rather cost efficient and 
governable due to relative openness and financial ability to survive changes. 
 
All these characteristics are important when analysing this organisation as a 
part of a process of change. One could say that the 1975-1999 Danish electrici-
ty organisation could not change itself but was able to survive in a process of 
change. 
 
Seen in relation to the goal hierarchy illustrated in Figure 6, and discussed in 
Chapter 5. This section brings the following conclusion: 
 
8.1.6 The direct electricity supply systems motivation for increasing the 
electricity consumption 
a) Expansion on account of the dynamics of co-ordination 
In the power companies there are large groups of employees whose employ-
ment is dependent on the construction of new plants and on the future of the 
power companies. Every one of these companies is represented in ELSAM’s 
board of directors and is protected from abandonment by a series of agree-
ments. The finely balanced system of cooperation, with complicated volume 
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and price agreements on mutual power delivery, functions without a market 
competition. It is a mutual support system, where the individual Power Compa-
ny cannot "go bankrupt". Within ELSAM, all of the six power companies have 
a desire for plant extension. The costs are mutual, but they cannot all be ex-
tended at the same time. In 1991, Vestkraft Power Generation Capacity (PGC) 
in Esbjerg had just been extended, just after Funen PGC in Odense, the follow-
ing on the list being Skærbæk PGC and Nordkraft PGC. 
 
Expansion, in the form of more power plants, was a necessity in the former 
ELSAM organisation. The proverb "the horse bites when the crib is empty" is 
very relevant in an organisation of this type. 
 
ELSAM currently wishes to implement a long-term plan for a high-tension 
grid for the entire Jutland-Funen area. The aim of this network is to provide 
a second relief of high-tension supplies to all parts of the area. The largest 
capacity is now 400 kV, which ELSAM describes as the power motorway. 
The area already has several supply routes, but only at 150 kV. When the 
more powerful grid is completed, ELSAM will implement a more effective 
daily re-organisation, in which they will own the 400 kV network, while the 
150 kV network will be transferred to the ownership of the individual power 
companies. At the present time, only four or five out of a total of 15 sections 
require completion in order for the high-tension grid to be accomplished. 
The section between Aalborg and Aarhus is one of the remaining. 
 
ELKRAFT has similar plans. On Zealand the expansion is concentrated on one 
large power company, SJÆLLAND PC, which supplies 85% of the generated 
power within the area. The recent expansions have resulted in an agreement for 
350 MW to be sold to the former East German Electricity Company, VEAG, in 
the period 1996-2006. 
 
b) Expansion on account of the dynamics in the allocation of internal costs 
The electricity systems regulation on capital transference is favourable towards 
electricity distribution companies with an expanding consumption. The old sol-
idarity principle from the initial electrification period, when those who had 
been provided for were prepared to pay for the continued electrification, is still 
applicable in this regulation. The distribution companies, which make an effort 
to save electricity, did not pay less in capital transference levies per kWh to a 
new power plant than a distribution company which did nothing for electricity 
saving. 
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c) Expansion on account of the dynamics in the allocation of external costs  
The consumer who economises on electricity consumption paid the same in 
capital transference levies per kWh to a new power plant as a consumer who 
did nothing towards electricity saving and, thus, increased the need for a new 
power plant. 
 
Recent expansions have resulted in an agreement for 350 MW to be sold to the 
former East German Electricity Company, VEAG, in the period 1996-2006. 
 
d) Expansion on account of the dynamics in the allocation of internal costs 
The electricity systems regulation on capital transference is favourable towards 
electricity distribution companies with an expanding consumption. The old sol-
idarity principle from the initial electrification period, when those who had 
been provided for were prepared to pay for the continued electrification, still 
applies in this regulation. The distribution companies, which make an effort to 
save electricity, did not pay less in capital transference levies per kWh to a new 
power plant than a distribution company which did nothing for electricity sav-
ing. 
 
e) Expansion on account of the dynamics in the allocation of external costs  
The consumer who economises on electricity consumption paid the same in 
capital transference levies per kWh to a new power plant, as a consumer who 
did nothing towards electricity saving and, thus, increased the need for a new 
power plant. 
 
f) Expansion on account of democratic influence 
The democratic influence at power plant level and ELSAM level was depend-
ent on the amount of used kWh electricity, and still is, after the 1999 reform 
and changes in the electricity organisation (See chapter x). This means, that de-
creased electricity consumption in a distribution company results in decreased 
influence at the power plant and ELSAM level. 
 
8.1.7 The Danish direct electricity supply systems cost and price efficiency 
As the Danish direct electricity supply system is a consumer owned system 
with a “sort of monopoly”26, there has been very tough ideological pressure up-
on the system from the present “neoliberal ideological movement”. It has al-
                                                 
26  It is theoretically not adequate to call a well functioning consumer owned system 
a monopoly system, as any monopoly surplus will be paid back to the consumers. 
The ”monopoly effects” might nevertheless exist if control over the system is lost 
and too many/ ”lazy”/ or expensive employees exist. This does not seem to be the 
case in the Danish consumer owned electricity supply system. 
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most become a common prejudice that an area monopoly, although owned by 
consumers, will or might become expensive and lazy. Therefore, it has been 
difficult to acknowledge that the Danish electricity supply system has had the 
lowest electricity prices in the EU for the last decades. 
 
The following discussion will be divided between an analysis of the cost per-
formance and the price efficiency performance in the Danish system. In this 
case, costs and prices are the same, because of the “consumer profit” organisa-
tion of the system. But costs could naturally rise, due to what economists would 
see as a lack of electricity market27 competition. Let us take a look at the cost 
performance of the Danish system. 
 
Cost performance of the Danish Electricity Supply System from 1980-2000 
 
Year 
1980 1990 1998 
Productivity 
change from 
1980-1998 in % 
Sale in DK 22 TWh 28.6 TWh 32.6 TWh + 48.2 % 
Employees in distri-
bution 
5996 5405 5269 -  12.1% 
Employees in produc-
tion 
4957 6384 4781 -   3.6% 
Total number of em-
ployees 
10953 11789 10050 -   9% 
Sale per employee in 
distribution GWh 
3670 5290 6190 +68.7% 
Sale per employee in 
production GWh 
4440 4480 6820 +53.6% 
Total sale per em-
ployee in GWh 
2010 2430 3240 +61.2% 
 
Table 6. Developments of labour productivity in the Danish electricity sup-
ply system 1980-1998. 
 
The 1980-1998 period was a period during which the Danish electricity supply 
system was consumer owned and non-profit oriented, or, to be more exact, a 
consumer profit system. During this time, the total number of employees de-
creased by 9%, whereas the production increased by 48.2%. The total labour 
                                                 
27  By electricity market competition we mean price competition on a market where 
different suppliers of electricity offer their electricity services to the consumers, who 
can then buy wherever they get the best offer.  
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productivity increased by 61.2 %. The increase in labour productivity has been 
especially high since 1990. 
 
The above development is an indication of cost sensitivity and cost efficiency 
in the Danish electricity system. However, it does not tell anything about the 
capital cost efficiency of the Danish system, a question that we have not exam-
ined in depth here. Some incidents indicate capital inefficiency in the Danish 
electricity system, especially with regard to the power plant capacity, where the 
excess capacity was built in the late nineties. Meanwhile it is difficult to say 
whether this event was built as a consequence of the specific consumer owner-
ship construction described above. It happened during a time of widespread 
knowledge between power company administrators, meaning that a sort of 
competition and liberalization would be introduced at the end of the century.  
 
So the capacity expansion in the late nineties might very well have been a sort 
of free expansion paid by the consumers on a monopoly market just before the 
doors of competition were opened when this possibility no longer would exists. 
In fact, we do not know whether the Danish consumer-owned model resulted in 
capital inefficiency. What we do know is that a combination of the Danish con-
sumer ownership model and a ”near liberalization” results in the establishment 
of excess capacity and capital inefficiency. 
 
The distinction between cost and price efficiency is often forgotten. It should 
be emphasised that it is easily possible that an electricity system can be cost 
efficient and price inefficient at the same time. It simply evolves when the 
owners or administrators of a company in a monopoly or an oligopolistic sit-
uation exploits this situation and collects a monopoly profit.  
 
Here, we deal with two levels, namely (a) price level efficiency, and (b) price 
distribution efficiency, both dealing with the character of price difference be-
tween various consumer groups. 
 
8.1.8. Price level efficiency 
The British experience 
In Tables 7 and 8, we compare the electricity price development for different 
consumer groups in the UK and Denmark during the 1990-1997 period. In the 
UK, privatisation started in 1990, where distribution and power companies 
were sold on the stock market. 60% of the stocks in power plants were sold by 
1/3/1991, and the rest was sold in 1995. American holding companies own six 
out of the 12 distribution companies, which still are monopoly firms in their ar-
eas. (For a further description of the UK power reform see (Thomas 1997)).  
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        1990       1993        1994        1995       1997 
kWh/year DK UK DK UK DK UK DK UK DK UK 
30000 5,99 8,83 5,67 10,2 5,68 10,3 5,53 9,55 5,14 11,
2 
50000 5,92 8,74 5,59 9,94 5,6 10,1 5,45 9,32 5,06 10,
5 
160000 5,65 9,62 5,37 11,0 5,34 11,3 5,31 7,8 4,92 8,6
3 
1,25 mill. 5,43 7,26 5,13 7,82 5,14 7,97 5,01 6,72 4,63 6,6
5 
2 mill. 4,75 6,34 5,01 6,84 5,06 6,29 4,97 6,0 4,63 5,9
3 
10 mill. 4,72 6,31 4,93 5,39 5,0 5,56 4,88 5,69 4,51 5.5
2 
24 mill. 4,38 5,67 4,64 5,31 4,67 4,98 4,69 5,25 4,22              
 
Table 7: British and Danish electricity prices for industry and excluding. 
taxes in ECU pro 100kWh for different consumer groups. (As of 1/7/1997, 
the ECU equaled 7.54 Danish Crowns). 
Source: Electricity prices 1990-1995, Eurostat and Statistics in focus, Energy 
and Industry, 1997 nr. 28 Eurostat. 
 
Comments: All figures are excluding Value Added Tax and other taxes. The 
UK is represented here by the figures for London. In Birmingham the devel-
opment has been almost the same. The statistics for Leeds and Glasgow are 
incomplete, but where there are figures, they indicate the same development 
as in London and Birmingham. The Danish numbers represent an average of 
the prices in SEAS, København, NESA, EFLA, Herning, Arke, ENV, KOE, 
MSE.  
 
It should also be emphasised that, all things being equal, one would have ex-
pected a decrease in the difference between Danish and UK electricity prices 
due to the fact that the UK producers in the period changed away for expen-
sive UK coal contracts, and in 1997 had considerably lower fuel prices than 
they had in 1990. For the whole period Denmark bought coal at the world 
market, and therefore had no gains due to falling fuel prices. 
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                       Denmark                       UK 
Consumption 
kWh/year 
    
1990 
    
1997 
 Growth in 
% 
1990-1997 
    
1990 
   
1997 
 Growth in % 
1990-1997 
    30000    45,2     8,8     - 14     6,6    84,6    +27 
    50000    44,6     8,1     - 15     5,9    79,0    +19,9 
   160000    42,6     7,1     - 13     2,5    65,1    - 10 
   1,25 mill.    40,9     4,9     -14,7     4,7    50,1    -   8,4 
    2 mill.    35,8     4,9     -  2,5     7,8    44,7    -   6,5 
   10 mill.    35,6     4,0     -  4,5     7,6    41,6    - 12,5 
   24 mill.    32,7     1,8     -  3,7     2,7  39,528    -    7,5 
 
Table 8. Price development in UK and Denmark in øre/kWh for the 1990-
1997 period 
 
Regarding comparative price development in the privatised UK system and the 
consumer owned non-profit/consumer profit system, the following can be con-
cluded: 
 
a. UK prices were around 45% higher than the Danish prices in 1990. In 
1997, UK prices were around 67% higher (average for consumer groups 
with an annual consumption of 10 mil. KWh/year and less). 
b. In the UK, the price difference between small and large consumers has in-
creased since the 1990 privatisation. The opposite has happened in Den-
mark. 
In 1990, small firms and farms paid 50% more per kWh in the UK than in 
Denmark. 
 In 1997, they paid 100% more than in Denmark. 
c. In the UK, even large consumers, with an annual consumption of 24 mil. 
KWh or more, paid 24% higher price for electricity than in Denmark. 
 
The development in other EU countries is illustrated in Table 9 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  1995 numbers are used here since there are no 1997 numbers from Eurostat. 
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Country Den-
mark 
Fin-
land 
Swe-
den 
UK France Belgium Germany 
(1) Payment in 
DKK 
 160.000 
kWh/year con-
sumer 
 59200 66400 75520 104000 100800 141120 148960 
Payment, 
øre/kWh 
     37    41,5    47,2     65      63     88,2      93,1 
 
Table 9. 1997 electricity prices per kWh excluding taxes in some EU coun-
tries. 
Source: Statistic in Focus NR. 28, Eurostat 1997. 
 
As can be seen from this table, a typical small firm or large farm, would have 
an annual bill which would be higher by 76% in the liberalized UK, by 70,5% 
in France and by 138% in Germany, than under Danish price conditions. 
 
Regarding the cost and price efficiency of the Danish Electricity Supply Sys-
tem, we can conclude that price and cost data indicate that its performance is 
far more convincing than most other electricity systems, and that it has per-
formed better, than the UK system, since its privatisation in 1990. 
 
8.1.9. Price distribution efficiency 
Table 10 shows the difference between the Danish- and some European 
countries  “price spread performance”. The table shows a very distinct dif-
ference, where Denmark has a far more “flat” price structure, than the four 
countries around Denmark and the UK.  
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Percentage for  which the 
kWh price is higher for a 
30000 kWh/year-  than for a 
10 mill.  
kWh /year consumer 
47.4 78.8 46.5 101 103 14 
 
Table 10. Difference in kWh price between 30,000 kWh/year- and 10 mill. 
kWh/year consumer. 
Source: Eurostat: Statistics in focus. Energy and Industry, nr. 36, 1996 and 
nr. 8 and 28 1997.  
Average between 1/7 1996, 1/1 1997 and 1/7 1997 prices. With regard to the 
UK numbers, the source is Statistics in focus, Energy and Industry, 1997, 
Eurostat. 
 
We have analysed the “price spread” development from 1982-1992 for all 
Danish electricity distribution companies. This analysis shows a very vivid 
price development between the different consumer groups from year to year 
in the individual distribution company, and large differences from company 
to company. In Denmark there are 111 distribution companies, of which 46  
have municipal ownership, and the rest different forms of  co-operative con-
sumer ownership. A few examples from our analysis will illustrate this. 
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Example 1: A  consumer-owned electricity distribution  cooperative in 
Bjerringbro selling 97 GWh electricity in 1999.  
 
Figure 25. Price spread development in Bjerringbro consumer owned 
electricity distribution company. 
Source:  Calculated on the base of information from 10 volumes of 
“Elforsyningens tariffer og elpriser”. The volumes from 1983-1993. Danske 
elværkers forening.(The figures shows the average kWh price paid by a con-
sumer. Calculated as the bill paid for electricity divided by the number of 
kWh bought one year.) 
 
From the figure we can see that there is an ongoing “price communication”29 
within the company. In 1987, a 250,000 kWh/year consumer paid around 
70% of the price pr. kWh of a 3000 kWh/year consumer. In 1991, they paid 
105%. In 1982,  a 1 mill. kWh/year consumer paid 80% of the average kWh 
price of a 3000 kWh/year consumer. In 1984, they paid only 55%. In addi-
tion, the price structure is very flat. The difference  between  the kWh price 
for a 20,000 kWh/year consumer and a 1 mill. kWh/year consumer is less 
than 10% on average in the period. 
 
                                                 
29 It would be a very interesting research process to analyse the processes of price 
formations in this and other firms. Regrettably, there has been no time for this here. 
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Example 2: A consumer owned cooperative, "Himmerlands electricity sup-
ply" electricity distribution company selling 797 GWh  electricity in 1999. 
 
Figure 26. Price spread development in Himmerland consumer owned 
electricity distribution company. 
Source: As Figure 25. 
 
The general price spread development in this company is characterised by 
varying from year to year when compared with the price spread development 
in Bjerringbro in Figure 25. The company displays a general tendency of rel-
ative kWh price increase for the 3000 kWh/year consumer. 
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Example 3: A municipally owned electricity distribution company in Århus 
(the second largest Danish city) selling 680 GWh electricity in 1999. 
 
Figure 27: Price development in Århus municipal owned electricity dis-
tribution company. 
Source: As Figure 25. 
 
The figure also shows a lively development in the relative prices, although 
the differences between the kWh price  at a 20,000 kWh/year consumer and 
a 1 mill. kWh/year consumer is relatively stable over the period, with the 
year 1985 as an exception. The period in the late eighties had a mayor for the 
energy area, who belonged to a green and left wing party30, and secured a 
decrease the fixed price share for household consumers in 1989. Conse-
quently, the difference between the average price of a 3000 kWh/year con-
sumer and the other consumers decreased, as it is seen at the figure. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30  The decision regarding decreasing the fixed share of the electricity price was met 
with severe resistance from the electricity company’s top administrators. The 
Mayor, Lone Hindø, organised an advisory "backing group", which gave her spe-
cialist support, in her discussion with her own administration (I was one of the 
members of this group). 
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Example 4: A municipally owned electricity distribution company in Copen-
hagen, selling 2.7 TWh electricity in 1999. 
 
Figure 28. Price spread development in Copenhagen municipal electrici-
ty distribution company. 
Source: As Figure 25. 
 
Copenhagen is characterised by a comparatively very small price spread be-
tween small and larger consumers. This historically has given problems with 
the association of Danish industries. When the "flat" price structure has been 
maintained during so many years, it is reasonable to believe, that it is caused 
by the fact, that household consumers makes up the vast majority of voters. 
 
What can then be learned from the above analysis of the electricity price 
spread development? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the periods, there has been some state control of prices, through the 
Government’s "Electricity price committee". But this committee has accept-
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ed a very decentralised price development with regard to the "price spread" 
question.  
 
As mentioned, the Danish electricity system is by law a "non profit", or bet-
ter expressed, "consumer profit" system, where any surplus in year 1 is paid 
back to the consumers in year 2 by lowering the prices. The low price spread 
in the Danish system is probably, amongst others, caused by this incitement 
structure which does not further any profit oriented pricing policy. It has nei-
ther been necessary nor profitable to levy high prices upon consumer groups, 
with no easy accessible alternatives (low price elasticity), and low prices on 
consumer groups with accessible alternatives (high price elasticity). There 
simply has not been any motivation for cashing in on the monopoly position. 
 
In a shareholder profit oriented system, the optimal price policy would be to 
take advantage of the different price elasticity of the different consumer 
groups, thereby also taking advantage of the position as area monopoly. In 
such a system, the price policy is characterised by a combination of a rela-
tively high capacity payment and a considerable price spread.  
 
Regarding the concrete price spread development, as described above, we 
will emphasise the following interesting comments and observations: 
- The price structure in the cooperatively owned electricity companies will 
be basically decided upon by the democratically elected board of directors, 
and reflect power structure and culture of conduct in this forum. As the vast 
majority of representatives in these groups consists of farmers, small indus-
trialists, common household consumers, etc., it is not surprising, that these 
cooperatives will end up with a very flat price structure. There, though, is a 
tendency to establish a price structure with an increased fixed component for 
common household consumers, resulting in an increased price spread be-
tween this group and the other groups.  
 
- The price spread varies considerably from period to period within the 
individual electricity distribution company. Not surprisingly, there 
seems to be a political competition between the different consumer 
groups. 
- The price spread development also varies clearly from company to com-
pany. So the price spread development is an individual business linked 
to the concrete culture and power relationship between the consumers in 
the individual company. 
- It is a general tendency in the material, that the large consumers, and to 
some extent the household consumers, in the consumer owned coopera-
tives, seem to be losing the price battle. (On the other hand they are re-
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gaining what is lost by electricity prices, which are, in a European com-
parison, very low.) 
 
It is interesting to combine the above price discussion with the description of 
the value-added distribution in the electricity supply system.  
A distribution company is-and will remain as long as distribution networks 
are used- in a technical monopoly situation with regard to the supply of "grid 
services". This is the case all over the world, even in the most "liberalized 
systems". The grid service remains a monopoly service. The only present 
technologies that compete with this monopoly are different types of electrici-
ty conservation technologies. 
  
This has as the consequence that a price market cannot give the consumers 
any control over the grid service. One or another type of political control has 
to exert this task. One then can choose between third party political control 
via the state or local government and/or one can exert the control directly by 
means of consumer ownership of the "monopoly" parts of the electricity sys-
tem value-added chain. In a system with "third party" state control of the 
monopoly service, it is a risk that the state could be captured by the largest 
industrialist and allow very low prices for these groups of consumers. In a 
consumer owned system with price transparency, it seems possible to estab-
lish a pricing process, where the controller is not captured by any minority 
group of large consumers. The "pricing power" is, in general, distributed ac-
cording to number of voters and not according to number of kWh used.  
 
But how can this good cost, price level and price distribution performance be 
accounted for? 
 
8.1.10 Conclusion regarding costs, prices and consumer ownership  
The organisational setting assuring a high cost and price efficiency in the Dan-
ish electricity system consists of: 
(a) Consumer ownership, and elected representatives, who are motivated to 
keep costs and prices low. 
(b) Openness of information (see “communication power” in Figure 17), that 
makes it possible to compare prices locally and between different regional 
electricity distribution companies. 
(c) A non-profit legislation that hinders the direct use of money from the elec-
tricity consumers for other purposes. 
(d) A relatively democratic public regulation and a free press. 
(e) It should furthermore be emphasised that in a shareholder owned “liberal-
ized” system, the price includes a profit to the shareholders, which in the 
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consumer owned system goes back to the consumers. This mechanism is 
described in Figure 29.  
 
 
Figure 29. Consumer price in a shareholder profit system and in a con-
sumer owned “consumer profit” system . 
 
The column figure represents the marginal costs of power production. The 
produced amount and price in a shareholder profit system is determined, 
where this figure meets the consumer demand curve. In this case, the pro-
duction is 8 TWh/ year and the price is 5 EUR/C/kWh. The profit to the 
shareholders then will be the area with the vertical dotted lines, z plus x. 
 
If the same amount is produced in a consumer owned consumer profit sys-
tem, this area z + x is paid back to the consumers. The normal way of doing 
this is by lowering the price to the average cost level31, which in this case 
will be 3 EUR/ C/kWh.  
                                                 
31 This, meanwhile, entails the problem of having lower prices than marginal costs. 
This problem can be solved in many different ways. One is, that the government ab-
sorbs the difference between average cost pricing and marginal production costs by 
levying a tax on electricity as shown in the figure by "c. Potential tax in a consumer 
owned system". Another way of keeping the prices sufficiently high in a consumer 
owned system is by having a low payment for capacity, and a relatively high pay-
ment for actual kWh consumption.  
Price pr. kWh
EUR / C
  1     2      3     4      5      6      7      8      9     10       Power    production   in   TWh
M = Produced  amount   at  the  market   price  5 EUR / C / kWh
5
 3
Demand b. Marginal
production costs /
kWh
 a. Price in a shareholder profit
system = marginal cost / kWh of
most expensive unit
d. Price in consumer
profit  system =
average price in grey
area
c. Potential tax in
consumer owned
system
x
y
z
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In the Danish consumer owned system, a combination of taxes and, com-
pared to other countries, a very low capacity payment has kept the actual 
price paid by the consumer higher than average production costs, and in-
creasingly closer to marginal production costs. It should, however, be under-
lined that the Danish electricity prices has, in several periods, been lower 
than long-term marginal production costs in a coal-based electricity system. 
It, therefore, has also been proposed to elevate the electricity prices up to the 
level of long term marginal costs by putting higher taxes upon the electricity 
system. In that way, the price will be equal to marginal production costs (5 
EUR/C/kWh) and the Government is absorbing the profit, which, in a share-
holder owned system, is gained by the shareholders. In the Danish case, this 
has given a financial background of giving subsidies to the development of 
new renewable energy technologies. 
  
In a shareholder profit dividend system, the interest is in profit maximising, 
by means of a combination of high electricity prices and low costs. 
 
The idea in a shareholder owned system is that firms must compete against 
each other for shareholder capital. Because of this competition, capital seeks 
the activities that provide the largest surplus. The characteristic of this system is 
the payment of dividends to shareholders for their investment; the secondary 
effect is that the shareholders have an interest in a large profit. This goal is 
achieved by trying to get as high prices and as low costs as possible. There-
fore, a shareholder owned system might have an interest in outdoing, bribing, 
or lobbying against the regulator in order to achieve a monopoly and hinder 
public price control. It is this mechanism which operates in Germany, where 
the electricity companies pay concession royalties to local regional and district 
authorities, and where these authorities continually make alliances with the 
electricity companies, in order to avoid greater competition on the market32. So 
far, these alliances have been successful, inasmuch as they have successfully 
prevented many attempts to establish greater competition on the German elec-
tricity market. 
 
In a consumer owned and consumer shared profit system, there is an interest 
in low costs and low electricity prices if the democracy in the consumer owner-
ship model is strong enough to control the bureaucracy/technocrats of the com-
panies. There will be no interest in higher electricity prices for owners-
                                                 
  32 See, for instance: "Energiekonsensusrunde Ost" of 31/31996, where the power 
companies obtain the endorsement of the "Bundeswirtschaft Ministerium" to use 
cross-subsidiation in order to expand the monopoly. The text is available at the Bundes 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Industrie in Bonn. 
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consumers, as opposed to the interest in a shareholder-organised enterprise. 
Therefore, there will be no strong interest in cheating or “bribing” the public 
price regulator. 
 
On the other hand, in a consumer owned system, consumer control could be so 
weak that an expensive bureaucracy might counterbalance low electricity pric-
es. To avoid this, alternative control mechanisms of market competition be-
tween different power suppliers have to be introduced33. In the Danish case this 
alternative control mechanism has been successfully implemented as a combi-
nation of openness about tariffs and sales conditions, and an effective control 
by means of the consumer-elected representatives.  
 
Both forms of organisation will continuously attempt, in their own way, to 
influence the economic framework for their own benefit. This way of func-
tioning, in relation to societal aims, is completely dependent on the exact na-
ture of the relationship between the electricity system and the existing politi-
cal system. Consumer ownership might only function efficiently if placed in 
the right context supervised by a legislation demanding openness of infor-
mation for the public, and establishing strong democratic mechanisms within 
the electricity companies. But given the “optimal” regulation context around 
the organisation, the consumer ownership model can probably be controlled 
with considerably lower transaction costs than private companies within a 
techno-structure similar to that of the electricity supply type as described in 
Figures 8 and 9. These features seem to ensure a cost and price efficiency 
which appears to be even more effective than the cost and price regulation in a 
system where the consumer can select between different power producers. So 
cost and price regulation in the Danish system operates by means of openness34 
about and publication of consumer prices and costs in combination with the 
consumer representatives’ interest in keeping costs low. In this area, the con-
                                                 
  33 It must be kept in mind that "liberalized" systems, like those in Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, do not have many independent power suppliers. Therefore they can-
not be called liberalized systems with any market as such or with conditions close to 
what is called ’perfect competition’ in the economic theory sense. It can be argued that 
the Danish regulation regime is closer to perfect market conditions, as the regulator 
systematically removes the "barriers to entry" for new technologies. The result of this 
policy is that the production from decentralized cogeneration plants and windmills has 
grown from around 4% in 1990 to 27% in 1996. 
  34 It is interesting, in this connection, that the Danish electricity system is based on co-
ordination, plus a high degree of openness of information. The English system, follow-
ing privatisation, is based on the market, plus a very limited degree of information 
openness. It is a matter of open conjecture as to which of these two systems is closest 
to the free market utopia. 
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sumer representatives safeguard consumers’ common interest, even though 
they are elected in a process where voting participation is only approximately 
2-4%.  
 
8.1.11 International price competitiveness 
The Danish electricity system has the third lowest average electricity prices in 
EU. Only Sweden and Finland have slightly lower prices. The average Danish 
electricity prices for industry are around 50% of the German level. Small indus-
trial consumers and farmers, who are typical Danish consumers, are paying 
three times as much in Germany as in Denmark. Furthermore, it should be 
mentioned, that Denmark has the lowest electricity prices in EU with regard to 
consumer groups with an annual consumption of less than 1 mill. KWh. 
 
The price structure is characterised by the lowest price differentiation between 
large and small consumers in EU and probably in the whole world. Small in-
dustrial consumers and farmers even have lower prices than in Sweden.  
 
Furthermore, the capacity payment is lower in Denmark than in any other EU 
country. This price structure is closely linked to the culture of co-operative 
ownership, where a precondition for fruitful organisational collaboration is that 
there is no large difference in prices paid by the different consumers.  
 
Competitiveness at the home market 
The new electricity reform has resulted in a very low production at the Danish 
power plants. This is mainly due to the establishment of excess capacity in 
Denmark, most of which was caused by the construction of three large power 
plants in Denmark in the late nineties. This has come at the same time as the 
opening at the market, and massive rain and snow in Scandinavia, making the 
power market extremely crowded in Northern Europe. The result has been elec-
tricity prices close to the short-term marginal costs of new large coal-fired 
power plants. But the Danish electricity system only has a very low debt, and 
therefore is relatively independent of the development at the capital market.  
 
At present an adaptation to the changing regulation regime has been prepared in 
the new electricity law. The power distribution companies have got increased 
freedom to buy electricity from other power plants than their own.  
 
At the foreign electricity markets 
At present it is not possible for the Danish power companies to use the capi-
tal collected at the home market as base for electricity export and invest-
ments in other countries. In that sense the Danish power companies have a 
handicap in relation to PreussenElectra (Now E.O.N), and Electricity de 
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France, Vattenfall etc. But no one hinders the Danish power companies in 
establishing independent limited companies for investment outside Den-
mark. 
 
There is no real danger of losing the home market on a long-term basis. 
 
So far it is not possible to use the money of the electricity consumers as base 
for electricity export, overseas investments or investment in new products.The 
"no debt" situation makes it very difficult for foreign companies to sell electric-
ity based on long term contracts at lower rates than can be offered from the 
Danish power companies. 
 
8.1.12 International market power competition 
It should not be forgotten that a liberalized market (in economic theory) means, 
among others things, that there are (a) many independent buyers (b) many in-
dependent sellers and (c) a situation where the companies have no influence on 
the institutional setting on the marketplace. 
 
At present there is a tendency to focus on the "independent buyer" dimension 
without any serious analysis of the process of developing market power and 
corporate political power. 
 
Nevertheless, the real fight against the electricity markets is a fight against 
market power. 
 
Although there is no free market at all in Germany, France or the United States, 
companies from these countries are presently buying parts of the electricity sys-
tems in the countries which have "liberalized" their markets. Currently, around 
25% of the distribution companies in the United Kingdom are owned by North 
American companies. PreussenElectra has bought 35% of the former East 
German Company VEAG, and is now strengthening their monopoly power in 
the former East German area together with the other electricity companies from 
the former West Germany35. At the same time PreussenElectra buys more than 
20% of the Swedish Company Sydkraft. The state owned monopoly company, 
Electricity de France, has bought 10% of Sydkraft, etc. 
 
                                                 
  35 See"Verhandlungen zur "Energikonsensrunde Ost", which was agreed upon on  
January 31, 1996. In this agreement, the Minister of Industry, Günther Rexroth an-
nounces that the German power companies have agreed upon using "cross subsidiza-
tion" to establish "barriers to entry" against electricity produced at independent cogen-
eration units and against electricity from other nations. 
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The real threat is not price competition, but that foreign power companies 
might be very interested in buying the Danish electricity system. That is why 
the ongoing discussion continues regarding the organisation of the electricity 
system. At the beginning of 1996 a consultancy firm, PA Consult, submitted a 
report for ELSAM, giving the advice that the power companies should be 
changed to joint stock companies. This proposal is currently under debate, 
meeting arguments regarding the threat of being bought by foreign companies, 
such as PreussenElectra. At present the Minister for Environment and Energy 
supports continued consumer ownership and does not seem to accept any for-
eign take over. In 1996 Parliament accepted a resolution supporting continued 
consumer ownership. 
 
Conclusion regarding the market power question: 
- Until the 1999 electricity reform, the Danish market was, to a relatively 
large extent, protected against foreign take-over because of the combina-
tion of consumer profit and the consumer ownership system. 
- This protection from foreign take-over had been supported actively by the 
Danish Government until the 1999 power reform. (In this reform a majori-
ty in the parliament still supported the protection orally, but not in the leg-
islation.) 
- Specific interests at the director level could work for a "joint-stock compa-
ny" model, paving the road for a later foreign take-over. 
 
8.1.13 Democratic efficiency (The Danish direct electricity supply systems 
political dirigibility) 
Strangely enough the political dirigibility, or the ability to be steered, of large 
companies generally is analysed when discussing the future organisation of the 
power system. We find it necessary not to analyse organisational suggestions, 
as if they all have the same features regarding their political dirigibility. Espe-
cially in situations where technological changes are needed, one should be 
aware of maintaining/developing organisations that can be regulated by the par-
liamentary process. 
 
The above mentioned deficiencies in the technological innovation capability of 
the direct electricity system are not necessarily a catastrophe, inasmuch as this 
may be able to be compensated for by the parliamentary system taking over the 
direction. If the combination of public regulation and the direct electricity sys-
tem have the technological innovative ability, then technologically conservative 
electricity system is not necessarily a problem. Therefore, it is interesting to see 
if the electricity supply system is politically dirigible. This question will be ex-
amined in the following way: 
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The political dirigibility is determined in the boundary zone between the direct 
electricity supply system, the indirect electricity supply and the democratic pro-
cess (the second order governance system, Figure 6.) 
 
Conditions that facilitate the political dirigibility 
When analysing the electricity system it is not sufficient to look at the direct 
electricity system. One must also look at the relations between the direct elec-
tricity system, the indirect electricity system, the consumers and the Govern-
ment (the second order governance system in figure 6). 
 
When analysing these questions, the following statements can be drawn: 
 
a) There is no vertical integration within the fuel procurement. This differs 
very much from many other European electricity systems, such as in the 
German case, where the lignite mines are owned by the same organisation-
that owns the power plants, as well as the transmission and distribution 
system.  
 No coal miner will demonstrate if the use of coal decreases! 
b) There is no great degree of horizontal integration in the subcontractors 
for power generation technology, e.g. the German electricity system, 
where the largest German Company, RWE Energie, is a part of a group 
which also includes building contractors that construct power and smoke 
purification plants. 
c) There is no horizontal integration with other fuel companies. This is also 
in comparison with the German system, where the VEBA Group, which 
owns PreussenElektra, is also the owner of a company that sells fuel oil. In 
the VEBA case, the establishment of cogeneration units would decrease 
the turnover in the VEBA subsidiary "VEBA Oil Company”.  
 The interest against cogeneration, therefore, is much stronger in Germany 
than in Denmark. 
d) There is no horizontal integration with other large industries. This is dif-
ferent from the VEBA Group, where PreussenElectra has sister companies 
dealing with the production of chemicals, transportation, oil, etc. Therefore 
no Danish industries are interested in high electricity prices, whereas in the 
VEBA Group, members of this group will sometimes gain more than they 
lose by high electricity prices.  
 At the same time there will be no specifically low electricity prices for 
large consumers, like those that the large firms in Germany are getting. 
e) It is consumer owned and the profit remains with the electricity consumers 
in the form of lower electricity prices, whereas, in the German electricity 
system, the profit goes to the shareholders. In the case of PreussenElektra, 
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these are private shareholders, and in the case of RWE, these are regional 
and district authorities.  
In a Danish consumer-owned system, there are no strong interests work-
ing for higher electricity prices, whereas stockholders in a joint-stock 
company have a motivation for higher electricity prices. 
f) There is no interweaving of specific electricity supply system revenue and 
the public sector taxation revenue. The public sector, with regard to its 
revenue, is independent of the electricity systems actual structure. This 
should be seen in relation to the Danish natural gas companies, where the 
local authorities are financial guarantors, and thus, economically depend-
ent on the sale of natural gas. In Germany, local authorities are dependent 
on concession levies, which the electricity companies pay to them. Thus, 
the public sector with regard to their revenues is dependent on the share 
dividends of the electricity companies. A reduction in electricity consump-
tion or the establishment of independent producers, in the German case, 
will result in reduced revenues for regional and district authorities.  
 In the Danish system such a dependency does not exist.  
g) The Danish electricity system is a self-financing consumer profit sys-
tem 
 The Danish electricity system has no debts. 
 There are no capital owners whose share values drop when the electricity 
supply market becomes smaller. This means that the system has no real 
economic problems in connection with an actual fall in consumption. 
Therefore, the Danish electricity system, in comparison with the German 
system, cannot be threatened by a falling electricity production. 
h) The Danish electricity supply system is subject to demands on open-
ness, with regard to prices and costs 
 This means that, to a relatively large extent, it is possible for participants in 
the democratic debate to examine the crooks and crannies of the electricity 
supply system. 
 
Conditions which make the political dirigibility difficult 
i) Short-sighted advantages in the construction of a power plant, which 
binds district and regional politicians 
 The construction of a power plant, at a cost of 3 billion DKr, provides em-
ployment for the local labour force, during the period of construction and 
afterwards. ELSAM’s payment regulations are so formed that it is the 
Power Company, which has the newest and most efficient power plant, 
that has the lowest electricity prices. Furthermore, electricity consumers, 
e.g. in Jutland-Funen, make a capital transference to finance the next pow-
er plant. This means that all consumers pay towards the new station, repre-
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senting 3 billion DKr regional investments, which no regional politician 
can refuse. 
j) The immediate effect on employment results in support from the trade 
unions - especially the metal workers - when the power companies make 
application for permission to construct a new power plant. It appears to be 
of importance, in the political process, that employment in relation to the 
construction of a power plant is assigned to workplaces that identify them-
selves as energy related workplaces. The alternative to a new power plant 
is electricity saving, decentral cogeneration plants, etc. The workers in 
these alternatives are dispersed, employed in multi-purpose organisa-
tions (electrical, plumbing and heating services, etc.), generally less aware 
of their roles in the alternative energy game, andweakly organised in the 
trade unions. 
k) The electricity supply companies power position in the decision mak-
ing process in the Central Administration 
 The power companies have been and still are strongly represented in the 
decision-making processes in the Ministry of Energy and in the Energy Di-
rectorate. Thus, the interests of coal technology were taken care of in the 
seventies and the eighties. The new technologies did not and still do not 
have similar political and administrative opportunities and advantages. 
 The so-called "Committee of Directors" was a good example of this in-
fluence, in which the directors of ELSAM and ELKRAFT held regular 
meetings with senior staff from the Environmental Agency, the Energy Di-
rectorate and the Ministry of Energy. There are no recorded proceedings 
from these meetings.  
 The Electricity Pricing Committee is a second example, with 50% of the 
members from the electricity sector and no representation from environ-
mental interests or energy saving technologies. 
 Electricity Prognosis Committee is a third example, where 7 out of 12 
members are from the power companies36. 
 The Electricity Supply Statute is a fourth example. The Energy Direc-
torate is only an approving  authority, with the competence to approve or 
reject. The power companies prepare the agendas, and decide what is to be 
applied for. 
 The Electricity Strategy Committee is a fifth example. It consists of 
members from the electricity sector and the central administration, and 
holds a number of meetings. The recorded proceedings are not publicly 
available. 
 
                                                 
  36 The role of this Committee is described in "Offentlig regulering og teknologisk 
kursskift"; Henrik Lund & Frede Hvelplund; Aalborg Universitetsforlag, 1994. 
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8.1.14 Channels of consumer regulation in the Danish Electricity Supply 
System 
  
A. "Liberalization", public regulation and ownership structure 
In order to understand the Danish electricity supply system, and its second or-
der governance system, we find it worthwhile to start with a short description 
of the present “liberalization” governance model, which has been implemented 
in many places throughout the world in the last decade. This “liberalization” 
paradigm, as discussed in Chapter 8, is limiting itself to a “three leg chair” 
strategy, dealing solely with a combination of market, parliament and public 
space (communication power), and excluding consumer ownership as an inte-
grative part of an efficient regulation in the market.  
 
Figure 30 illustrates the present “zeitgeist” liberalization paradigm. 
 
 
Figure 30. Economical “Liberalization” or the “three-line” consumer 
power. 
 
Figure explanation: This system of regulation does not have the “consumer 
ownership” regulation possibility and depends solely on the function of the 
marketplace. The function of the marketplace also depends on public space 
(box 6) and the parliamentary political processes, which should control its in-
stitutions. However, the focus in the “liberalization” discourse has mostly been 
on “economic liberalization”, empowering the consumers to buy where they 
want, and in that way control amount, price and quality of the “goods” (elec-
tricity) produced. 
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Instead of a consumer “first party”37 ownership, the ownership is removed 
from the consumer level to the “third party”38level in a stockholder ownership 
system, box 7. This ownership system has given the production technolo-
gy39sector an interest in low production costs. On the other hand, it also has in-
terest in the establishment of technical systems where the product is indispen-
sable for the consumer, monopolies can be established, and which are general-
ly expensive. Typical for the stockholder ownership model is furthermore, a 
motivation for high prices. 
 
We believe that there are very good reasons for extending the regulation para-
digm to a “four line” governance model, including consumer ownership power 
as an important regulation method. This is especially true when dealing with 
techno-systems, like the ones linked to electricity production, which are very 
difficult to control by means of the the three line regulation system. The "four 
line"  governance structure has , as shown in the former chapters,  been used in 
the Danish energy systems with relative success, when compared with, for in-
stance, the cost, price and innovation performance of electricity systems in oth-
er countries.  
 
 
                                                 
37 By ”first party” ownership it  is meant that the owner is the same as the consumer. 
38 We define ”second party” as the employees in the electricity companies, and 
”third party” as organisations or persons that are neither consumers or producers. 
39 The ownership system has also given an interest in techno-organisational systems  
that the consumers cannot establish themselves, such as energy conservation tech-
nologies, or systems which are very cheap on a long run basis. The ideal system is 
expensive (high turnover), necessary (no other opportunities for the consumer), and 
monopolistic.  
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Figure 31. Economical and political liberalization, or the “four line” 
governance structure/consumer regulation. 
 
Figure explanation: It is labelled “economical and political” liberalization 
because it includes both consumer ownership control and parliamentary con-
trol. Both ways of control implicates political procedures in relation to election 
processes and bureaucratic procedures. Consequently, the figure also visualis-
es the areas of political control mechanisms. These mechanisms should be ex-
amined with regard to democratic institutions such as openness40 in the par-
liamentary system (box 1), and the performance of the democratic system 
linked to the consumer ownership of the electricity system (box 3). The econom-
ic institutions in which the economic “liberalization”, box2, are embedded also 
have to be subdued to democratic control, which is why political liberalization 
is also important as a part of the “liberalization” at the marketplace. 
It is therefore important to note that the conditions of the public space (box 6) 
should also be under critical observation by the public. The “four leg chair” 
regulation model will degenerate if the information process is blurred and 
monolithically controlled by the large actors at the market in the parliament or 
in the administration. 
 
                                                 
40 Increased openness with regard to information plus participation of economically 
independent members of public committees within the energy area. See chapter 11 
in ”Demokrati og forandring”,Frede Hvelplund,Henrik Lund,Karl Emil Se-
rup,Henning Mæng. Aalborg Universitetsforlag 1995. 
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Looking at the consumer power in the Danish electricity supply system, as it 
was up until 1999, Figure 19 illustrates some of the important aspects of the 
“four leg chair” regulation process: 
 
1. Whether a production system is efficient or not, seen in relation to short 
term as well as long term goals, depends on the balance between buyers’ 
power, ownership power, the function of the Parliament, and the public 
space and communication process within which this power game is played.  
 
2. Until the 1999 electricity reform, the Danish Electricity supply system was 
characterised as having no direct buyers’ power at a market for electricity. 
In that way it was not possible for the consumers to buy kWh electricity 
from other suppliers than their own distribution companies and power 
plants. But no third party could establish a monopoly from this situation as 
the consumers themselves were, and still are, the owners. Therefore, it is 
not theoretically justified, as it is very often done, to talk about a monopoly 
situation in the neo-classical sense. 
  
 Cooperative consumer ownership can be regarded as the group version of 
the core model of an individual consumer’s private ownership of their cars, 
bicycles, houses, etc.  
 
The stock company model has a much weaker connection to the consum-
ers, and could rather be called a sort of public ownership as it is seen from 
the consumer perspective is owned by a “third party”. Seen from this per-
spective a stock company is much more a “relative” to state owned compa-
nies than democratic, well functioning consumer owned companies. So it is 
conceptually ironic that in the discourse regarding liberalization and privat-
isation, the consumers of electricity have managed to call “third party” 
ownership, as represented by the stockholder model, more “private” than 
“first party” consumer ownership, by the ones who use the good produced-
in this case electricity.  
 
3. It is often argued that in consumer owned co-operatives, the employees in 
the firms will capture the monopoly profit, which does not have to work ef-
ficiently, as they are safely employed within their monopoly area where 
there is no competition. As we have seen above, the cost and price devel-
opment in the Danish system indicates that it has worked efficiently, both 
from a cost and price efficiency viewpoint. The reason for this seems to be 
a combination of openness with regard to costs and prices within the “Pub-
lic space” (4) and through consumer elected boards of directors. In such a 
system, there is no direct price competition, but there is an indirect price 
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competition where the board of directors would put pressure on or even fire 
an administrative director, if his/her company did not perform efficiently in 
comparison with other companies. This is illustrated in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32. Factor price competition instead of kWh price competition. 
 
Figure explanation: We have three electricity supply firms linked to each of 
their consumer groups and “monopoly” areas (a), (b) and (c). We can see how 
there are three “monopoly areas, (a), (b) and (c) at the top of the figure, but 
there is no price market connection between these three markets. The consum-
ers have to buy from each their suppliers, firm (a), firm (b) and firm (c). The 
firms are consumer owned and consumer controlled, which is indicated by the 
three vertical grey arrow at the bottom of the figure.  
 
The important observation from Figure 32 is that the consumer representatives 
can dismiss the director of the firms and that the director can fire the employ-
ees. It is important to note that there is a labour market with competition be-
tween directors and employees in this market. So if the consumer representa-
tives in an electricity distribution company analyse the open price statistics for 
all other distribution companies and find the prices too high in their area, they 
can change the management of their firm.  
 
When discussing liberalization, the tendency is often to talk about markets as 
one dimensional, only looking at the market for goods. But when we have a 
system where the consumers are owners of production facilities, the consumers 
can decide which production factors to employ. In this case the market for pro-
duction factors, labour and capital is just as important as the market for goods. 
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In Figure 32 the labour market is symbolised with the large “dotted” box. As a 
general principle it can be stated, that the market which is of interest, when 
evaluating, whether a system has competition or not, is the market which is 
within reach from a consumer action point of view. In the specific consumer 
ownership case, the democratic processes within the consumer owned compa-
nies should also be taken into a process of critical analysis. If there, as dis-
cussed in section 8.1.5. are serious shortcomings in the concrete democratic 
processes, such problems should be discussed and solved internal in the organi-
sations. And if these organisations are not able to, by their own41, to introduce 
democratisation reforms, the parliament should intervene.  
 
B. Value added and regulation of etectricity supply systems 
There is, as argued above, a link between ownership structure, and adequate 
level of “liberalization”/competition. In a consumer ownership structure it is 
the competition at the factor market, which is relevant, whereas, expressed in 
few words, in a stockholder ownership structure, the relevant “liberalization” 
level seen from the consumer viewpoint is at the electricity market. Conse-
quently it is a logical mistake to call a consumer ownership system a monopoly 
system, if there is competition at the factor market, and if the democratic chan-
nels in the consumer democracy functions in a reasonable way. 
 
There is also an interesting connection between regulation, ownership structure, 
and the value-added system of a specific techno-organisational electricity ser-
vice supply system. Here we will shortly deal with this question. 
 
When dealing with the public regulation discussions under this the “liberaliza-
tion” discourse, the liberalization subject is this electricity supply system and its 
appurtenant value- added chain (the grey boxes in the value-added Figure 23). 
 
In the two Tables 11 and 12 below, we will analyse the connections between 
both the three and the fourleg chair regulation model and these value-added 
levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Often organisations do not have the ability to change their election rules, as the 
ones being elected so far are in power because of rules which should be changed. So 
why should they change the rules and in that way voluntary lose their power?  
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(1) Classical 
fossil 
fuel/coal 
based  elec-
tricity sys-
tem 
(2) Value-
added 
% of sale 
price 
(3)Market 
liberaliza-
tion 
(4)Parliame
ntary/bure
aucratic 
control 
(5)Public 
space/com
munication 
control 
(6)Resultant 
consumer 
pow-
er/“liberalizat
ion” 
 
(a)Power 
production 
9.3 + + Assump-
tion is 
freedom of 
press polit-
ically and 
economi-
cally. Pub-
lic open-
ness poli-
cy. 
(++) Difficult 
to maintain 
competition 
(b) Trans-
mission 
3.4 
Monopoly 
+ -/+ 
(c) Distribu-
tion 
14.6 Monopoly + -/+ 
(d) Total 
electricity 
supply value- 
added 
27.3   Consumer 
control not 
establised. = 
Inefficient 
“liberaliza-
tion”. 
 
Table 11. The “Three line” economic “liberalization” model, and the re-
sultant degree of “liberalization”. 
 
Figure explanation: + means that there is an efficient increase in consumer 
control, or an efficient “liberalization” effect.  (++) means that it is difficult to 
maintain a competitive situation. - Means that there is no efficient consumer 
control. 
 
Out of the 27.3% value-added, which is allocated to the electricity service sup-
ply sector out of the consumer level sales price, 9.3% is supposed to be regulat-
ed at a competitive market. The rest, 18%, will remain regulated by bureaucrat-
ic procedures, either via a publicly regulated private monopoly, or via publicly 
owned monopoly firms.  
 
Table 12 shows the same situation for the “four line” economical and political 
“liberalization” model. 
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(3)Market 
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tion42 
(4)Consu
mer 
owner-
ship43 
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men-
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control44 
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space/co
mmuni-
cation 
control 
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nt “liberal-
iza-
tion”/cons
umer pow-
er 
(a)Power 
produc-
tion 
9.3 + + + Assump-
tion is 
freedom 
of press 
political-
ly and 
econom-
ically 
Public 
open-
ness 
policy 
+ + 
(b)Trans
mission 
3.4 
monopoly 
+ + + + 
(c)   Dis-
tribution 
14.6 monopoly + + + + 
(d)Total 
electrici-
ty sup-
ply val-
ue- add-
ed 
27.3    ++ Con-
sumer 
control es-
tablished= 
Efficient 
“liberaliza-
tion”. 
 
Table 12: The “four line” economic- and political “liberalization” model, 
and the resultant degree of “liberalization”. 
 
Figure explanation: + means, that there is an efficient increase in consumer 
control, or an efficient “liberalization” effect. 
 
What we are seeing in these two tables is a summary justification of the argu-
ment saying that the organisation of the Danish electricity service supply sys-
tem, until 1999, was closer to an economical and political liberalization situa-
tion, than the present “zeitgeist” economic “liberalization”. This conclusion is 
drawn under the assumption that the basic aim of liberalization is to increase 
                                                 
42 We are saying here that the existing consumer ownership structure, with area 
”monopolies” for power plants, can be considered as a system with market competi-
tion at the ”production factor” level. And as the consumers decide which production 
factors to employ in a consumer owned system, there is market competition at the 
relevant level, given,that the consumer organisations have a functioning democracy.. 
43 The plusses are linked to the argument in foodnote 21. 
44 Here it is just an assumption.  
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consumer power in the production system in order to optimise the utility func-
tion of the consumers. Without any full scale experiments, as the ones going on 
now in New Zealand, California, the UK, etc., it is possible analyse the existing 
techno-organisational system, and to conclude beforehand, that the present 
“three-line” regulation model will continue to run into huge regulation prob-
lems. 
 
C. Change of techno-organisation system and  “liberalization” models 
As we have argued in Chapter 5, a probable value-added structure for coming 
techno-organisatinal electricity systems might have a value-added change 
which looks like the one in the Figure 33 below. 
 
From this figure we see that the value added in the electricity service supply 
system has decreased from 27.3% in the present classical coal-based system to 
18% in present electricity conservation and renewable energy systems out of 
the total value added. This figure indicates that the important level of liberaliza-
tion is not the markets where liberalization is implemented today, the grey are-
as, but the white areas in Boxes 3,4 and 5, which are growing in importance. So 
when making new regulation regimes it is important that there is secure compe-
tition between windmill-, solar cell-, biomass equipment, producers. That is the 
growing “liberalization” challenge. 
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Figure 33. The increasing importance of the indirect electricity system. 
Source: Same figure as 15. 
 
8.1.15 Conclusion regarding the goal performance of the direct electricity 
service supply system as it was until 1999 
 
This sub-conclusion deals with the characteristics regarding the sub-system, the 
electricity service supply system, which is a part of box 2 in Figure 5, and box 
VII in Figure 6. The dynamics of this sub-system is interesting, as it influences 
how the larger system, the electricity supply system and its second order Gov-
ernance system functions.  
 
The system is relatively cost and price efficient on account of: 
a) The consumer ownership organisation and returned profits 
In a consumer ownership model, where the democracy has not degenerat-
ed45, there is nor motivation for higher electricity prices whereas a share-
                                                 
45 In a consumer ownership system, where the election processes are undemocratic, 
and the level of information low, the system naturally can become ineffective, with 
too many employees and to high salaries and benefits for the managers at director 
level. It should however be mentioned, that this also might happen in a shareholder 
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holder owned electricity system has a motivation for increasing the elec-
tricity prices. 
b) The relative openness on prices and costs in combination with elected con-
sumer representatives, which can freely decide which directors to employ 
at the labour market, and which production machinery to buy at the market 
for capital equipment. 
c) Prices are set in accordance with average production costs, and not as in a 
kWh price market system, according to the marginal costs of the produc-
tion unit with the highest marginal costs.  
 
Environmental efficiency: The system is conducive to increased consump-
tion on account of: 
a) The internal organisational dynamics causes a current motivation to con-
struct new power stations. In ELSAMs area this is by means of competi-
tion between the 7 power companies and, in ELKRAFTs area, this is em-
ployment interest within the organisation. 
b) The electricity distribution company which urge the consumers to econo-
mise on consumption, pays the same to new power stations per kWh as 
those who encourage increased consumption. 
c) The electricity consumer, who economises on consumption, pays the same 
to new power stations per kWh as those who do not economise. 
d) The democratic influence increases with increased consumption.  
 
Regarding technological innovation, the system is technological conserva-
tive with regard to the introduction of radical technological changes.  
This mainly has the following causes: 
a) ELSAM and ELKRAFT are responsible for the long-sighted development  
 plans. 
 The chairmen and vice-chairmen of the large power companies sit on the 
boards of directors of ELSAM, and the managing directors of their power 
stations also have the right to participate in board meetings. Thus, ELSAM 
and ELKRAFT have a built-in interest and knowledge, which leads to-
wards a systematic support for a centralised power plant development on 
the basis of fossil fuels. 
b) The value-added profile of electricity conservation and renewable energy 
leads to lower turnover in the electricity service supply system .  
c) The general historical situation of change indicates, that the old “fossil fuel 
sunset technologies” has organisational comparative advantages within the 
fossil fuel technologies, but rather comparative disadvantages in the re-
                                                                                                                   
owned corporate system with oligopolies and monopolies. 
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newable energy and electricity conservation “sunrise technologies”(See 
Table 1) 
 
Regarding system efficiency 
The coal based system has been able to organise cogeneration in the large cit-
ies, but has great difficulties when it comes to the organisation of the interplay 
between these large systems, decentralised cogeneration and windpower. 
Democratic efficiency: The direct electricity service supply system is rela-
tively46 dirigible on account of: 
a) independence of a horizontal and vertical ownership structure. The system 
is a small system from a value- added point of view. Not including fuel ex-
traction like the German system, and having no ownership links to power 
equipment producers. 
b) No direct economical links between a specific way of producing electrici-
ty, and the public finances, neither at the municipal nor at the state. In that 
way the public economy, and the public governance process is independ-
ent and not linked to the continued use of for instance coal for electricity 
production. More likely one could assume, that the links between the pub-
lic finances and the use of natural gas might have influenced the support 
for the introduction of natural gas fired decentralised cogeneration.47 
In Table 13, the goal -performance of the sub-system, the electricity ser-
vice supply system is summarised.  
 
 
                                                 
46 In relation to the power systems in for instance Germany. 
47  Although this is a valid hypotesis, the Governmental policy was a stand against 
decentralised cogeneration until 1989. In practice, the publically owned natural gas 
company preferred to sell gas to individual heat consumers, as the political fixed 
prices for this consumer group was the most advantageous for the natural gas com-
panies. 
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Goals Goal perfor-
mance of 
ESSservice 
supply system 
Comments Need for public 
regulation 
(1) Supply se-
curity +++ 
No problems None 
(2) Price effici-
ency 
++- 
Almost no problems, 
due to consumer 
ownership, and a 
consumer profit sys-
tem. 
Necessary to secure 
openness with regard to 
costs and prices and a“non 
third part profit”regime. 
+ 
(3) Cost effici-
ency 
++ - 
Same as above, but 
some problems with a 
motivation for excess 
capacity. 
Public regulation in order to 
avoid excess capacity 
+ 
(4)Conservatio
n efficiency - - - 
No real motivation to 
decrease electricity 
consumption. 
+++ 
(5)Innovation 
efficiency - - - 
No ability to radical 
technological innova-
tion. 
+++ 
(6)System  effi-
ciency 
- - - 
No ability to transcend 
to optimisation pro-
cesses including ac-
tors outside the elec-
tricity sector. 
+++ 
(7)Democratic 
efficiency 
+ - - 
Ability to endure pub-
lic regulation, which 
decreases the market. 
++ Some needs for vitalis-
ing the internal democratic 
processes. 
(8)Competitive 
efficiency 
+ - - 
Strong ability to com-
pete on a long-term 
base. Low ability to 
compete due to no 
accumulated capital.  
 
++ 
When a market is intro-
duced, as it is from 1999 
an onwards, it is necessary 
to establish some capital 
protection. 
 
Table 13. The “Goal efficiency” of the (sub-system), the 1999 Danish elec-
tricity service supply system. 
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Table explanation: Three crosses (+++) in the white areas indicates, that the 
goal performance is ok. Two crosses and a minus in the light grey areas (++-) 
indicates a general good goal performance, but with a need for some improve-
ments. One cross and two minuses, the light grey areas, mean some goal 
achievements, but in general weak goal performance. In this case there is a 
clear need for improvements, which mainly can be introduced by public regula-
tion measures. Three minuses, and dark grey areas, indicate very poor goal per-
formance and a clear need for the introduction of public regulation measures.  
 
As we can see from the above table, there are two areas, where the Danish elec-
tricity service supply system has almost no problems, when seen in relation to 
the goals. The Danish electricity supply system has a very high degree of sup-
ply security, and is the most price efficient electricity supply system in EU Eu-
rope. Regarding price efficiency it should though be mentioned, that it has not 
been possible to introduce electricity tariffs, which establish a sufficient incite-
ment for electricity conservation. Regarding Cost efficiency, the Danish system 
has a tendency to generate excess capacity. This tendency has never been so 
strong, that it has threatened the Danish position as the EU country with the 
lowest electricity prices.  
 
The table also indicates where the weaknesses of the Danish electricity supply 
system are localised, when using the shown goals as measure. Weaknesses that 
might not be important  when compared with other electricity supply systems 
in the world. These weaknesses are most obvious with regard to the inability of 
the Danish Electricity Supply System of developing and implementing radical 
technological changes with regard to environmental-, innovation and system ef-
ficiency. Furthermore the Danish electricity supply system also has, when 
comparing with the goals shown here, democratic weaknesses resulting in a 
relatively low participation rate in the elections for the representatives. But 
compared with other electricity supply systems in the world, the democratic 
performance, as consumer owned companies, is outstanding. As the Danish 
electricity companies have not accumulated free capital, their competitive effi-
ciency is relatively weak in the short-run on a market, where there is excess ca-
pacity, and the price is determined by the short-term marginal costs of the sys-
tems. In this type of situation, accumulated capital is important in order to be 
able to pay the deficits evolving in such situations with excess capacity and 
prices based upon the short-run marginal costs.  
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9. The dynamics of the electricity supply sys-
tem and its Second Order Governance system 
before the 199948 electricity reform 
 
 
In the previous chapter we analysed the dynamics within the electricity supply 
system. Here we will combine this analysis with an analysis of the Public 
Regulation processes governing the electricity supply system. 
 
Our point of departure is the conclusion regarding the internal efficiency in re-
lation to the energy policy goals of the electricity service supply system, as it is 
shown in Table 13. 
 
If we look at the electricity system as a natural part of a larger system, which 
includes the Parliament and the public regulation processes and measures, one 
cannot say just by looking at the electricity service supply system, whether its is 
functioning optimally, seen in relation to the goals or not. It is the results of this 
larger system seen in relation to the goals, which is of relevance when evaluat-
ing performance in practice. Therefore, in the following section we will analyse 
to what extent the public regulation-/second order governance system supple-
ments the electricity supply system by repairing the “weaknesses”49 of the in-
ternal dynamics of the electricity supply system. In the following we will deal 
with this question. 
 
 
9.1 Public regulation processes and institutional reforms 
from 1975-1999  
Lobbyists should, as underlined in the Figure 6 structure, be divided between 
the ones who are economically bound to the old fossil fuel and uranium solu-
tions, and the ones, which are economically independent of these connec-
tions. 
 
                                                 
 48 We find it necessary to emphasise the development aspect of public regulation, in a 
situation, where radical technological changes are needed, implicating the develop-
ment of new techniques and organizations.  
49 Quotation marks, as we cannot call it weakness, if we aknowledge it as a conse-
quence of the division of labour between the electricity supply companies and the 
Parliamentary process. 
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The Parliament should be regarded as an organisation that is able to establish 
a process of innovative democracy, making it possible for the “majority”, 
which is economically independent of narrow economic interests on the en-
ergy scene, to design, choose and implement new technological solutions, if 
necessary, against the interest of the “minority”, consisting of strong and 
concentrated economic interests in specific fossil fuel or uranium based 
technologies.  
 
9.1.1 The interplay between the electricity system and the public regulation 
We now will illustrate the economic motivation of the Danish electricity com-
panies in three “situations”, namely, a situation with excess capacity, a situation 
with no excess capacity, and a description of the fossil fuel system as a dynam-
ic process which over time oscillates between the above two situations, and 
therefore should be understood as this type of “oscillation” process. 
 
Situation a: Motivation for electricity conservation or renewable energy in a 
situation with excess capacity  
The question here is, for which of the above three actors is continued use of 
coal the economically best solution, and for which actors is investment in re-
newable energy economically best? 
 
Comparison of innovative motivation of the Danish coal based electricity 
service supply system with the motivation of an independent company.  
 
Looking at the Danish coal based system in Figure 6 and 16, the direct elec-
tricity supply system consists of the value-added in the boxes 2,3,4, (13,7 
øre/kWh), plus the capital costs from 5,6,7,8,9,10 (23,3 øre/kWh). If there is 
excess capacity in a period, the 23,3 øre/kWh will be fixed, and therefore in-
dependent of the level of power production. It is possible to fire some of the 
employees, but there will be though resistance within the organisations 
against this. In practice, the saved cost in the conservation case will be the 
fuel costs plus for instance 20% of the 2,3,4, salaries to the employees, or in 
this case around altogether 16 øre for 1 kWh, which is 32% of the sales price 
in a non-profit system as the one described in Figure 6 and 16.  
 
We now assume, that it is possible to produce renewable energy based elec-
tricity and or electricity conservation for 30 øre/kWh. 
 
As there is excess capacity, which is the case in Denmark and Northern 
Germany for the next 5-10 years, this company only saves around 16 øre, 
when 1 kWh of electricity is produced at the renewable energy plant for 30 
øre/kWh. Therefore the companies will lose money if it introduces renewa-
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ble energy, namely 30-16= 14 Øre pr. kWh renewable energy produced 
by the company. 
 
In this situation, the electricity service supply systems will be strongly moti-
vated against electricity conservation and renewable energy. 
 
We now introduce a new company, which is totally economically independ-
ent of the fossil fuel company. We assume, that there is collaboration be-
tween the fossil fuel based power companies at the market, and that electrici-
ty consequently is sold for the full long term marginal cost plus profit for the 
coal-based electricity, or in this case 50 øre/kWh including transmission and 
distribution for electricity delivered at the consumer level.  
 
For the sake of the argument, we are here looking at the specific case, where 
a renewable energy-/electricity conservation "plant" is producing for the 
consumer, without having to use the transmission and distribution grid. It is 
the worst case situation seen from the viewpoint of the fossil fuel based sys-
tem.  
 
As the cost of electricity conservation and/or renewable energy production is 
30 øre/kWh, the independent firm achieves a yearly gain of 20 øre/kWh 
when producing renewable energy or electricity conservation instead of buy-
ing coal-based electricity. So this independent company is motivated for es-
tablishing a renewable energy or electricity conservation "plant".  
 
Meanwhile, in the real world, the coal-based company will, in this situation 
try to lower the sales price, where there are newcomer competitors, and/or 
establish a situation or governance system50 with oscillating prices, and in 
these ways establish a “barrier to entry” against renewable energy technolo-
gies. This will be done by in periods to sell electricity at prices far below the 
long term marginal costs of coal based electricity production. So even in this 
situation, reality might prove investing in renewable energy uneconomical 
for the independent company, if there is no public regulatory interference. 
 
The motivation of society in a situation with excess capacity 
On a short-term basis, the society will gain money by utilising the short-term 
excess capacity at the coal-fired plant by and abstain from building renewa-
ble energy systems. In a long-term perspective, such a policy will hinder the 
                                                 
50 Could be a system with “Green Certificates” for renewable energy, which changes 
the regulation system from fixed prices and variable amounts to a system with fixed 
amounts and variable prices. (See chapter 10.3) 
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technological development of renewable energy technologies, which, in this 
example, could produce electricity at lower long-term social costs. 
 
The above simple example illustrates that it is worthwhile not only to look at 
the long-run marginal costs when discussing technological innovation pro-
cesses, but also to look at the dynamics of the interplay between political 
processes, and the short-term marginal costs of established old technological 
systems. There will be a motivation for creating alliances between the coal-
based organisations, and economist, which analyse the world by means of 
neo-classical economy, dealing with technology within a static worldview, 
and regarding businesses as being undifferentiated with regard to economic-, 
organisational and cultural motivation.  
 
Situation b: Motivation, when there is no excess capacity 
In a situation with no excess capacity, as in California today, or what might 
evolve in Northern Europe within five to ten years, one could imagine that elec-
tricity service supply companies would have a higher interest in electricity con-
servation and renewable energy technologies, when established within their 
own organisations. It is the result of the analysis here that we will conclude that 
even in this situation there will still be the resistance against these new technol-
ogies. This is because renewable energy technologies requires organisation cul-
tures, which are very different from the organisation cultures linked to the use 
of fossil fuels (See Table 1 and section 5.4.) The established direct Electricity 
Service Supply Companies have a strong comparative advantage within 
knowledge regarding producing electricity services by means of large fossil 
fuel plants in combination with high tension transmission systems and low 
voltage electricity distribution systems. They do not have a corresponding 
comparative advantage in the production of electricity conservation and renew-
able energy based services.  
 
Furthermore, the strategic change from fossil fuel technologies to renewable 
energy and conservation (REC) technologies means a considerable decrease in 
value added within the existing fossil fuel companies. So, strategically, it is also 
in a situation with no excess capacity and very cost-efficient REC technologies, 
against the interest of the present fossil fuel companies to further investments in 
renewable energy and energy conservation technologies.  
 
Consequently, one cannot expect fossil fuel companies to further and deliber-
ately implement electricity conservation and renewable energy technologies, 
even in periods of no excess power plant capacity. 
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Situation c: Barriers to entry and oscillation between excess- and underca-
pacity. 
In addition to the above arguments, it is probable, that fossil fuel based systems 
should be regarded as  “by nature” and by “intention51” oscillating between a 
situation with excess capacity and low prices and a situation with not sufficient 
capacity and high prices. This “by nature” oscillation concept could be de-
scribed as a behaviour, which in its effects strengthens the competitiveness of 
the "techno-/organisation" of uranium and fossil fuel technologies against po-
tential newcomer technologies. If the long term marginal cost including profit 
at the power plant level is 25 øre/kWh there are two strategies, which can as-
sure coverage of production costs plus profit: 
 
One "strategy"52 is to establish a situation, approaching a constant price of 25 
øre/kWh. 
 
A second strategy would be to establish an oscillating price situation, where the 
average paid price is still 25 øre/kWh, but distributed with 12 øre/kWh in year, 
2,3,4,5, 60 øre/kWh, in year 6,7, 10 øre/kWh in year, 8 and 9, and 50 øre/kWh 
and year 10 at the power plant level. This second strategy gives- as mentioned- 
the same average price, but has one additional advantage seen from the point of 
view of the uranium and fossil fuel "techno- organisations", namely, that it con-
stitutes a rather efficient “barrier to entry” against newcomer technological par-
adigms such as electricity conservation- and renewable energy systems.  
 
One of the basic preconditions for the successful Danish, German and Spanish 
introduction of wind power was the public regulation linking the payment for 
wind power to the consumer price plus a public service payment from the state 
for the supply of CO2 free electricity. This gave a stable price making it possi-
ble for new organisations, in the specific case, wind power cooperatives, to bor-
row money in the banks for the windmill investment. This possibility would not 
have existed on a market with the same average but oscillating prices. Conse-
quently, the second strategy would have protected the fossil fuel and uranium 
based “first comer” techno–organisations against the newcomer technology, in 
this case windpower. 
 
                                                 
51  As there are strong “barrier to entry” qualities linked to a strategy based upon os-
cillating prices, it would be improbable, that nobody in the fossil fuel companies 
knew about this. And if they knew about it, it would be improbable that they would 
not try to use it consciously. 
52 A "strategy" here does not necessarily include a subject organisation that elabo-
rates the strategy.    
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At present, January 2001, the California electricity system has insufficient ca-
pacity, resulting in power prices, which on average are far above the long term 
marginal costs of power productions53. 
 
In Northern Europe there is at present excess capacity which is supposed to last 
until 2005/2008. This has resulted in electricity prices at the Nordpool market, 
which, due to the large proportion of hydropower at the Scandinavian market 
are often below the short term marginal costs of modern coal fired power 
plants.  
 
A capacity and price oscillation process is very difficult to withstand for new-
comer electricity conservation- and renewable energy technologies. 
 
Concluding it can be stated, that the motivation for electricity conservation will,  
in the case of excess capacity,  insufficient capacity and  with regard to the ca-
pacity and price oscillating strategy, be, that the fossil fuel based organisations 
will not have the economic motivation to invest whole-hearted in electricity 
conservation and renewable energy technologies. Their economical and organi-
sational motivation structure is not geared to engage in this type of radical 
technological change. Fossil fuel based energy companies have an organisa-
tional and economical motivation structure, which, with regard to the intro-
duction of energy conservation and renewable energy technologies, is very 
different from the motivation structure in firms, which are independent of 
fossil fuel interests. The banal truth thus is that fossil fuel based energy 
companies strongly tend to want to continue using fossil fuel based technol-
ogies, as that’s where they have their organisational comparative advantages 
and their “hardware” investments. Consequently these firms tend to go for 
“end of pipe” technological improvements, such as smoke abatement 
measures or a change from coal to nuclear technologies, which fits easily in-
to the fossil fuel organisational structure. 
 
This conclusion has consequences, when dealing with public regulation 
measures within the following areas: 
- To what extent public regulation should rely on corporate collaboration 
with existing fossil fuel and uranium companies, or rather develop mod-
els of collaboration with groups and companies, that are independent of 
fossil fuel interests. 
- To what extent the situation can be regarded as a win/win situation, or 
                                                 
53 On December 14th, the price of electricity on the California Power Exchange 
reached 1,4 US$/kWh. (The Economist, December 23,2000,pp.72-73), with 0.015 
US$/kWh being a typical short-term marginal cost at a coal fired power plant. 
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should be regarded as a situation, where there are losers and winners. 
- To what extent regulation tools like “Green Certificate Markets”, and a 
system with “tradable CO2 permits” should be introduced. 
 
One of the main public regulation and innovation problems at the energy scene 
is that the technological solutions needed in  meet to-days energy policy goals 
require radical technical and institutional changes. By radical technological 
changes is meant that changes are needed not only at the technical level, but al-
so at the level of knowledge, organisation and product. In a situation of change 
with these characteristics a regulation model along the lines of negotiated regu-
lation between the central administration and the large energy companies repre-
sents the fundamental problem, that the new technologies, are not present at the 
negotiation table. The owners and top managers of established fossil fuel com-
panies naturally will argue, that they are more than willing to implement the 
new renewable technologies as soon as these technologies are economically 
feasible. But due to the fact, that the fossil fuel companies would lose, if the re-
newable energy and conservation technologies are getting success, the fossil 
fuel companies represent the economic setting/organisation in society  in such a 
waythat the renewable energy technology , as illustrated in Table 10, will come 
up with the worst result in any economic feasibility study. 
 
9.1.2 The need for a non-corporate public regulation process 
As a consequence of the above arguments, the renewable energy and conserva-
tion technologies will not get acceptable conditions under a regulation model, 
which is characterised by negotiations between the fossil fuel energy compa-
nies and the central administration. Therefore, the parliament should establish 
regulation procedures, where groups independent of the fossil fuel interests are 
representing the new renewable energy and energy conservation technologies at 
the “negotiation table”. 
 
Naturally, we know that it is not easy for politicians wanting to be elected for 
the next term to govern against existing wealthy and focused54 minority inter-
ests, such as power companies and natural gas and oil companies, which have 
the economic motivation and resources to lobby heavily for their own interests. 
On the other hand, it is also important to emphasise what is often forgotten, that 
a functioning democratic process is the only place where there is always a po-
tential majority against any short-term and narrow economical interest group. 
The parliamentary democratic process, with its innovation gains for society, is a 
                                                 
  54 By focused we mean that power companies are producing mainly power. The alter-
natives to power companies are often electricity conservation measures, which have to 
be taken in companies having totally different main purposes. 
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potential forum for radical technological innovations. However, from the per-
spective of dominant firms in the market, the democratic process poses regret-
table innovation risks that could threaten their standing in the market.   
 
Until the mid-70s, there was very little public regulation of the electricity sys-
tem. Since then there has been a growing public attention and intervention in 
the affairs of the electricity system.  
 
The main questions at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s were nuclear 
power and the introduction of natural gas. Nuclear power was removed from 
the political agenda in 1984, while natural gas represented a new fuel distribu-
tion infrastructure that formed the base for a new competitive situation for the 
Danish electricity system. 
 
From 1975 until 1983, when the Parliament removed nuclear energy from the 
Danish Energy plans, the anti-nuclear power movement, OOA and the pro re-
newable energy movement OVE were very strong. A generation of motivated 
people became educated in the area of energy issues following these events. 
This generation is now working at universities, in the school system, in consul-
tancy firms, in the Ministry of Environment and Energy, and in the press. This 
movement continued as a sociological and psychological environment behind 
the energy planning discussion throughout the eighties and nineties. During this 
time, the Parliament allocated research funds for the development of renewable 
energy prototypes in biomass, solar and wind energy from an institution totally 
independent of the old energy companies55.  
 
The end of the 1980s witnessed the completion of the natural gas network. This 
network represents a physical infrastructure, which has made the extensive 
development of decentralised cogeneration of power and heat on the basis 
of natural gas possible everywhere in Denmark. 
 
The 1990s was a period during which the Danish electricity system encoun-
tered problems of hitherto unseen dimensions. At the same time they were of a 
character which the electricity system was not accustomed to deal with, and 
could not solve within its organisation. 
 
The most important external causes of these problems were the environmen-
tal problems and increased international competition for electricity consumers, 
in connection with the beginning implementation of market regimes and within 
the energy sector. 
                                                 
  55 Styregruppen for vedvarende energi. 
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The public regulation process was (and still is) a dialectic process between "ne-
gotiated regulation" between the central administration and the traditional pow-
er companies, on one hand, and active and open public debate (with partici-
pation from grass-roots movements, proponents for the new technologies, the 
general public, and Members of Parliament) on the other hand.  
One way of describing the main components of this process is described in 
Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34. Main components of the energy policy discourse, 1975-1999 
 
Figure explanation: The figure illustrates the Danish energy planning dis-
course with its combination of: Goals, Box 6, description of alternative tech-
nical scenarios, Box 1, description of alternative institutional scenarios, Box 
2, the political process, Box 3, with the economically dependent56 lobbyists, 
Box 5, and the economically independent lobbyists, Box 4. 
 
The energy planning discourse typically has developed within a process be-
tween the components of Figure 34, resulting in a dialectic process that some-
                                                 
56 An economically dependent lobbyist, is a lobbyist who is privately and economi-
cally influenced by the decision being discussed. It can be someone employed with-
in a fossil fuel company or selling equipment or getting economic support from such 
companies (political parties, pressure groups, or researchers). An independent lobby-
ist is not subject to such influence upon her/his private economy. 
(1) Alter native technical
scenar ios
-Ener gy conser vation, r enewable
ener gy, cogener ation
(2) Al ter native Institu tional
Scenar ios:
- Financing conditions, tar r iffs,
r esearch policy, education
policy, etc .
(3) Political process
- Openness in the public
administr ation
- Active and well - infor med
population, etc .
(4) Economically independent
lobbyists, such as
OOA, OVE, NOAH, DN, and the gener al
public , etc .
(5) Economically dependent
lobbyists such as Fossil fuel
companies, par ts of the tr ade
unions, assoc. of Danish
industr y, etc .
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a. Supply security
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efficiency
c. Environmental
efficiency
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efficiency
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times resulted in victories for the economically dependent lobbyists, the power 
companies, the association of large industries, and the metal trade union (which 
organises the workers at the large power plants). In other situations, the eco-
nomically independent grass-roots movements won victories, for instance, with 
regard to the large reforms resulting in an extensive introduction of wind power 
and decentralised cogeneration plants. In the nineties one could say that both 
the proponents for large coal-fired power plants and the supporters of decentral-
ised cogeneration plants won, which resulted in the establishment of a huge ex-
cess capacity at around the year 2000. 
 
If we start by examining the environmental problems, a massive parliamen-
tary majority supported the goal that Denmark, in the period from 1988-2005, 
should reduce the CO2 emission by at least 20%. When this type of legislation 
was possible in the late eighties, it was linked to the fact that there are many 
parties in the Danish Parliament. The old large parties, the Social Democrats, 
the Conservatives, and the Liberals are all linked to interests connected to the 
fossil fuel companies. But some of the smaller parties are independent of these 
links, and at the same time they sometimes have concrete political influence. 
For instance, in 1989, the Minister of Energy came from the small Liberal Rad-
ical party. He changed the energy policy and was responsible for the new "En-
ergy 2000" plan from 1990.  
 
The goals of the new energy policy started with “Energy 2000” and are now 
being sought for implementation by means of the Ministry of Energy's energy 
plan "Energy 21”. 
 
With regard to the supply of electricity, this plan calculated that: 
- The installed capacity of decentralised cogeneration of power and heat 
must be increased from the present 1700 MW to 2000 MW in the year 
2015. This should be seen in relation to a total installed non-wind capacity 
of 10500 MW.  
- The effect from wind generators should be increased from 1200 MW57 in 
2000 to 1800 MW by the year 2005, and 4000 by 2030. 
 
Recently, Parliament demands to the electricity system have been specified so 
that the electricity system has been charged with a specific obligation of reduc-
ing its CO2 emission by at least 20% of the 1988 level before the end of the 
year 2005. 
 
                                                 
57 The installed wind power capacity at the end of the year 2000 has reached 1500 
MW. 
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The politicians did not only give “lip service” to green plans. They also backed 
these plans in the nineties by actual measures for their energy policies. 
Amongst these measures may be mentioned the following institutional chang-
es: 
a) Introduction of a system of energy levies, including a CO2 levy. This levy 
is 0.65 DKr per kWh for households and a number of service enterprises, 
amounting to about 60% of the kWh price. The levy for industry, agricul-
ture, and market gardens, is only 0.10 DKr per kWh, amounting to 15% of 
the kWh price. 
b) CO2 subsidy of between 0.07 and 0.10 DKr per kWh for electricity pro-
duced by cogeneration plants powered by natural gas. 
c) In 1994, the Integrated Resource Planning Statute was brought into opera-
tion. This Statute requires the electricity system to prepare 20 year energy 
plans every second year. On this basis, the citizens will be kept aware of 
whether investments are to be made in plants, or consumers are to be af-
fected by investment in energy effectiveness. 
d) In December of 1995, a law was passed by Parliament establishing a set of 
regulations regarding the sale of electricity from decentralised cogenera-
tion plants. The law states the right to sell electricity from decentralised 
cogeneration plants to the public net, at a price equivalent to the long-
term avoided costs in the electricity system. This means a payment in-
cluding capital costs pr. kWh of large coal power plants and transmission 
network.  
e)  On April 16, 1996, a law proposal regarding a certain "liberalization" of 
the Danish electricity market was proposed by the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Energy (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1996). The main 
content of this law was that: 
 - Electricity distribution companies and companies with a consumption 
above 100GWh/year are allowed to buy electricity at the market, for in-
stance, from Norwegian or Swedish power companies. 
 - Electricity from cogeneration plants and renewable energy plants have a 
priority in the market, meaning that any distribution company is obliged to 
buy their portion of the total electricity production from these plants. Dur-
ing the winter months, the production from these plants will often be 80-
90% of the whole electricity market in Denmark. This market share is in-
creasing. During the summer months this proportion is naturally much 
lower.  
 - If any costs are connected to the above-mentioned obligation, these costs 
are equally distributed among the consumers of electricity.  
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This law is introduced in order to protect the Danish environmental "public ser-
vice policy” as the market is partly opened for the new market regime.  
  
On the public regulation process in Denmark in the nineties, the following can 
be concluded: 
- It has, in several cases, been possible to mobilise the democratic process in 
such a way that radical technological changes have been introduced and 
implemented.  
 
This is, among other things, due to a combination of: 
- A specific balance in the parliament resulting in a period with a “green ma-
jority” combined with a system with many parties in the Parliament, some 
of which have no interests directly linked to the power companies. These 
parties could then, in specific situations, become the deciding factor in the 
Parliament58.  
- Easy public access to communication with members of Parliament. 
- Grass-roots movements working during the seventies and eighties, educat-
ing many people within the energy area, and in that way, spreading this 
knowledge to almost any level in society.  
- The financial possibility of independent research at universities and new 
centres for renewable energy59. 
 
The latest legislative move regarding market access, and a continuation of the 
energy policy from "Energy 2000", shows the beginning of a change from 
"challenged and negotiated regulation" to "challenged legislative regulation". 
This has been made necessary partly because of the pressure for the changing 
market regimes around Denmark. 
 
9.1.3 To what extent does the Danish Public regulation compensate for the 
“shortcomings” of the goal efficiency of the direct energy supply compa-
nies? 
At the end of the previous Chapter 8, in Table 12, we localised the areas where 
the Direct Electricity Supply system could not, on its own, fulfil the described 
energy policy goals as described in Box. X in Figure. 6. The fulfilment of these 
goals should be achieved within the larger system described in Figure 6 as the 
electricity supply service system plus its second order Governance systems. In 
plain words, the electricity service supply system could only function in ac-
                                                 
58 . This situation seems to deteriorate in these years where the green majority is dis-
appearing according to current opinion pools. 
  59 For instance the "people’s Center for 
 Renewable Energy" in Ydby, Thy.  
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cordance with the goals if supplemented with a public regulation. The question 
now is whether or not and to what extent the Danish public regulation measures 
have improved the larger system in line with the described goals. 
 
Goal B: Price efficiency 
In a consumer owned system, price efficiency is, with regard to the average 
price, equal to cost efficiency. There is no ”third party” capital owner that 
could accumulate excessive profit, as the consumers themselves are the 
owners. The Danish Electricity supply service system is, as shown in Section 
8.1.7. very price efficient when looking at the development of the average 
electricity prices in Denmark compared with the electricity prices in the EU.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise two other main characteristics with 
regard to price structure in the Danish system: 
- Firstly, the Danish electricity system has the ”flattest” price structure in 
the EU, meaning that the Danish price structure has the smallest differ-
ence between large and small electricity consumers.  
- Secondly, the Danish price structure has the lowest capacity payment, 
when compared with other electricity systems in the EU. 
 
This characteristic of the price structure is not surprising, as the prices in the 
Danish system are determined by political power heads in the consumer 
ownership organisations, and not by buying power (money) at the market, or 
negotiation power of a strong heavy industry lobby in a state owned system. 
The lobby power of the heavy industries in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Ger-
many and UK is comparatively much higher than in Denmark, which has a 
business structure with relatively many farms, small firms and industries. 
The large energy consumers linked to the heavy industry can be counted on 
one hand, and therefore, have a relatively limited lobby power, in relation to 
the conditions in our neighbour countries. 
 
Public regulation has assured two main features, namely, openness with re-
gard to prices and costs, and a ”non third party” profit system, where it is not 
allowed to establish any profit to be used for other purposes than electricity 
supply services. So no third party, such as a shareholder or a municipality, 
has been allowed to take a profit from the electricity supply sector. 
 
This public regulation has managed to establish a situation, in combination 
with the internal dynamics of a consumer owned electricity supply system, 
that has secured the lowest electricity prices in the EU.  
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Goal C: Cost efficiency 
As discussed in Section 8.1.7, the Danish electricity supply system seems to be 
rather cost effective, with regard to its centralised power generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution on the basis of fossil fuels (coal). However, the Danish 
system does have a cost problem, when looking at its tendency to establish ex-
cess power plant capacity. This tendency can be ascribed to: 
a. Almost no interest paid on new investments. An electricity law allowing 
the power companies to pay 75% of the power plant in advance via the 
electricity prices.  
b. An internal democratic structure, which, in the ELSAM area, establishes a 
competition for new power plants. See Section 8.1.5. 
c. No tax on capital, which means that capital is very cheap for the power 
companies. 
 
The power companies cannot build a new plant without the acceptance of the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy. So, in principle, it should be possible to 
hinder excess capacity by means of the public regulation process.  
 
In practice, the public regulation process has not been able to perform this 
“brake” function60. Consequently, the electricity supply system has established 
excess capacity, especially in the nineties, just before the 1999 liberalization 
bill was passed. Nothing indicates, though, that the Danish organisational “con-
struction” has developed more excess capacity than the state owned and mo-
nopoly governed systems around Denmark.  
 
Looking at the larger system, the electricity supply service system and its sec-
ond order governance system, one might conclude that there are difficulties in 
avoiding the establishment of excess capacity. 
 
 
                                                 
60 This problem has been analysed in ”Offentlig Regularing og Teknologisk Kurs-
ændring”, Henrik Lund og Frede Hvelplund, Aalborg Universitetsforlag 1994. 
1999 remaining problem 1: Regarding cost efficiency there was 
still a tendency to establish excess capacity. 
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Goal D: Conservation efficiency 
Is the Danish electricity system conducive to increased consumption? 
 
The Danish electricity system is conducive to increased consumption, on the 
following grounds: 
- A capital transference system where the electricity distribution company 
(and the consumer) initiate reduced consumption and pay the same per kW 
of new capacity as the electricity distribution company (and the consumer) 
which further increased consumption. 
- A tariff system where the average price per consumed kWh falls according 
to the size of the increased consumption. This is caused by a system of 
consumption-related levies, which, in a number of areas, are as high as 600 
to 800 DKr. per consumer household. 
 
The electricity supply system has no internal motivation for decreasing elec-
tricity consumption by introducing a price system where there is no fixed 
price and where there might be no capital subsidy to the ones increasing their 
electricity consumption.  
 
Strangely enough, the public regulation process never has been able to 
change the tariff structure towards a system that motivates electricity con-
servation61. 
 
 
As shown in Chapter 8, the Danish electricity service supply system, on its own 
volition, is not able to implement the necessary radical technological changes 
without parliamentary intervention. 
 
It does not take the initiative to introduce radical technological change, and it 
systematically opposes the implementation of such changes. 
 
                                                 
61 This is interesting, as there have been proposals to change the tariff structure sev-
eral times within the last 20 years. This “minor” reform proposal seems to have met 
so much resistance between the administration of the fossil fuel companies that it 
was never implemented, nor seriously placed on the political agenda.  
Remaining problem 2, regarding conservation efficiency: 
The large system (the electricity supply system plus the second or-
der governance system) has not been able to introduce electricity 
tariffs which further electricity conservation, although this theme 
has been on the agenda several times during the last 20 years. 
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Since the beginning of the study period (1972), the electricity supply system 
has not taken any initiative for a general introduction of electricity saving, de-
central cogeneration plants or utilisation of renewable energy resources. 
 
The demand for the introduction of these technologies in energy policies has 
come, and still comes, from grass-roots movements, in combination with the 
parliamentary process. Reforms, which make it possible for these technologies 
to enter the market, have also come from the popular movements and Parlia-
ment. 
 
During the course of the whole period, the electricity supply system has sys-
tematically opposed the introduction of these new technologies. 
The systems strategy has: 
a) Made it difficult for a competitive technology to enter the political agenda. 
b) Opposed the practical implementation, if the new technology has been put 
on the political agenda. 
c) Attempted to take possession of the new technology, if this opposition has 
not been successful. 
 
Technological conservatism appears to be caused by: 
a. An election system with a series of indirect elections, which are directed 
towards strategically designed organisations. Representatives from the cen-
tralised power technologies dominate ELSAM and ELKRAFT. 
b. The general characteristics of an electricity system with a value-added 
chain as shown in Figure 8, combined with the above mentioned tendency 
to generate surplus capacity of the old coal-based technology. In such a sit-
uation and organisation, the new technologies have to compete with the 
short term marginal costs of the coal technology. This makes the existing 
power companies the least prone to adapt any new technology, which 
might result in decreased production of the centralised fossil fuel-based 
electricity supply service system. 
 
The Danish Parliament, so far, has shown some ability regarding the introduc-
tion of radical technological changes at the energy scene. This ability has to do 
with a combination of the development of a strong public debate on energy 
Remaining problem 3, regarding innovation efficiency:   
- Insufficient inclusion of economically independent groups at 
early stages of the planning process (too indecisive electricity 
conservation measures). 
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questions in the 1970s regarding nuclear energy and a Parliament with some 
small political parties, which are independent of the lobbyists of the power 
companies. The public debate was developed by grass-roots movements, 
which, again, educated many people on energy questions.  
 
The Danish political system has been able to introduce a set of regulation 
measures establishing radical technological changes, which have often been 
against the will of the power companies. The process has been a dialectical 
process between a tradition of negotiated regulation and another tradition of 
public interest and interference. Here we call this regulation a praxis for "chal-
lenged negotiated regulation". 
 
Compared to the regulation performance with regard to technological innova-
tion in other countries, the Danish Public regulation can be characterised as rel-
atively outstanding. But seen from within, an array of shortcomings come to 
light, such as: 
a. A very slow innovation process producing economic losses. For instance, 
the development of cogeneration went on from 1976 to 1990 before a 
breakthrough was established. In the meantime, a lot of time was wasted, 
and the established power companies had built new coal-fired power plants 
representing an expensive excess capacity, when added to the decentralised 
cogeneration plants being built in the nineties. This expensive and slow in-
novation process might be caused by a public regulation procedure that 
does not include economically independent groups early enough in the 
planning procedures. 
b. An inability to introduce massive innovation procedures at the area of elec-
tricity conservation. 
 
Here we are dealing with the ability of the electricity system to cooperate 
with technological systems outside the electricity sector. Cogeneration is the 
clearest example related to this dimension of efficiency, where the Danish 
electricity system has been able to collaborate with the heat markets in the 
larger cities since the fifties. This collaboration has developed without mas-
sive interference from the state level. 
 
The collaboration with the decentralised cogeneration technology has been 
much more difficult, and the electricity supply service system resisted this 
technology in a very long process of resistance, lasting from 1976-1990. 
Around 1990, the established electricity system lost the battle against decen-
tralised cogeneration in Denmark. Public regulation rules supporting decen-
tralised cogeneration were forced upon the electricity sector during the late 
eighties and nineties by the Parliament.  
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The latest technological ”problem” requiring system efficiency is the steer-
ing problem linked to the large proportion of wind power and cogeneration 
at the electricity market. Here, the established electricity system does not 
seem able to establish the necessary decentralised ways of regulation. In-
stead, it adheres to the way of regulation linked to high voltage grids com-
bined with large coal- fired plants as regulation units. 
 
The public regulation did not establish institutions making it attractive to co-
ordinate the increasing wind- and heat-steered electricity production locally, 
in order to avoid being forced to export the electricity at very low prices at 
the Nordpool market. 
 
 
Goal G: Democratic efficiency 
One way of looking at the levels where the consumer can influence their 
electricity supply service system is shown in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 35. Levels of consumer regulation 
 
Remaining problem 4, regarding system efficiency: 
No public regulation measures are introduced in order to facilitate 
regional coordination of fluctuating windpower, cogeneration and 
consumption.  
1. Medium: 
Elections, public 
debates etc.
2. Medium
Buyers and sellers
power
3. Medium:
Elected representatives,
public debate
5. Resultant
consumer
power
6. Public space (communication power)
4. Consumer
power
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(Consumers ownership
power)
1. Parliament
2. Marketplace
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Up until the electricity reform of 1999, the Danish system was characterised 
by a consumer owned system (Box 3), where the consumers could chose be-
tween different suppliers of electricity at the market, but they could choose 
between different directors, employees at the marketplace (Box 2). In that 
sense, there was market competition in the Danish electricity supply system. 
Whether this system functions or not, seen in relation to establishment of ef-
ficient consumer influence, depends on the way the democracy functions 
within the electricity service supply system and within the Parliament (the 
second order Governance system). These processes are then dependent upon 
the function of the communication sphere (Box 4). 
 
First, we will look at the function of the democratic processes within the 
electricity service supply system (Box 3). It has many weaknesses, when 
evaluated against the goals of the electricity system as shown in Figure 31. 
These are (among others): 
- The articles of association mostly allow a small majority of the elected 
representative to elect all the members of the board of directors. In that 
way, fundamental innovations are hindered, as they are almost always 
coming from minorities.  
- With conditions as the above mentioned, it is very difficult for people 
with new ideas to get influence. This reduces the interest in participating 
in the election processes. The number of people participating conse-
quently oscillates between 2 and 10%. 
 
Regarding the democracy in the consumer owned electricity system, one can 
conclude that it works with regard to the three goals, a. Supply security, b. 
Price efficiency and c. cost efficiency. With regard to the fulfilment of these 
goals, it does not really matter that only a small minority is voting, as this 
small minority has the same interest as the non-voting groups with regard to 
the fulfilment of these three goals. 
 
When looking for the innovation ability of the organisation, it can be con-
cluded that it does not exist when talking about radical technological innova-
tions. 
 
The next question is whether the Danish electricity system is (being) organised 
in such a way that it can be directed by the parliamentary system? 
 
Our conclusion is that the Danish electricity supply system has features mean-
ing that the causes of relative political dirigibility are: 
- It is a self-financing non-profit system which, financially, can survive in a 
decreasing market. From 1990 to 1999, ELSAM, the electricity supply sys-
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tem in Jutland-Funen, lost 30% of its market without getting economic 
problems. In the case of a joint stock company, like the German Preussen 
Electra, the result of such a decrease in market share could easily have re-
sulted in heavy drops in the value of the shares. 
- As there is no commercial competition, there is openness on prices, costs 
and development plans. 
- The Danish direct electricity supply system only counts for 27% of the 
value added in the whole electricity supply system, as it owns no coal 
mines, and produces no capital equipment.  
- The public accounts are not dependent on income or expenditure related 
to any specific electricity supply structure. 
 
 
However, this dirigibility is not worth very much if the electricity system cap-
tures the central administration, and thus decides the type of public regulation 
to be implemented. There has been a strong tendency in that direction by the 
establishment of a number of closed committees, consisting of members from 
the electricity sector and the central administration. One of these committees, 
the Electricity Strategy Committee has been directly involved in the preparation 
of the new Electricity Supply Statute.  
 
Goal H: Competitive efficiency 
Can the Danish electricity system compete under the new international re-
gulation regime?  
 
Yes, due to cost efficiency and a high level of consolidation, the danger of price 
competition at the Danish home market is very low, seen on a long-term basis. 
 
On a short-term basis, there is a danger that the Danish power plants cannot 
survive a period of excess capacity in the German and Scandinavian electricity 
system. This is due to the fact that the Danish power companies have no free 
capital and will have difficulties in surviving a period with prices determined 
by the short term marginal costs, which are as low as 10 øre/kWh.  
 
Remaining problem 5, regarding  democratic efficiency:  
The Parliament and the public administration have not, so far, in-
troduced systematic methods which secure the influence of eco-
nomically independent lobby groups. 
The election procedures of the electricity service supply system 
have not yet been improved sufficiently. 
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Nevertheless, the real danger is linked to a potential sale of parts of the system 
to foreign power companies, for instance, PreussenElectra, Vattenfall, etc. But 
this is, due to the Danish consumer ownership structure, not a very easy pro-
cess, as it has to be approved by the many elected representatives in the elec-
tricity system.  
 
The “take over danger” could be a reality in a scenario where the power com-
panies run into difficulties due to a period of very low electricity prices at the 
spot market, forcing them to seek capital by selling out shares to energy hold-
ing companies and/or their Scandinavian and German competitors. 
 
 
9.1.4 Remaining problems, a summary 
Table 15 resumes to what extent the second order regulation system (public 
regulation) succeed in remedying the shortcomings of the internal goal effi-
ciency of the electricity service supply system. 
 
Concluding, one can say, that the public regulation processes have some im-
portant successes within the goal price-, innovation-, and system efficiency. 
These achievements are very important, and have resulted in a massive intro-
duction of windpower-, cogeneration- and some biogas plants.  
 
The failures have been linked to the goals cost-, conservation-, and democratic 
and competition efficiency. 
 
With regard to cost efficiency, the problem is that the capital costs are too low, 
due to the methodology of financing new equipment and that the public regula-
tion process is unable to withstand the lobby pressure, when the electricity 
companies want to invest in new equipment. It is, though, still worthwhile to 
emphasise that the electricity system as a whole has a general built-in motiva-
tion to keep the costs low and a performance showing, that they to a large ex-
tent has succeeded with this effort. Nothing indicates that the performance of 
the Danish electricity system with regard to cost efficiency should not be at lev-
el with cost performance in other electricity systems in the EU.  
 
Remaining problem 6, regarding competition efficiency:   
Due to a combination of consolidation and no free capital, the 
Danish power companies are vulnerable in a situation where they 
have to survive on a market and where the price is close to the 
short-term marginal costs of large coal-fired power plants. 
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With regard to conservation-, and democratic efficiency it also is worthwhile to 
remark, that the Danish system is well functioning, when compared to the elec-
tricity system in other EU countries.  
 
When it comes to competition efficiency, the Danish system is very competitive 
with regard to ability to produce electricity to low prices at a long-term base. 
However, it has a weakness caused by having no free financial funds, which 
can be used for survival in shorter periods, where the price at the market is 
close to the short-term marginal costs. 
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Goals Need for public 
regulation 
Public regulation Remaining problems 
(1) Supply security None None None 
(2) Price efficiency 
Necessary to se-
cure openness 
with regard to 
costs and prices 
and a “non third 
part profit” regime. 
+ 
Legislation assuring 
“non third party prof-
it” assures price effi-
ciency. 
None 
(3) Cost efficiency 
Public regulation 
in order to avoid 
excess capacity 
+ 
The electricity sys-
tem can only build 
new capacity, after 
accept by the minis-
try of energy. 
The ministry of energy is still 
not able to assure that ex-
cess capacity is not build. 
Capture problem. 
+ 
(4) Conservation 
efficiency 
+++ 
No public regulation 
introducing “green” 
tariffs 
The tariffs are still supporting 
consumption increase. 
Capital in supply system is 
too cheap. 
+++ 
(5) Innovation effi-
ciency 
+++ Some inclusion of 
economically inde-
pendent groups in 
the planning process 
Still too late inclusion of in-
dependent groups. Not suffi-
cient proactive. 
+ 
(6)   System     ef-
ficiency 
+++ 
Legislative support 
of cogeneration 
No system regulation of 
windpower, cogeneration 
and consumption 
++ 
(7) Democratic effi-
ciency 
++ Some needs 
for vitalising the 
internal democrat-
ic processes. 
No legislation secur-
ing democracy within 
the electricity sys-
tem. No systematic 
inclusion of  eco.ind. 
groups. 
Still many problems both 
within the electricity system 
and within the public regula-
tion processes. 
++ 
(8)  Competitive ef-
ficiency 
++ 
When a market is 
introduced, it is 
necessary to es-
tablish some capi-
tal protection. 
No improvements of 
the public regulation 
procedures. 
 Still problems with no free 
capital. 
 
 
 
Table 15: The goal efficiency of the Danish electricity service supply system 
and its second order governance system 
 156 
The cause of the problem within public regulation shown above, is in general, 
that achievement of the energy policy goals requires the introduction of radical 
technological changes at the same time as there is a “regulation by negotiation” 
public regulation tradition in Denmark. Where public regulation has succeeded, 
it is where this tradition has been replaced by a regulation influenced by the 
economically independent grassroots groups. Where public regulation has not 
succeeded, it is where the economically dependent lobbyists such as the old 
fossil fuel based power producers have influenced it. 
 
The Figure 36 structure illustrates an explanation regarding the connection be-
tween the political process and an innovation process changing the electricity 
supply system from a fossil fuel-based energy system to a renewable ener-
gy/energy conservation-based energy system.  
 
It is important to mention two important circles of influence. The “Green” in-
fluences cluster around Boxes I, IVb, and III, and the “Black” influence cluster 
around IVa, I, II, V and VI. 
 
This is always linked to a set of politically defined goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157  157 
 
Figure 36. The electricity supply system, and its second order govern-
ance system. 
 
When describing the existing public regulation problems, it is important to lo-
calise them in the system and dynamics described in Figure 36. 
 
The key words are that there are goals (box B), a historically specific situation 
of technological change (box C), a division between economically dependent 
and economically independent lobby groups (box II and III), and a specific dy-
namics within the cost structure of the established fossil fuel based companies, 
(box VI). When combining these characteristics of the institutional setting and 
the historic situation, one starts to get a base telling within which “thinking 
base” /paradigm, the conclusions have been evolved. 
 
It is worthwhile to remark that if we had not been in a specific historic situation 
where the goals tell that it is necessary to decrease the emission of greenhouse 
gasses, having the consequence that radical technological changes are needed, 
it would not have been important to distinguish between economically depend-
ent and economically independent lobby groups. It is also worthwhile to be 
aware that this situation is rather new, and the political institutions and the po-
litical theory do not yet seem to be prepared to this situation of change. 
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The Danish second order governance system has succeeded in establishing 
some “new corporatism”, where is has opened some doors for the pressure 
from economically independent groups, but is still dominated by the old corpo-
ratism links between the parliamentary process and the old fossil fuel based 
power system. 
 
The latest development has shown tendencies in the direction of regulation by 
(negotiated) legislation instead of regulation by negotiation. A law stating the 
conditions regarding the sale of electricity from auto producers to the public net 
was accepted in Parliament at the end of 1995. According to the law the power 
companies are obliged to pay a price for electricity from cogeneration units 
equivalent to the long term marginal electricity production costs. 
 
The needed technological changes require more initiative by new organisations. 
It is not possible for the old power companies to develop and introduce these 
new technologies. New dynamic organisations and organisational models are 
needed. The regulation, at this stage of the technological development, has to 
introduce such organisational measures. But so far this has not been done. 
Whether Parliament will be able to introduce such regulation measures is the 
big regulation question for the time being. 
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The character of techno-
logical change 
The present market regu-
lation 
Shortcomings in the pre-
sent regulation regime 
Many internally inde-
pendent organisations. 
- Legislation assuring a 
rather stable price for 
electricity sold to the 
grid. 
- CO2 subsidy for re-
newable energy and 
cogeneration. 
- Public guaranty for 
loans invested in district 
heating systems. 
- Etc.etc. 
- Especially problems 
with electricity conser-
vation. 
- Not sufficient free con-
sultancy for the con-
sumers. 
- Not sufficient regulation 
of energy tariffs, where 
the fixed part often in-
creases, making con-
servation uneconomic. 
Technical solutions vary 
from place to place. 
- Network of publicly paid 
energy offices. 
-    The network is much to 
small. 
Often the techniques are 
at an “undeveloped” 
stage. 
- Subsidy to new tech-
niques. 
- Technical service. 
- Overly bureaucratic 
systems. 
 
Need for regional co-
ordination. 
-Regulation possible in the 
present system, but is still 
monopolised by the old sup-
ply system. 
-   The existing price and 
market system does not 
support the new co-
ordination needs. 
 
Table 16.  Radical technological change and problems in the present regula-
tion of the electricity supply system 
 
9.1.5 Proposals for changes in public regulation and the electricity service 
supply system 
These proposals are derived from the analyses of the situation before the elec-
tricity reforms in 1999, and can be used as yardstick when analysing the effects 
of this reform. 
 
The situation has changed. We have a new development at the international 
scene and we are at a stage of the technological development where a new pub-
lic regulation paradigm is needed. Together with a detailed knowledge of the 
existing organisational setting, this has to be taken into consideration, when the 
public regulation strategies of the future are designed. 
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The dynamics of the role of the Danish electricity supply system 
The development in the last two decades has shown that the Danish electricity 
service supply system is technologically conservative, inasmuch as it has an 
inherent need for expansion, in the direction of development towards large cen-
tral power plants in combination with major expansion of the high tension 
grids. 
 
The systems employees do not possess the competence to take the initiative to 
implement technological changes, which would require organisational change 
in the electricity system. This can be illustrated by the fact that, in the 20 years 
of the study period, there are no examples of any of the 11,000 employees in 
the electricity system having opposed the fundamental energy policy attitudes 
of the systems management. 
 
Initiatives for the introduction of wind generators, decentralised cogeneration 
plants, industrial cogeneration and electricity savings have all come from out-
side the electricity system. These initiatives have all been met with opposition 
from all parts of the electricity system. 
 
However, the opposition has not always been so severe that some of the initia-
tives could not be implemented. This is caused by a number of conditions in the 
Danish parliamentary system, and in the Danish electricity systems historical 
organisation, with consumer ownership, non-profit62 principles and relative 
openness on prices and costs. As opposed to the natural gas system, there is no 
significant confusion between the economy of the electricity supply system and 
the economy of the public sector, which serves to increase the electricity sys-
tems political dirigibility. These very positive aspects of the Danish electricity 
system should be retained in connection with the implementation of future re-
forms for the electricity area. 
 
If one is to understand the current pattern of reaction in the Danish electricity 
system, it must be comprehended as a battle on two fronts. Firstly63, opposition 
                                                 
  62 It is important to indicate that this is a consumer profit system, in which cost 
awareness is to the benefit of the consumers by means of the return of profits to the 
consumers in the form of lower prices. 
  63 It is not to be expected that the electricity system is incited to major implementation 
in any of these fields. It is difficult to believe in an initiative where the electricity sav-
ings are of such a volume as to make new generating capacity unnecessary for the next 
10 years. Of course there are groups, within the electricity system, that are working se-
riously and determinedly with electricity saving, etc. However, these initiatives, until 
further, have not shown themselves to be powerful enough, and the Danish Associa-
tion of Power Generating Companies has continued, determinedly, to oppose measures 
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continues against wind generators, decentralised cogeneration plants, industrial 
cogeneration and electricity savings, on the home market. This opposition 
swings continually between opposition and, where this does not succeed, take-
over. Secondly, the threats and possibilities from relations with PreussenEl-
ektra, Vattenfall, Electricity de France and EU regulation changes are intended 
to be managed. 
 
The electricity systems desire for an expansion of the capacities of the power 
plants and high tension grids must be seen as a stage in the participation of the 
Danish electricity system in the struggle/co-operation with the large neighbour-
ing electricity companies, on their technological premises. From the perspec-
tive of the power companies, it has been important, that the integrated resource 
planning did not prevent the construction of a planned 400 MW power plant, 
Avedøreværket II, which is a part of the co-operation with the large Swedish 
power company, Vattenfall, or the extension of the KONTEK connection, 
which is part of the agreement with the German VEAG/PreussenElektra/RWE, 
electricity companies. A take-over strategy or a practice whereby the electricity 
system -with the consumer’s money - gains a monopoly on electricity conser-
vation activities has been established. In the closed Electricity Strategy Com-
mittee, the implementation of the Statute on Integrated Resource Planning has 
been limited so that the electricity system - with the consumers money – is im-
plementing an electricity saving activity, concurrently with an increase (or at 
least no reduction) in electricity consumption.64 Thereby, electricity conserva-
tion is controlled in such a way that the Danish electricity system’s interest in 
the construction of new power plants and participation in the struggle/co-
operation with the large neighbouring power companies, is strengthened.  
 
At this time, the confrontation on two fronts appears to be the dominating inter-
est within the electricity system, but it is against the current parliamentary en-
ergy policy goals. Paradoxically, the new electricity law is, to an increasing de-
gree, making the electricity companies responsible for the further development 
of renewable energy, especially with regard to windmill parks in the sea.  
 
This combination of inherent resistance against the new renewable energy 
technologies within the electricity companies, and their increased responsibility 
                                                                                                                   
to convert electrical heating, in 1994 and 1995. 
  64 In connection with the argumentation for the new Avedøre II generating station, 
ELKRAFT assumes that electricity consumption will increase (unless there is public 
intervention) by 12% over the next 7 years, even though the increase in the last 7 years 
has only been 3-4%. If the results of the electricity savings, supported by the energy 
policies, are deducted from this 12% increase, then the result is a stagnation in electric-
ity consumption. 
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for the development of these technologies represents an institutional and politi-
cal time bomb, which makes it difficult to develop and implement solutions 
which are in accordance with the official aim of reducing the CO2 emission by 
50% before the year 2030. 
 
The environmentally necessary technologies 
At the same time we have come to a stage in the technological development at 
the energy scene in Denmark where it is no longer possible to gain very much 
by using "end of pipe" solutions. It is no longer possible just to build another 
better power plant, or to clean the smoke. The new technologies are decentral-
ised, and have to be developed, introduced and implemented by organisations, 
which often do not have energy as their main area of interest. 
 
At this stage of technological development, new infrastructures, organisations, 
calculation methods, etc., are needed. 
 
The international development 
New market regimes are introduced in Europe at present. The actors at the 
Danish energy scene are increasingly dependent on what is happening in Scan-
dinavia and the European Union. Regulation by negotiation may be increasing-
ly difficult along with internationalisation and the increasing difficulties in 
identifying with whom the administration should negotiate. 
 
It is in this landscape between changing technological and international condi-
tions, the following proposals should be seen. 
 
The above analysis of the development of the electricity supply system until the 
year 1999 leads to the recommendations of the following character shown be-
low. It should be mentioned that something very different has happened with 
the 1999 electricity reform. But it is interesting to discuss which reforms it 
might have been justified to introduce, and which reforms were introduced in 
reality. So first the needed reforms are mentioned, and later on the realised re-
forms will follow. 
 
1) Proposal to reduce the technological conservatism 
Internally in the electricity system 
Technological conservatism appears to be the result of the election system with 
a series of indirect elections, which are directed towards strategically designed 
organisations. Representatives from the centralised power generation technolo-
gies dominate ELSAM and ELKRAFT. The negative effects must be changed 
by means of: 
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a) Changing the election procedures of the electricity system to more direct 
elections, and 
b) Strengthening of those parts of the electricity system which are inde-
pendent, and also strengthening of the opportunity for the public to partici-
pate in the development of alternatives to the proposals of the electricity 
technocracy. 
 
In relation to the public administration and the political dirigibility  
c) Changing the capital flows within the electricity system so that accumulat-
ed capital for large power plants can be used for solutions, which are out-
side the scope and fantasy of the established power system. In this way, 
groups which are independent of the present electricity organisation can 
use their own electricity accumulated funds to construct local solar cell-, 
windpower-biomass power systems and establish electricity conservation 
investments, which makes it possible to economise with electricity and the 
use of fossil fuels. 
d) Establish “New corporatism” with committees in the energy administra-
tion, which are systematically using the expertise of groups that do not 
have direct economic interest linked to the energy companies . Representa-
tives for grassroots groups, citizens in a region, etc., establish a system of 
“New corporatism”, where the “lobbyists” from Figure 15, box II, b, are 
included in the decision process at an early stage.  
 
2) Proposal to maintain the cost efficiency 
The cost efficiency and especially the price efficiency appears to be caused by a 
system with the following characteristics, which should be maintained and 
strengthened 
 
e) A consumer profits system. 
f) Openness regarding electricity prices and electricity generating, transmis-
sion and distribution costs. 
g) The cooperative ownership organisation, where the consumer representati-
ves, in spite of low election participation, have rather effectively repre-
sented a desire for cost awareness, especially at the level of the electricity 
distribution companies. This system should be strengthened by more direct 
consumer elections. 
 These characteristics of the electricity system must be maintained in order 
to sustain the cost efficiency and the price structure of the Danish electrici-
ty system. 
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3) Proposal for change from a consumption furthering to a consumption 
reducing dynamics 
- Changes in the direction of progressive electricity prices and capital trans-
ference regulations which support electricity saving.  
- Abolishment of any fixed price for consumers that have been linked to net 
systems older than 10 years. 
 
4) Proposals for the strengthening of the democratic process 
- At all levels more public access. 
-  That committees in the central administration have members not only from 
the old power companies, but also from green organisations, the new re-
newable energy and conservation technologies, etc. The tradition of nego-
tiations in committees with members from the old power plant companies 
therefore should be changed. 
- That the new law on integrated resource planning should be changed in 
such a way that groups other than the old power plant companies get access 
to independent planning resources and investment funds. 
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10. The Danish 1999 “Liberalization” re-
forms 
 
 
Figure 37 illustrates the approach in Chapter 8 and 9 and the present Chapter 
10. In Chapter 8 we discussed the goal performance of the electricity service 
supply subsystem as it was organised until 1999. In Chapter 9 we discussed 
the goal performance of the combination of this system and the second order 
governance system as this system functioned in the period up to 1999. We 
ended up by giving proposals, which could improve the goal performance in 
some areas.  
 
 
Figure 37. The approach in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 
 
Chapter 8
(1) Analysis of goal performance of the electricity supply system as it
functioned until 1999
Goal performance of the  until 1999
electricity  supply system
Chapter 9
Analysis of the effects of the "until  1999 public regulation system".
Goal performance of  the "until 1999” electri-
city supply system + public regulation system
Chapter 10
Analysis of the impact on the Chapter 9 system of  the 1999
" liberalization" reforms.
Goal performance after the " liberalization"
reforms on the Chapter 9 system
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This Chapter 10 deals with an analysis of the impact of “liberalization” in 
general and the 1999 “liberalization” reform especially. The aim is to ana-
lyse two questions: 
 
a. To which degree the new reform improves the goal performance of the 
Danish electricity service supply system and its second order governance 
system. 
b. How the dynamics of this system is changed, and how this influences the 
questions regarding the Figure 5 influences of the development from the 
German energy system. The “risks” of selling the Danish electricity in-
frastructure, the influence upon Danish technological innovation at the 
energy scene, the direct political influence and the market competition 
influence.  
In 1999, a new electricity reform was accepted in the Parliament. In the fol-
lowing, we will describe this reform and discuss whether it is an answer to 
the needs for reform discussed in the preceding chapters. 
 
The new Danish law regarding the electricity supply system was approved 
by the Parliament on the 28/5/1999 with a solid majority. 
 
 
10.1 Background situation  
The technical development in the Danish electricity system in the nineties is 
characterised by considerable technical changes. In this period the wind 
power share of electricity production rose from 1.2 % to around 10% and the 
“Decentralised cogeneration” share from below 1% to around 25% of total 
electricity consumption. The share of electricity coming from large coal fired 
power plants decreased from close to 100% in 1990 to around 60% in 1999. 
 
The situation is characterised by an energy policy in the nineties, which al-
lowed both capacity increase in the green technologies, wind power and de-
centralised cogeneration, and in centralised coal based capacity, resulting in 
a considerable increase in power production capacity without a correspond-
ing increase in electricity consumption. In 1999, the total installed power 
plant capacity was 10570 MW (Exc. 1500 MW wind power), and the con-
sumption 32.5 TWh. These 32.5 TWh could, if each MW effect produced 
4000MWh/year, have been produced by means of a capacity of 8130MW.  
 
The excess capacity in the Danish electricity system, therefore, can be esti-
mated to be between 2000 and 3000 MW around 2000.  
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So the technical situation at the Danish electricity scene had, at the end of 
the nineties, the following characteristics:  
a. A recent increase in the wind power proportion to 15% of the total elec-
tricity consumption. 
b. A recent increase in the proportion decentralised cogeneration based 
electricity to 25% of the total electricity consumption. 
c. A recent decrease in the coal based electricity production from close to 
100% to a little above 60%. This is resulting in a situation where rather 
new coal-fired power plants are running at very low production, and 
where the average utility factor is around 3000 hours, meaning, that the 
coal-fired capacity is producing in average 3000 MWh/year pr installed 
MW capacity. This surplus capacity already in 1996, before finishing 
800 MW capacity at Vendsysselværket and in Skærbæk, made it possi-
ble to export 7TWh electricity in 1996. 
d. A considerable excess capacity amounting to around 30% of the in-
stalled capacity (excluding wind power). 
 
This situation naturally has a lot of influence upon the succeeding liberaliza-
tion, as Denmark adds a large contribution to the situation of excess capacity 
in Northern Europe. 
 
The 1999 electricity law from May 1999 
This introduced a system of changed regulation within the following areas: 
 
1. Changed regulation of the existing direct electricity service supply 
system consisting of: 
a. Market opening before 1/1/2003, so that all consumers have the right to 
buy electricity, wherever they want to.  
b. The establishment of a new organisational structure. 
c. CO2 quotas: 23 mil. Tons in 2000, 22 mil. Tons in 2001, 21 mil. Tons in 
2002 and 20 mil. Tons in 2003. If the power companies exceed their 
quotas, they will have to pay a fine of 40 DKK/ton, or around 3.5 
øre/kWh. 
2. The establishment of energy conservation legislation. 
3. A new “double market” regulation of “green technologies”.  
a. The introduction of “Green Certificates” and a market for renewable en-
ergy, together with the goal of 20% renewable energy based electricity 
from the total electricity consumption, before the end of 2003.  
b. The base price of renewable energy determined on the “market”, i.e. 
Nordpool. 
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10.2 The changed regulation of the existing direct electric-
ity service supply system and its impact upon cost and 
price efficiency 
It is worthwhile to mention that the Danish direct electricity service supply 
system in 1999 had a very good price efficiency, and a combination of price- 
and cost efficiency which made the Danish system provide the lowest elec-
tricity prices in EU including Sweden and Finland for industrial consumers 
using less than 1 mill. KWh/year. There were, however, indications that the 
Danish system, in specific situations like the one in the nineties where a 
“liberalization” was in the horizon, could result in the establishment of ex-
cess capacity. The question here is whether the 1999 “liberalization” is able 
to solve this (minor) problem regarding a tendency to develop excess capaci-
ty while not destroying the high price efficiency of the system. 
  
10.2.1 The establishment of a new organisational structure 
A distinction is established between: 
- power production companies, which, in the future, will be stock-profit 
driven companies with an obligation to continue to deliver heat to the 
cities,  
- system operator companies (at present two), which will be monopolies, 
and have the obligation to manage the transmission networks and co-
ordinate the whole electricity system within their region, and  
- net distribution companies, which will own and manage the distribution 
networks and continue to be monopoly companies in the future, 
- electricity supply companies, which have the obligation to supply elec-
tricity to all the consumers in their supply area,  
- electricity trade companies, which is any company that wants to trade 
electricity, and are allowed to earn a profit. 
 
In the year 2001, the common ownership structure is that the consumer owns 
the power production companies. Meanwhile, the door for sale to other own-
ers has been opened by the 1999 reform. Especially the fact that they now 
are allowed to gain and accumulate a profit, is a necessary precondition for a 
later sale. A sale of parts of the power companies is a probable scenario, as 
the ongoing very strong merger movement between electricity companies all 
over Europe might make it very tempting for the “director level” manage-
ment groups in the Danish power companies to enter so called “strategic al-
liances” with, for instance, Vattenfall, E.ON. Energie (former PreussenElec-
tra and Bayernwerk). In practise, exchanging ownership shares typically re-
sults in this.  
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In the case of sale, any surplus should be returned to the owners/consumers. 
But the sales price might be too low, if the influence from the consumer rep-
resentatives is too weak.  
 
Power companies have the obligation65 to continue deliverance of district 
heat to their heat markets in the big cities at prices that are not exploiting a 
monopoly position (§75 stk.2 in the 1999 electricity law). The power com-
panies shall also meet the CO2 quota, which is stipulated each year by the 
Parliament. 
 
The System operator companies are still owned by the consumers. At present 
there are two such companies, namely ELTRA in Jutland-Funen and 
ELKRAFT on Zealand. 
 
They own and operate the transmission network, and have the obligation to 
secure that the total system functions with regard to capacity and technical 
quality of the electricity. Furthermore, they must secure that the prioritised 
electricity production (renewable energy and cogeneration) is sold and dis-
tributed proportionally66 to the consumers. The company also should pay for 
this prioritised electricity to the producers and collect the payment from the 
consumers. The system operator also has an obligation financially to support 
the development of new electricity conservation and renewable energy tech-
nologies. 
 
More than 50% of the executive body should be elected by the consumers in 
the supply area of the system operator. 
 
The system Operator Company and the transmission network can be sold, 
but the State has the right of pre-emption within three months from the mo-
ment, when a bid from a buyer is known. The State must pay a price accord-
ing to “usual market conditions”. Here it should be stated, that it is very dif-
ficult-if not impossible- to define usual “market conditions” in a situation 
where there are only very few potential buyers. If the State does not use its 
                                                 
65 It is not possible to force power companies to deliver heat to the large cities ac-
cording to the hitherto price policy, where the heat consumers just pay the marginal 
extra costs, which, on a power producing coal-fired plant selling electricity to the 
long-run marginal costs, can be allocated to the extra activity “heat production”. So 
if the power companies cannot sell the electricity from the cogeneration plants at the 
market for a price, which in average is equal to the long-term marginal costs of elec-
tricity production at a large coal-fired power plant, it will nevertheless be necessary 
to rise the heat price in the large cities.  
66 Any consumer is obliged to buy a certain percentage of prioritised electricity. 
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option within a three months period, it looses it. 
 
A “reasonable profit” can be returned to capital owners, linked to the amount 
of physical assets needed for the activities of the system operator § 69 in the 
1999 electricity law. The estimation of the value of the fixed assets is done 
in an opening balance at 1/7 2000 (Kragelund, 2000). The following years 
the value of the fixed assets will be estimated by means of usual accountancy 
principles. 
 
There are 104 Distribution net Companies out of which 45 are owned by the 
municipalities, 40 are consumer co-operatives, 11 self-governing institu-
tions, 7 partnership owned, and 1 a limited company. They own and operate 
the distribution network and secure the technical quality within the network. 
According to the 1999 law, they are also obliged to give energy conservation 
advice and to further electricity conservation in their area. The consumers in 
the supply area must elect more than 50% of the executive committee.  The 
company can be sold, but there are rather strict rules controlling the profit, 
which can be extracted from the company.  
 
The owners can extract a “reasonable” profit as return on the investment 
share contributed. This does not mean that a profit share related to any share 
“purchase” automatically can be extracted. The basic principle regarding 
price policy is that the company can cover costs plus a reasonable payment 
to the investment share contributed. The rate of return is calculated on the 
base of a making up regarding the value of the necessary fixed assets, and 
will be around 7% in interest.  
 
The estimation of the value of the fixed assets is done in an opening balance 
at 1/7 2000 (Kragelund, 2000). The following years the value of the fixed as-
sets will be estimated by means of usual accountancy principles.  
 
The electricity supply companies are initially the same as the Distribution net 
companies. They are achieving concession from the State for a period of five 
years, and must with regard to accounting, be separated from the distribution 
net companies. 
 
Their main obligation is, within a specific region, to supply electricity for 
reasonable prices and conditions to any consumer who might want it. And 
furthermore to organise the accounting and payment procedures related to 
help fulfilling the consumer obligation to buy a specified proportion of prior-
itised electricity. In this connection they also are supposed to organise the 
system of “Green certificates” for renewable energy, when this is established 
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around the year 2003. Supplying electricity conservation counselling also is 
one of the obligations of the supply obligation companies. 
 
At least the consumers must elect 30% of the members of the board. 
 
The company can be sold.  
 
The basic principle regarding price policy is that the company can cover 
costs plus a reasonable payment to the investment share contributed. The 
rate of return is linked to an account rendered regarding the value of the 
fixed assets, and will be around 7% in interest.  
 
Electricity trading companies can be any company that wants to trade with 
electricity. They have the right to use the transmission- and distribution net-
works, when paying according to the rules described in the 1999 electricity 
law. 
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In Table 17 the above information are resumed. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)Point of  
departure 
ownership 
(2) Owner-
ship Re-
strictions 
(3)Profit 
Re-
striction
s 
(4)Public Ser-
vice Duties 
(5)Other 
Re-
strictions 
(a)Power  
production 
companies 
Consumer 
ownership. 
None. None. Heat supplies 
obligation. 
Price control 
for heat prices. 
CO2 quo-
tas. 
(b)Distributio
n net   
companies 
Consumer 
ownership. 
At least 
50% con-
sumer 
ownership. 
Reason-
able 
profit 
linked to 
estima-
tion of 
fixed as-
sets. 
Obligation to 
organise pay-
ment for re-
newable energy 
etc.  
Establish 
standard 
“articles of 
associa-
tion”. 
(c) Electricity 
supply    
companies 
Consumer 
ownership. 
At least 
30% con-
sumer 
ownership. 
Reason-
able 
profit 
linked to 
estima-
tion of 
fixed as-
sets. 
Obligatory 
supply of elec-
tricity and PSO 
service. Organ-
ise payment for 
renewable en-
ergy, etc. 
Establish-
ment of  
standard 
“articles of 
associa-
tion”. 
(d)System  
operator  
companies 
Consumer 
ownership 
At least 
50% con-
sumer 
ownership. 
Public rep-
resentation 
in board. 
Reason-
able 
profit 
linked to 
estima-
tion of 
fixed as-
sets. 
Obligatory 
supply security 
for the whole 
system. 
Establish 
develop-
ment pro-
gram for 
“green” 
technolo-
gies. 
(e)Electricity 
trade  
companies 
None. None. None. None. None. 
 
Table 17. A summary of the organisational and ownership part of the Danish 
electricity reform 
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By the 1999 electricity law it is stated that disputes are resolved in the elec-
tricity supervision committee, to which six members are designated by the 
Minister of Energy. 
 
10.2.2 The degree of market competition in the 1999 electricity law 
One of the main aims of the new law is to establish increased competition in 
the electricity service supply sector. In order to analyse this question, it is 
worthwhile to go back to our discussion regarding the value-added chain in 
this sector, as described in Figure 8, and combine it with a description of the 
regulation changes being introduced by the 1999 electricity reform. This 
combination is seen in Table 18. 
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“Liberaliza-
tion” 
Dimensions 
   2. Direct Electricity supply system 
3. Indi-
rect 
eletr. 
system 
4. Con-
sumer 
level 
 
1. Fuel 
system 
2.1.Power 
produc-
tion 
2.2.  
Transmission 
2.3. 
Distribution 
(a) Value 
added as %  
of Direct 
Danish Elec-
tricity Supply 
System 
     26%       9.3%       3.4%      14.6%        46.7        100 
(b) Buyers 
Power, Price 
competition 
No gen-
eral re-
forms in 
order to 
remove 
subsi-
dies.  
- Access 
to buy 
from any 
power 
producer. 
-Obligation to 
transmit at fair 
prices. 
-Natural mo-
nopoly. 
-Natural mo-
nopoly on “net 
services”. 
-Less price in-
formation. 
 
No re-
forms 
No control 
regarding 
consumer 
cartels. 
(c) Owner-
ship Pow-
er/competitio
n. 
No re-
forms. 
-No effi-
cient mo-
nopoly 
control. 
-100% can 
be sold. 
- As 2.2.c. 
-No division of 
ownership be-
tween power 
production, 
transmission and 
distribution. 
- State “option”. 
-No max. Size 
for distribution 
companies. 
- 50% to 70%  
influence and 
assets might be 
sold. 
-As 2.2.c. 
No re-
forms 
No control 
regarding 
consumer 
cartels. 
(d) Parlia-
mentary 
power 
No re-
forms. 
Conces-
sion sys-
tem. 
- Public repre-
sentation in the 
board of the 
“system respon-
sible” company. 
-Introduction of 
state cost control 
(Bench marking) 
-Public Service 
Obligations. 
No re-
forms 
- Conser-
vation 
linked to 
Distribution 
comp. No 
independ-
ent con-
servation 
agents. 
(e) Access to 
public grid. 
Barriers to 
entry remov-
al. 
As 2.2 c. -Close to 
monopoly 
with regard 
to regulato-
ry services. 
 monopoly with 
regard to decid-
ing the type of, 
and agent for 
regulatory ser-
vices. 
-Free use of the 
distribution net. 
Fair payment.  
 No re-
forms 
-No policy 
against 
monopolis-
tic electrici-
ty tariffs. 
etc.etc. 
 
Table 18. The “liberalized “ sections of the direct and indirect electricity 
service supply system. 
 
 175  175 
How to read the table? When the consumer buys electricity for 100 DKr, 
26% goes towards fuel, 46.7% to the indirect electricity system and the rest, 
27.3%, to the organisations/people managing the production chain, power 
companies, transmission grid and distribution system.  
 
Only the black/grey part in Table 18, power production, or in this case 9.3% 
of the total value added chain, is liberalized in the sense that the consumer 
can select between different power producers. Consumers still have to use 
the “one set” of distribution and transmission cables. The distribution and 
transmission systems thus here, as everywhere else in the world, remain mo-
nopolies.  
 
Furthermore, as it can be seen from the above table, the “liberalization” di-
mension of the Danish 1999 electricity reform, as well as the liberalization 
reforms in the electricity sector of other countries, only deals with liberaliz-
ing the direct electricity supply sector. There are no reforms dealing with 
fuel procurement, which could have been the case as a part of the EU collab-
oration. There are no reforms dealing with the indirect electricity system, or 
dealing with competition between power cable-, power plant- solar cell- and 
wind generator producers, although equipment, in the case of coal-based 
technology, amounts to almost 50% of the electricity prices. A percentage, 
which will increase when windpower and solar cells get a larger share of the 
electricity markets. 
 
If we regard liberalization as a method to increase consumer influence over a 
production system, this can be done by means of the three lines shown in 
Figure 31, consumer power through the Parliament, through the market and 
through consumer ownership control. 
 
The Danish electricity supply system still has consumer ownership control, 
but the door has been opened for changes in this area. The power plants and 
large parts of the network and transmission companies might be sold to 
shareholding companies or other electricity companies. If this happens, the 
Danish electricity supply system risks losing its consumer control or moving 
from a consumer ownership type of political liberalization to a shareholder 
ownership type of oligopolistic “liberalization” such as in the UK. In that 
case, it is most probable that the cost and especially the price efficiency of 
the Danish electricity supply system will considerably decrease. 
 
So with regard to price and cost efficiency, the Danish electricity consumers 
cannot expect any improvements. Rather they can expect price increases, 
and a new price structure making smaller consumers pay relatively more per 
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kWh than large consumers, as they already do today. This is what will prob-
ably happen, despite the fact, that cheaper and more cost efficient electricity 
production was the main argument behind the reforms.  
 
All the reforms are only dealing with the “Direct Electricity service supply 
system” which amounts to around one quarter of value added contained in 
the Danish electricity price.  
 
Regarding Buyers power: 
The transmission and distribution net services are almost 100% natural mo-
nopoly services in the Danish consumer profit system. There is no windfall 
profit to any stockholders, which could be decreased by means of increased 
competition. The value-added share of the electricity price, therefore mainly 
are net services.  
 
Both the transmission- and distribution net services will continue to be area 
monopolies.  
 
Therefore, what is left for price competition in the Danish system is the 
power companies, being responsible for around 10% of the electricity price. 
 
Regarding Ownership power/competition 
From a legislation point of view, it is now possible to sell the power compa-
nies to anybody, and the power companies are allowed to get a profit. The 
road is open for the establishment of stock ownership by others than the 
electricity consumers. Still the motivation for selling might be weak, as any 
profit should be distributed between the consumers, and sale should be ap-
proved between the consumerss representatives. This means that it is not as 
easy to sell consumer owned power companies, as it is for a government to 
sell its state owned companies. Many of decentralised decisions have to be 
made within the democratic institutions of the electricity companies. Fur-
thermore, the excess capacity in the Danish power system at present has no 
high value, as the CO2 quotas makes profitable export difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, it is a possible scenario that the professional directors of the 
power companies will be able to convince the democratic assemblies of the 
electricity companies that it is a good idea to sell, for instance, 30-50% of 
the power companies in order to establish strategically partnerships with 
other large actors at the market. The professional leaders within the power 
companies might have an interest in this development, as it would weaken 
competition and establish a stabilised market situation. It is much more diffi-
cult to localise any interest seen from the consumer viewpoint, as a weak-
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ened competition results in higher consumer prices. 
 
Concluding, regarding consumer ownership control, this control has been 
decreased by the reform, as it is now to an increased extent possible to sell 
the property rights to non-consumer capital interests.  
 
Parliamentary consumer power.     
There is public representation in the board of the “system responsible com-
pany”, which also handles the transmission system. 
The openness regarding costs and prices has been decreased in the whole 
system. 
 
In general, no increased openness towards the public has been introduced. 
 
State “Bench marking control “ has been introduced towards the distribution 
companies. So now we are in a situation where the costs in a privately con-
sumer owned system is not only controlled by the owners representatives, 
but also by the state authorities, which are now controlling that the consum-
ers are not cheating themselves. 
 
 
10.3 Comparison of the new Danish and the new German 
renewable energy governance systems 
In the 1999 Danish electricity reform the "political price-/amount market" 
system was replaced with a "political amount-/certificate price market" mod-
el. All wind turbines contracted before end 1999 were secured a political 
fixed price for the produced electricity, whereas wind turbines contracted af-
ter this date were paid according to the new renewable energy governance 
system. In this system the price consists of two elements, of which the first is 
the normal spot market price at the Scandinavian Nordpool electricity mar-
ket, and the second a price on green certificates determined upon a market 
for "green certificates". This system is supplemented by a political quota, 
where the consumers are obliged to buy a certain percentage of their electric-
ity consumption from renewable energy technologies. This quota is defined 
some years ahead. The system is planned to be implemented in the year 
2003. 
 
Here we will compare this new Danish renewable energy governance system 
with the new German renewable energy governance system. 
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(a) The new German is a “Political price-/amount market67” model, which 
has politically set prices for RE (Renewable Energy) electricity, and 
where the produced quantity of RE electricity is determined on the mar-
ket; and: 
(b) The new Danish system is “Political quota-/certificate price market68” 
model, where the RE electricity quantity is politically fixed as a quota 
and the RE electricity prices determined on the market. 
 
The “Political price-/amount market” model has been successful in Germa-
ny, Spain, and Denmark, countries that boasted around 80% of the European 
wind power production in 2000.  
 
In 1999, the Danish Parliament approved a law introducing a "Political quo-
ta-/certificate price market" model for RE. Wind turbines contracted from 
2000 and onwards are subdued to payment according to these not yet totally 
settled rules. Almost no contracts have been entered into under these rules, 
which have brought the Danish wind power development to a very critical 
situation. Only offshore wind turbines are build, as they are subdued to spe-
cific "demonstration project" subsidies and payment rules. The wind power 
boom (660 MW) of 2000 was contracted before 31/12 1999 and based on the 
old "Political price-/amount market rules", which were in effect until this 
date. 
 
In 2000, the German Parliament approved a new advanced "Political price-
/amount market", and in 2001, the French Parliament accepted a similar 
model. Recently, the EU commission accepted the use of the "Political price-
/amount market" model in the latest Directive proposal3, which has been ac-
cepted by the Council of Ministers. This keeps the question of the future 
regulation framework open. The “Political amount-/certificate price market" 
model, therefore, is no longer ‘the only possible future regulation model’. 
This development has lately been supported by a European Court adjudica-
tion69, which says that the German "Political price-/amount market" model is 
not to be regarded as illegal state aid, and is therefore acceptable as a way of 
regulating RE development.  
                                                 
67 The price is politically determined, and the RE-electricity amount is determined 
on a market. 
68 The amount  (quota) is politically set and the price is partly determined on the 
market, ‘partly’ only because the price in the new Danish "Political quota-/certificate 
price market" system can only oscillate between a politically determined minimum 
and maximum. 
69 13 March 2000: Judgement of the Court, Case C-379/98. 
Formateret: Automatisk nummerering + Niveau: 1 +
Nummereringstypografi: a, b, c, … + Begynd med: 1 +
Justering: Venstre + Justeret:  0 cm + Indrykning:  0,63 cm
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The main arguments for introducing a "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" system have been linked to the belief that a system with quota regula-
tion and a price regulated on the market would increase competition between 
suppliers of RE and result in getting more ‘value for the money’ of RE. Up-
on examining the various arguments and the dynamics of the debate, it is 
striking that there does not seem to be any thorough discussion on the fact 
that, compared to fossil fuel technologies, RE technologies are characterised 
by: 
 
a. Having a cost structure with a very high percentage of investment-fixed 
costs and very low running costs, which implicates high investor risks on the 
market and an increasing importance in keeping the competition at the 
equipment market alive. 
 
b.Having different natural resource bases from location to location, a factor 
which makes it necessary to establish a governance system that furthers an 
EU-wide "site efficiency"70 generating process rather than a " mono price" 
(one price on a European market) based price competition. 
 
c.Being dispersed around the country, and often in residential areas, which 
makes it particularly important to involve neighbours and people from the 
region in the design, development and ownership of RE projects.  
 
d.Being newcomer technologies, thus having minor market shares and meet-
ing resistance strategies from established technologies. 
 
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model is no longer ‘the only 
possible future EU renewable energy regulation framework’. The arena is 
open. The "Political price-/amount market" model is a better governance 
model for any country, as well as for the EU, especially because it is well 
adapted to the above four specific demands to a RE regulation framework.  
 
Which governance model is a market model? 
Before entering a discussion of the above four specific characteristics of re-
newable energy development, it is necessary to briefly discuss the "ideologi-
cal question" regarding the "market" attributes of the two models. 
 
                                                 
70 By "site efficiency" is meant efficiency with regard to the exploitation of a specif-
ic regional renewable energy resource. 
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The "Political quota-/certificate price market" system, with its politically set 
quantities (quotas), has persistently been marketed as more market-oriented 
than a "Political price-/amount market" system with politically fixed prices 
and quantities determined on a market. This delusion has been so successful 
that it is now an almost undisputed ‘fact’, that “Green Certificate” trading on 
the basis of a market plus quota regulation should be ‘the genuine market’ 
system.  
 
Table 18 illustrates why this is a delusion. 
 
 "Political quota 
/certificate price-
market" model 
(Danish model from 
2003) 
"Political price 
/amount market" model 
(Present German, Span-
ish and French model) 
Price determination Market and 
Political  
Political 
Amount determination Political Market 
 
Table 18. Political and market determination of price and quantity in two 
regulation models 
 
Comment: The price in the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model is partly politically defined, since the law determines that the 
price should not be below 1,32 EUR/C/kWh or above 3,57 EUR/C/kWh. 
 
As illustrated in the table, the "Political quota-/certificate price market" 
model shows the political interference on the market at the quantity as well 
as at the price levels in the Danish case. The only political intervention in 
the "Political price-/amount market" model is at the price level. 
 
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, therefore, is not more 
liberal or market- oriented than the advanced "Political price-/amount mar-
ket" model. On the contrary, the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price 
market" model, due to its 100% State-governed amounts, and partly State-
governed prices, was closely related to the governance frameworks of for-
mer East-European planned economies until around 1990. 
 
The high fixed cost RE characteristics  
(The "political quota-/certificate price market" system is “liberalizing” a 
dwindling market and “bureaucratising” a growing market) 
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In a "Political price-/amount market" system, the wind turbine factories are 
able to decrease their selling prices, resulting in an increased sale of wind 
turbines. It is due to this system that the wind power cost pr. kWh has de-
creased by 80% since 1980. In a "Political quota-/certificate price market" 
system, the quantity of wind power is politically decided several years 
ahead. Consequently, the wind turbine producers, as a group, can only in-
crease their turnover by increasing prices. This motivates the wind power 
firms to establish "strategic collaboration" or mergers, in order to achieve in-
creased market control. This mechanism constitutes an important problem as 
one of the general structural changes on the market. The decrease of value 
added on the market for electricity and the likely increase of value added on 
the market for energy equipment, seen as a proportion of the sales price at 
the consumer level.  
 
Concretely, the change to some types of RE systems, such as wind power, 
represents an automation of electricity production, with 85-90 % as invest-
ment costs and the rest as maintenance costs. Once the wind turbine is built, 
hardly anybody works on it. It just produces electricity for 20-30 years, and 
is usually maintained by service units linked to wind turbine factories. 
Therefore, the wind turbine will not work more efficiently because of com-
petition with other wind turbines on the electricity market. In a traditional 
electricity service supply system, the situation is totally different. At least in 
theory, one might expect that market competition on the electricity market 
might put pressure upon the power utilities, which will then dismiss some of 
the people employed at the power plant. A wind turbine can dismiss nobody, 
once it is built. Any potential personnel compression can then only happen at 
the level of the wind turbine factory, because a wind turbine is, in principle, 
an energy automaton.  
 
At present, fossil fuel back-up systems are still being used. But in the future, 
a system with different types of storage techniques, such as hydrogen stor-
age, might be developed. These systems also appear to be “automatic storage 
systems”, which hardly require any maintenance performed by employees in 
an energy organisation. 
 
Thus, when introducing renewable energy systems, the market for electric-
ity is decreasing in importance, whereas the market for energy equipment 
is becoming increasingly important.  
 
In Table 19, the relative importance of the market for equipment is compared 
within a fossil fuel system and a renewable energy-/electricity conservation 
system.  
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 Equipment market Electricity market 
Fossil fuel systems 47% 53% 
Renewable- and electricity 
Conservation systems 
81% 19% 
 
Table 19: moving from fossil fuel to RE means a change in value added from 
the electricity market to the equipment market 
 
In the present situation of technological change, the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system ends up introducing price competition on a 
dwindling market and abolishing market competition on an expanding mar-
ket. The advanced "Political price-/amount market" system supports market 
competition on the growing market for equipment, and, therefore, is espe-
cially well suited to the present period of technological change.  
 
Different natural resources base from location to location  
As mentioned in the beginning, renewable energy technologies are charac-
terised by having different natural resource capacities from location to loca-
tion. A wind turbine on an inland site in Germany only produces around 
50% of the quantity produced on a very good coastal site in Ireland or Scot-
land. When dealing with nuclear-, natural gas- or coal-fired power plants, 
variations from location to location will mainly depend on differences in 
cooling facilities, with a coastal site being slightly cheaper than an inland 
site that needs cooling towers.  
 
Due to the declared EU goal71 of increasing the percentage of RE based elec-
tricity production (not including large hydro) from 3.2 % to 12.5 % during 
the 1997-2010 period, it is necessary to not only exploit the best coastal sites 
for wind power. It is also necessary to use good inland wind sites all over 
Europe. With a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system for EU, 
there would be only one certificate price for wind power in the EU.  
 
Regarding wind power, Figure 38 shows the different production prices in a 
"model union" consisting of three case countries.  
                                                 
71 See Annex 1. in Draft directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity 
market, Dec. 2000. 
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Figure 38.  Wind power production costs in the three countries 
Source: "Renewable energy governance systems" Frede Hvelplund,  July 
2001. 
 
The costs of producing wind power vary from around 3 EUR/C/kWh on a 
very good coastal site, in Ireland for instance, to around 7 EUR/C/kWh on 
good inland sites in central Europe. As wind power production on inland 
sites is required, and there is only one marketplace and one price for “Green 
Certificates” in Europe, the price level needed in order to produce wind 
power on inland sites, especially in Central Europe, will be at around 9 
EUR/kWh. This price is required because some profit is necessary to stimu-
late investment. This price would result in very high profits on the good 
wind sites, with between 90-160% profits on the good (classes 0 and 1) sites. 
Hence, the problem of establishing a mono-price market for renewable ener-
gy in the EU.  
 
RE resources and the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model  
In the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, a quota politically 
regulates the amount of RE –electricity. The price is determined on a market 
for electricity. 
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In Figure 39, the three countries have introduced a common "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. Linked to their different wind resources, 
this governance system entails the following wind power cost functions and 
profits for wind site- and wind turbine owners: 
 
Figure 39. Costs, profits and prices in a union wide “Green Certificate” 
market (case example) 
Source: Same as Figure 38. 
 
(Assumptions: 10% risk premium due to fluctuating prices. 20% profit de-
mand on a wind class 3 site.) 
 
The figure shows that on this market, there is one price for wind power all 
over the Union, namely the one developed in the EU certificate market72. 
The assumption is that politicians have established a quota system that en-
sures that an annual production of 200 TWh RE-electricity is implemented. 
In order to reach this TWh goal, it is necessary that the kWh price on the 
market is at least high enough that it becomes profitable to use wind class 3 
sites, which concretely translates into a price slightly above 8 EUR/C/kWh. 
Additionally, the fluctuating prices on the certificate market imply that the 
investors demand a 10% risk premium, increasing the price to 9.8 
EUR/C/kWh. 
                                                 
72 In order to not complicate the argument, we assume that the basic price for elec-
tricity, and the ‘Certificate price’, is the same in all three countries. 
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RE-resources and the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model 
We call the model “advanced” because of its ability to foster a competition 
process, which increases “site efficiency” in a non-bureaucratic way73. In 
Figure 40, the effects of this type of regulation are illustrated. 
 
Cost and price efficiency of the advanced "Political price-/amount market" 
model 
The price performance of the advanced "Political price-/amount market" 
model is shown in Figure 40 for the three countries. The figure displays ex-
actly the same cost structure as in Figure 38 and 39. The only difference is 
that the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model has a politically 
defined, site dependent price framework, which makes it possible to de-
crease the profit on good wind sites without destroying the economy of in-
land wind sites. 
 
 
                                                 
73 It is worthwhile mentioning that the UK tendering system could, in theory, be 
called an ideal system, in the sense that it potentially fosters the pursuit of site effi-
ciency in a detailed way, as the auction is linked to a specific wind site. Meanwhile, 
unfortunately, the UK system seems too bureaucratic and unable to ensure sufficient 
wind power capacity. The advanced ”Feed in” system might secure site efficiency 
without the bureaucratic disadvantages of the UK system. 
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Cost and profit in a "political price-/market amount" model
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Figure 40. Price, profit and costs in the “Political price-/amount market 
“model (Case example) 
Source: Same as Figure 38. 
 
(Assumptions: Profits are a percentage of costs: 40% on wind site 0; 35% 
on wind site 1; 30% on wind site 2 and 20% on wind site 3. These profit per-
centages are approximations of the profits that we have calculated on the 
basis of the new German prices. Since prices are politically guaranteed, 
there is no need for any risk premium.)  
 
Renewable energy is "dispersed" and often close to residential areas 
One of the main historical secrets behind the Danish wind power success 
was that a system of co-operate neighbour and local ownership was furthered 
by the public regulation, resulting in more than 60,000 wind turbine owners 
in Denmark. People like wind turbines, when they own them, and are not 
annoyed by the noise and visual inconveniences, especially when getting a 
fair compensation. However, with a system of distant utility, or shareholder 
owners, the local inhabitants are only getting the disadvantages without any 
compensation. This is seen as unjust and results in increasing local political 
resistance against wind power. It is as simple as that.  
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The new Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" system results in 
very fluctuating prices due to a range of different factors. The cost structure 
of wind turbines results in a very vertical supply curve. Once wind turbines 
are built, they will not close down production, as the majority of costs are 
fixed. Annual wind resources vary with up to 30%, making it impossible to 
govern by quotas, as the annual change in wind resources will surmount the 
size of a quota increase. Furthermore, the market will be characterised by 
large actors who will have the ability to manipulate market prices. Altogeth-
er, this causes the certificate prices to fluctuate heavily and often in a manip-
ulated way, making it impossible to draft trustworthy wind power project 
budgets. Consequently, the old procedure of financing a wind turbine project 
together with the local bank is no longer possible. Only large financial inves-
tors and power utilities are left over in the market. This means that the num-
ber of investors and, consequently, the competition between investors is de-
creasing, resulting in higher project prices. Furthermore, it results in increase 
local and regional political resistance against wind power.  
 
Characteristics of “newcomer” technology  
The competition between renewable energy technologies and existing fossil 
fuel and uranium based power companies is very often a win/lose situation. 
If wind power production increases, then the profit of the power companies, 
ELSAM, in Denmark, EON in Germany, etc., decreases. Due to excess ca-
pacity linked to these existing power companies, RE technologies are, when 
owned by these companies, often competing with the short-term marginal 
costs within these companies.  
 
Hence, these old fossil fuel and uranium based companies do not have real 
economic interest in investing in RE plants. Consequently, it is important 
that the politicians are establishing development tracks, where independent 
investors not having "sunk costs" can further the renewable energy technolo-
gies linked to the old fossil fuel and uranium technologies. As described 
above, the "political quota-/certificate price market" system tends to hamper 
the possibilities of such independent neighbour and local investors. This 
governance system, therefore, is leaving the economically unmotivated ura-
nium and fossil fuel utilities alone in regard to investments in the RE market. 
This is not the case with the "Political price-/amount market" system, which, 
with its foreseeable prices, makes it possible for independent "neighbour and 
local" investors to establish wind turbine projects. 
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Concluding remarks 
The "political quota-/certificate price market" system introduces an ineffi-
cient competition between energy robots, and weakens the increasingly im-
portant competition between equipment producers. It hampers the competi-
tion between investors by making it difficult for neighbours and local inves-
tors to invest in wind turbines. Due to its mono price character, it gives too 
high profits to wind turbine owners at very good wind sites, and not high 
enough to wind turbine owners at poor wind sites. 
The "political quota-/certificate price market" system is very far from being 
a market model, as the RE amount is politically decided and the certificate 
market price is also political influenced. 
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Table 20 summarises our conclusion. 
 
 "Political price-
/amount market " 
model 
"Political amount-/certificate 
price market" model 
(a) Is it a market 
model? 
The price is political; 
the amount is decided 
upon a market. 
The amount is political; the price is 
partly decided upon a market, partly 
politically set. 
(b) Is it furthering 
competition be-
tween equipment 
producers? 
The equipment pro-
ducers as a group can 
expand sales and prof-
it by lowing produc-
tion costs. 
The equipment producers are facing 
a 6-8 year politically set annual 
production quota. They can expand 
profit by lowering costs and espe-
cially by increasing sales prices. 
(c) Can it differenti-
ate the price be-
tween good and bad 
wind sites?  
Yes, as it is done in 
the German model. 
No. In this "mono-price" model, the 
same price is paid to the very good 
coastal sites, as to the good inland 
sites. 
(d) Can it price dif-
ferentiate between 
the first and last 
years of the produc-
tion of a given RE 
plant? 
Yes, as it is done in 
the German model. 
No. The same price has to be paid 
during the whole lifetime of a RE 
plant. 
(e) Can it lower the 
price in parallel 
with RE productivi-
ty improvements? 
Yes, as it is done in 
the German model. 
No. The quota has to be set for a 6-
8 years period, and new improved 
wind turbines are getting the same 
certificate price as less efficient 
wind turbines built at an initial 
stage of development. 
(f) Does it support 
neighbour and local 
investors? 
Yes. The foreseeable 
prices enable local 
groups to get loans 
from the local banks. 
No. The very fluctuating and possi-
bly manipulated prices make it too 
risky to invest, and difficult to get 
loans from the local banks. 
(g) Does it put a 
cost pressure upon 
equipment produc-
ers? 
Yes. Almost the same 
cost pressure on inves-
tors at good wind sites 
as upon investors at 
inland wind sites. 
In general, no. The mono-price sys-
tem gives very high profits to own-
ers of good coastal sites. This in-
creases site prices and weakens the 
cost pressure upon equipment pro-
ducers. 
(h) Does it support  
independent inves-
tor groups? 
Due to the above (f), 
yes. 
Due to the above (f), no. 
 
Table 20. A comparison of the "political price-/amount market" model with 
the "political amount-/certificate price market" model 
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The conclusion, therefore, is that it is time to find a RE governance model 
that considers the specific needs and characteristics of RE technologies. The 
present analysis strongly indicates that a "political price-/amount market" 
model in this connection is far better than the "political quota-/certificate 
price market" model. 
 
Furthermore, a common EU model, based on the principle of site efficiency, 
would be much more flexible, cheaper and easier to pursue than the "politi-
cal quota-/certificate price market", or mono price model, which is designed 
for uranium and fossil fuel technologies, and represents a governance model 
designed for the technologies of yesterday. 
 
 
10.4 CO2 quota and tradable permits regulation 
As a part of the electricity reform, the Danish power companies have got a 
CO2 quota of 23 mil. tons in 2000, decreasing to 20 mil. tons in 2003. If the 
power companies exceed the emission quota, they will have to pay a fine of 
around 0.46 EUR/C/kWh. In 1999 and 2000, where the prices at the Nord-
pool spot market were are close to the short run marginal costs, that is be-
tween 1.32 and 1.6 EUR/C/kWh, this fine will inhibit production above the 
quota from these plants. But as soon as the prices are just above 2 
EUR/C/kWh, as they have been the first half of 2001, or still well below the 
long-term marginal costs excluding external costs, the Danish power compa-
nies will produce and sell coal-based electricity, even when having to pay 
the 0.46 EUR/C/kWh in CO2 fine. 
 
This illustrates the problem of giving a free of charge CO2 quota to estab-
lished fossil fuel companies, and establishing fines which are well below the 
difference between the short term and long-term marginal costs of coal-
based electricity production. 
 
The way firms are described in the theory behind the arguments for a trada-
ble permits system leads to the conclusion that it is, as it is done in the 1999 
Danish reform, economically optimal to give old fossil fuel actors free pollu-
tion quotas linked to their historical pollution level. Firms are described as 
“dots” with no internal organisation life, and with no difference in the inter-
nal political and economical incitement mechanism between an established 
power company owning large coal-fired power plants, and a newcomer or-
ganisation wanting to build a new renewable energy plant. 
 
These firms are all viewed as identical “dots” with the following character-
istics: 
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- Having the same pollution abatement costs. The costs and value of pro-
duction of a windmill is the same within an organisation producing coal- 
or uranium based electricity as in a firm, which is independent of coal 
and uranium. 
- Having the same organisational dynamics and relationship to the outside 
world. 
 
It is when these identical “dot firms” meet each other on the market, that the 
“curve exercise” with marginal cost-, supply- and demand curves can then 
get started, as discussed in Section 5.4. 
 
The conclusion usually is that it is economically optimal to give a certain 
amount of CO2 permits freely to the actors, according to their historical pol-
lution levels/emissions. The historically biggest polluter will consequently 
get the largest pollution quota as a present from the public. The argument is 
that such a system will not meet heavy political resistance, as the strongest 
potential opponents will get the largest gifts. This final conclusion is true, 
but it is not true that all firms are just similar, neutral “dots” acting in a 
world of supply and demand curves. And as this is not a useful or relevant 
description of the world in this connection as it also leads to the wrong con-
clusion.  
 
In this paper, Section 5.4, it is argued that when one regards firms as organ-
isms, which are very differentiated, it is no longer inconsequential which 
firms and groups one selects as the carriers of innovation and green technol-
ogy. It is also obvious, that the fossil fuel companies will be the firms with 
the least motivation to introduce technological solutions, which decrease the 
consumption of fossil fuel. Consequently, it is not a good idea to place the 
innovation responsibility and the funds -via free CO2 quota gifts- in the 
hands of the fossil fuel companies, as it is envisaged in the CO2 quota and 
“tradeable permit” construction, where the largest polluters are given the 
largest pollution present as a starter gift. 
 
It is necessary, as we try to do it here, to regard firms as organisms, which 
have different types of organisational inertia and different economic motiva-
tion structures. With regard to fossil fuel and uranium based companies, the 
ground for renewable energy and energy conservation innovation is quite 
barren. Consequently, a system of tradable quotas, which transforms the past 
CO2 emission levels into CO2 quotas, as public presents to the historically 
largest polluters, is a way of transferring the “innovation funds” to the most 
resistant and most expensive “innovators”, within renewable energy and en-
ergy conservation innovation activities. Therefore, it is important to establish 
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public regulation measures that channel the seeds and funds for innovation to 
independent and dynamic newcomer companies and groups outside the 
range of fossil fuel and uranium companies. 
 
 
10.5 Conclusion regarding the 1999 electricity reform and 
its goal performance 
In Section 9.1.4 we summarised the performance of the Danish electricity 
supply system, and its second order governance system in Table 14. We also 
developed an array of proposals in order to improve the system where it was 
performing badly. In this section we will evaluate to what extent the 1999 
electricity reform solved the "before the reform" performance problems of 
the, at that time comparatively highly well functioning Danish electricity 
system. 
 
The conclusions regarding efficiency in relation to the energy policy goals of 
Figure 6, related to electricity production are:  
 
Generally speaking, the success of the current “liberalization” model is up 
against very heavy odds, and one should expect rather low efficiency with 
regard to achieving these goals. 
a. The difficulties are, amongst others, caused by the following base condi-
tions: firstly, only around 10% of the added value within electricity pro-
duction comes from the “liberalized” part of the power plant sector, 
which is the only part of the value-added chain being liberalized. Sec-
ondly, even liberalizing the power plant sector is difficult and will result 
in considerable regulator transaction costs, due to the capital structure of 
power production with heavy investments, the 30 year lifetime of plants, 
and the fact that present typical electricity systems have only around 
40% of total long-run marginal costs as short-run marginal costs. Thus, 
the outcome of competition easily becomes a situation where it is not 
possible to cover the capital costs of investments, which is unacceptable 
for the actors. Consequently, there will be a very strong drive towards 
merging and the establishing of “strategic alliances”74. This tendency has 
proven to be almost the mainstream development after the introduction 
of “liberalization” reforms. The result has been and still is a very low 
“price efficiency” as in, for instance, the UK and California liberaliza-
tion experiences. 
b. Any “liberalization” reform has to be compared with the goal perfor-
                                                 
74  An ”Orwellian” coinage which, in many ways, is applicable to the same activities 
as cartellisation previously. 
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mance of the concrete regulation regime, which it replaces. It is obvious, 
that even a badly functioning liberalization process, with the inherent 
difficulties discussed above, might be better than the regulation system it 
replaces. Here we have compared it with the Danish “liberalization” 
model with its non-profit/consumer-profit organisation and the public 
regulation regime, which was in existence until the electricity reform in 
1999. The result of this investigation is the following: firstly, the hitherto 
Danish regulation model has had the lowest electricity prices in the EU 
for industries with consumption below 1 mil. KWh/year, which is a typi-
cal consumption, level within the Danish industrial structure with its 
many relatively small companies. Secondly, there is a built-in cost sensi-
tivity in the consumer owned Danish systems: 
- The consumer-elected representatives will replace incompetent direc-
tors, if the company is doing badly.  
- There is no motivation for price increase due to shareholder require-
ments, as there are no shareholders in a consumer owned company. 
- There is consumer cost control at the transmission and distribution lev-
el through the representative system. In the market model with share-
holder ownership, such consumer cost control at the transmission and 
distribution level will be non-existent.  
- The prices at power plant level will be set according to average costs of 
power plant production, and not according to the marginal costs of the 
most expensive power plant producing. 
 
Altogether one can say: 
 
If the core of liberalization is increased consumer influence upon costs 
and prices, the present “liberalization” and “shareholder privatisation” mod-
el does not represent any liberalization increase. The contrary seems to be 
the case. As there is no increased consumer power in the present “liberaliza-
tion” and “shareholder privatisation” models, it is not surprising that the 
1999 “liberalization reforms” will not bring price- or even long-term cost 
decreases in the Danish electricity service supply system. The opposite is ra-
ther the case. 
 
The introduction of “market models” for renewable energy 
In the Danish case a double market system should be introduced around 
2003. It is not yet totally clear how it is supposed to work, and there is a 
widespread scepticism as to whether it will at all function competitively. So 
far its results have been that, at present, no new windmill contracts are un-
dersigned, due to the insecurity about the design of the future regulation re-
gime. 
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There are several problems linked to the new model: 
- The introduction of a Nordpool and Leipzig market oriented price for 
renewable energy sold to the public grid instead of the present fixed 
price based upon the long-run marginal cost principle is a step back-
wards. This is because in periods with excess capacity, as is currently the 
case, it replaces a system based on a “secure” long-run marginal cost 
price, with a price which oscillates around the short-run marginal costs 
of existing power plants. Probably five to six years ahead, there will be 
excess capacity in Northern Europe, with short-run marginal cost pricing 
at the markets hindering the introduction of any new technology, even if 
it has lower total costs than coal and/or uranium based power produc-
tion. 
- The introduction of a “Political amount-/certificate price market" system 
will cause very fluctuating prices for CO2 payment. Although CO2 costs 
are difficult to assess, we know that once assessed, there is no reason to 
believe, that they would not fluctuate by a 2.7 factor within a month or 
year, as the CO2 payment is allowed to do in the future Danish “Political 
amount-/certificate price market" system. It is a wrong price mechanism 
seen in relation to any external cost reality, and it introduces insecurity 
to such a degree, that the large independent investor groups, which have 
so far carried and supported renewable energy, will have to cease invest-
ing. Only the energy companies with their lack of organisational motiva-
tion, and investor companies, who have so far had no serious interest in 
renewable energy, will remain on the market. This might result in in-
creased prices for renewable energy based electricity and /or decreased 
expansion. 
- The motivation for minimising renewable energy production costs might 
decrease, as, in a politically set quota system, producers no longer have 
the possibility of increasing their sales by lowering prices. The hitherto 
decline in production costs might stop and be replaced by “strategic col-
laboration” between, for instance, wind generator producers. 
- Furthermore, it is worth mentioning, that the new system with fixed quo-
tas and variable prices is by no means (or definition) more “liberaliza-
tion-” or “market-” oriented, than a system with fixed prices, and varia-
ble amounts. In fact, cost reduction potential might, as mentioned above, 
be stronger in a system which rewards competition between, for exam-
ple, wind generator producers, by increasing market size, when they de-
crease production costs and sale prices. 
- The new “double market” system does not foster possibilities of improv-
ing the system efficiency of the electricity system by establishing dy-
namic prices, thus encouraging the regional use of fluctuating renewable 
energy sources. 
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In Table 21, the conclusion is summarised. It enables us to ascertain that the 
numerous problems stated above have arisen because of the 1999 reform. 
Thus, we can conclude that even as far as the “liberalization” core goals, that 
is cost and price efficiency, the performance of the “liberalization” version is 
poorer than the consumer ownership system. In the Table, the darker the are-
as are, the worse the performance is. If we take “price efficiency”, the table 
was white (indicating good performance) before the 1999 reform, and be-
comes dark grey after the liberalization reform (indicating bad performance). 
One + indicates a problem, more crosses indicate more problems.  
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Goals Remaining 
problems before  
1999 reform 
Result of 1999 “Lib-
eralization” reform 
Remaining problems af-
ter 1999 reform 
(1) Sup-
ply secu-
rity 
None 
Cost competition and dismiss-
ing employees especially at 
power plant level 
Decreased supply security due to 
less maintenance. 
(2) Price 
eff. 
None Power plants can be sold, and 
probably will enter the North 
European oligopolistic power 
structure. Motivation for price 
increases, where possible. 
Decreased price efficiency with re-
gard to: 
both price level and price distribu-
tion. 
(3) Cost  
eff. 
The ministry of energy is 
still not able to ensure 
that excess capacity is 
not built.  + 
 Power plant motivation for 
cost efficiency linked to the 
development of share value.  
 
A change from profit maximisation 
with a long-term horizon to maximi-
sation linked to shareholder value, 
therefore with a short-term horizon.  
++ 
(4) Con-
servation 
eff. 
The tariffs are still 
supporting con-
sumption increase. 
Capital in supply 
system is too 
cheap.+++ 
From a “one man one 
vote“ + non-profit price 
mechanism to “market 
power” + shareholder 
profit based price mech-
anism at power plant 
level. 
Shareholder profit oriented prices 
with high prices for small consum-
ers and high fixed prices and rela-
tively low running prices. ++++ 
(5)Innova
tion eff. 
Still belated inclusion of 
independent groups. 
Not sufficiently proac-
tive. 
+ 
Prices for renewable en-
ergy will oscillate heavi-
ly. Decrease of invest-
ment opportunities for 
neighbours and inde-
pendent investors. 
Decreased innovation efficiency due 
to market prices, which oscillate, 
and are currently close to the short-
term marginal costs of large coal 
plants. ++ 
(6)System  
eff. 
No system regulation of 
windpower, cogenera-
tion or consumption 
++ 
No measures are introduced. 
The system responsibility mo-
nopoly is given to the existing 
firms closely related to fossil 
fuel companies. 
No utilisation of the new regulation 
potential built into market price 
regulation. The establishment of a 
price system with “local markets” 
has not been introduced.++ 
(7)Democ
ratic eff. 
Still problems both with-
in the electricity system 
and within the public 
regulation processes ++. 
No real improvements of de-
mocracy within the electricity 
companies. Now a coming 
shareholder governance sys-
tem. 
No improvements with regard to  es-
tablishment of a democratic liberali-
zation process. Some deterioration 
of democracy at the power plant lev-
el.+++ 
(8)Compe
titive ef-
ficiency 
 Still a problem with 
no free capital. 
 
+ 
Subsidies, amounting to 7 
billion DKr, to the large 
coal-fired power in order to 
make them competitive. 
The problem has changed. 
Now the power plants could 
accumulate “free” capital. But 
due to the current low prices, 
they cannot.+  
 
Table 21. Changes in goal efficiency of the Danish electricity service supply 
system caused by the 1999 electricity reform 
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As Table 21 illustrates, the 1999 electricity reform does not solve any "be-
fore reform" problems, but rather adds a set of new problems, especially 
linked to the new organisation at power plant level, where the power plants 
might be partly sold to external competitors. 
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11.Conclusion/executive summary 
 
 
 
11.1. Analytical macro-structure and the main questions 
in this study  
In Figure 40 the analytical macro-structure is repeated from Figure 1 in the 
introduction. 
 
 
Figure 40. The analytical macro-structure 
 
In this book we have dealt mainly with a description of the Danish electricity 
system, box 2, the Danish public regulation, box 6 including a description of 
some links to the EU policy, box 10, the German public regulation (the areas 
shown by the dotted arrows in figure 40). The energy system in Germany, 
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box 3, has been analysed in (Mez and Piening 2001), and a case of "ideolog-
ical context/pressure", and the link between German and Danish public regu-
lation, has been discussed in the book "Renewable energy governance sys-
tems" (Hvelplund 2001). 
 
It is worthwhile to mention that the above analytical macro-structure con-
tains areas, which have not been dealt with in this study. For instance we 
have only looked at some aspects of the development in the Scandinavian 
electricity market. And an important limitation is that this study does not in-
clude any description or analysis of the interrelationship between the elec-
tricity systems in Northern Europe and Eastern Europe and the developing 
countries. This limitation should be mentioned, as the large market for new 
uranium and fossil fuel capacity is in Eastern Europe and the developing 
countries. So dealing with electricity reforms, democracy and technological 
change also needs thorough studies with regard to energy technology trans-
fer from the industrialised countries to Eastern Europe and the developing 
countries. This field of study is interesting and important, but has been out-
side the scope of this study. 
 
The purpose of this study has been to analyse the following four questions: 
 
1. Which governance systems are most efficient, with regard to achieving 
optimal goal performance by means of the present typical uranium/fossil 
fuel electricity supply systems? 
 
2. Which governance systems are the most efficient in the transformation 
process from the present uranium/fossil fuel electricity supply systems to 
renewable energy-/conservation based electricity system? 
 
3. Which changes in goal performance of the Danish electricity supply sys-
tem has the 1999 Danish electricity "liberalization" reform induced? 
 
4. Will the Danish electricity supply system be able to maintain its con-
sumer ownership institutions and remain independent of the "third party" 
shareholder ownership structure after the 1999 Danish "liberalization" 
reform? 
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11.2 Governance systems and goal performance of typical 
uranium/fossil fuel based electricity systems. 
It is important to "follow the money" and describe electricity systems by 
their value-added distribution, which can tell a lot about the concrete eco-
nomical conditions of organisations linked to different types electricity pro-
duction technologies. 
It is also important to escape the present dichotomy; market versus public 
regulation and establish a broader governance study by focussing on four 
levels, public regulation, market regulation, ownership regulation and com-
municative regulation.  
 
11.2.1. Value-added distribution and governance systems 
Governance systems: Consumer power via market, state, ownership and 
communication 
 
Figure 41 shows the essence/goal of liberalization, which here is regarded as 
an establishment of optimal consumer control over the electricity supply sys-
tem in order to achieve cost and price efficient electricity services. This con-
trol can be achieved via Parliament/public regulation, the marketplace and 
consumer ownership. Whether this control function is dependent on how the 
communication functions in the public space. The result of the analysis in 
this book is that all four levels need to be well functioning if the consumer 
power should be able to exert sufficient control over the electricity supply 
system. 
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Figure 41. Economical and political liberalization, and the "four-line" 
consumer regulation 
 
Uranium and fossil fuel value-added system. 
A typical uranium-/fossil fuel electricity supply system is characterised by 
the Figure 42, value-added distribution 
 
 
Figure 42. Value-added distribution in a Danish coal based electricity 
supply system 
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When selling electricity at the consumer level for 100 DKr., only 27.3 DKr. 
is produced in the Danish electricity supply system shown by the dark grey 
boxes 2,3 and 4. The rest is produced in the fuel proliferation, box 1 26 DKr, 
and in the equipment production sectors, boxes 5,6,7,8,9,10. A nuclear sys-
tem would look rather similar, with a slightly lower fuel share. The German 
system is characterised by ownership integration of the fuel proliferation 
system with the electricity system, and with some ownership integration of 
electricity supplies system and equipment production. The German electrici-
ty supply system thus differs from the Danish electricity supply system by 
organising under the same ownership structure between 50% and 70% of the 
total value-added in electricity production. The political behaviour of elec-
tricity systems naturally is dependent upon their value-added structure. The 
coal miners have substantial influence upon the German power system, but 
no influence upon the Danish power system75. 
 
Conclusion 1. The present asymmetric " market liberalization" is an il-
lusion and will not work.  
The present "liberalization" model is an asymmetric "market liberalization" 
model.  Asymmetric because it only tries to establish consumer influence 
through buying power at the market, but does not deal with the necessary 
democratisation of the political regulation needed to control the monopoly 
parts of the value-added chain. This asymmetry is fatal, when dealing with 
systems, where up to two third of the value-added is produced in grid com-
panies, which remains technical monopolies, and where the rest is produced 
in power companies with a very strong economical "merger" motivation76. 
Experiences from “liberalization” in the real world are beginning to unveil 
the considerable shortcomings of the present liberalization models. This is 
the case, for instance, in California, New Zealand, Denmark, and the UK. 
 
It looks as if the legislators and their economic advisors have forgotten to 
look closely at the value-added chain and the cost structure of present elec-
tricity systems, the situation of change and the capture problems, as well as 
transaction costs needed to control a system with such characteristics. The 
telescope seems to be placed in front of the blind eye, and many supporters 
of the present asymmetric "market liberalization" version apparently have 
                                                 
75 We experienced this fact, when we in 1993 presented an alternative energy plan 
which phased out lignite, "Erneuerung der Energiesysteme in den neuen Bundeslän-
dern-aber wie?", Hvelplund, F,Knudsen N.W, Lund,H.,in Cottbus. The lignite min-
ers were demonstrating outside the house, where the plan was presented. 
76 Due to investment risks caused by asset specificity, capital intensity and the long 
plant lifetime. 
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forgotten that distribution- and transmission services will remain technical 
monopolies in classical electricity systems.  
 
Figure 42 illustrates what the problems in the asymmetric "market liberaliza-
tion" illusion is all about. Looking at the value-added distribution, "liberali-
zation" of an electricity supply system of the Danish type will not influence 
fuel proliferation or equipment production. It basically only deals with the 
27.3% of the value added which is produced within the production, transmis-
sion and distribution parts of the whole value-added chain. When looking at 
these 27.3%, it is clear, that neither distribution- nor transmission grid ser-
vices can be liberalized, as there will only be one distribution network and 
one transmission grid system. What remains as a possible market "liberaliza-
tion" goal is the value-added at the power plant level, or in this case 9.3% of 
the total electricity price at the consumer level. 
It naturally might be possible to decrease the costs at the power plants by 
dismissing some people, as this has happened and will continue in the future. 
But the power plant business is, due to the cost structure with high long-run 
marginal costs and relatively low short-run marginal costs, in combination 
with a lifetime of 30-40 years, a very risky business. This business cannot 
survive a competition with many mutually independent power producers, as 
this might result in a market price close to the short run marginal costs, and 
consequently no amortisation of capital costs. Consequently, they will have 
to enter into "strategic alliances77"- and merger arrangements. This exactly is 
what is going on in these years in Northern Europe and -by the way- all over 
the world.   
 
So -in the end- and this is the main message here, it is not possible to foster 
an efficient “liberalization" and “privatisation” process of the electricity sys-
tem if one only goes half the way, and does not include a systematic democ-
ratisation or "political liberalization" of electricity supply systems. 
 
Conclusion 2. There is a need for symmetric liberalization by add-
ing consumer ownership to the governance system. 
In Denmark and in all other countries, distribution as well as transmission 
systems remain monopolies. In Denmark, as mentioned, they represent 65% 
of the added value in the electricity supply system. 
 
If we regard liberalization as increased consumer power, which can be 
achieved through the four channels shown in Figure 41, consumer ownership 
is logically “the only” way of liberalizing the monopoly part of the value-
                                                 
77 The modern "management style" Orwellian word for cartels. 
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added chain, namely distribution- and transmission networks. Here we call 
the consumers the "first party"; the workers at the electricity sector the "sec-
ond party" and groups outside the producer consumer relationship the " third 
party". With this vocabulary in mind, it is worth emphasising that consumer 
ownership is a "first party" privatisation, whereas shareholder privatisation is 
"third party" privatisation.  
 
It should here be emphasised that "shareholder" privatisation of the technical 
monopoly activities linked to transmission and distribution will need a very 
tough public price control authority, as there will be a constant shareholder 
motivation for trying to achieve monopoly profits. Without a policy of ex-
treme openness towards the public regarding costs, prices, and price control 
and a very active press and public, a capture process, where the electricity 
companies captures the state regulator is very probable.  
 
Consumer ownership of the technical monopoly parts of the electricity sys-
tem does not run into these problems, as the profit is always recycled to the 
consumer. This is one of the causes behind the fact that the Danish electrici-
ty system has supplied the lowest electricity prices in EU Europe during the 
last decades. 
 
Consumer ownership should be introduced in electricity systems with regard 
to at least the transmission and distribution monopoly sections of the value-
added chain of electricity systems. An EU directive requiring this reform 
could be the content in the next new EU "liberalization" version, including 
democratisation and political liberalization. 
 
Conclusion 3. There is a need for political liberalization through in-
creased administrative openness and empowerment of the public.  
For instance, concerning the power plants, there is a need for very strong 
public regulation of price policy. This might result in a capture process, 
where the ones who should be regulated command the regulators. Conse-
quently it is a must, that the state regulation body has a policy of total open-
ness with regard to cost and price information. Such a policy is, by the way, 
truly in line with the theoretical base of liberalization, demanding full trans-
parency, and in that way, enabling the consumers to buy the best and cheap-
est products.  
 
It should be emphasised that public regulation is not the same as State regu-
lation performed by high-ranking employees from the Ministries. Efficient 
public regulation requires both democratic processes with openness of in-
formation, and financially empowerment of independent consumer groups. 
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In this way, such groups are enabled to buy consultancy support, and per-
form an efficient control of the "state regulator". 
 
 
11.3 Which governance systems are the most efficient in 
the technological transformation process? 
(From the present uranium/fossil fuel electricity supply systems to renewable 
energy-/conservation based electricity system) 
Figure 43 illustrates the change in value- added, when going from traditional 
uranium-/fossil fuel electricity supply systems to renewable energy-/energy 
conservation systems. 
 
 
Figure 43. Value-added and the transformation from uranium-/fossil 
fuel systems to renewable energy-/conservation systems 
 
The figure illustrates two important conclusions: 
a. The transition entails a substantial decrease in value added in the tradi-
tional electricity supply companies. This also brings along a decrease in 
the profit of these firms. 
b. Fuel proliferation as well as the value added at the power plant level dis-
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appears from the traditional electricity sector. As the power plants be-
come energy automatons, the value added is produced at the equipment 
factory, and the maintenance often carried out by these factories. 
 
Consequently the traditional electricity producers will lose value added and 
profit in this transition process, and therefore work against this process. 
 
Conclusion 4. As the traditional electricity supply systems are losing 
value added in a transition to renewable energy and energy conserva-
tion, they have worked, and still are economically "forced" to work po-
litically against this process.  
 
Building on Conclusion 4, we can develop the next conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 5. It is important to establish public regulation policies that 
empower investor groups that are economically and politically inde-
pendent of uranium and fossil fuel interests.  
 
As the transition represents a development towards energy automatons, 
where an increasing part of the value-added is allocated at the equipment 
producers, the following conclusion can be stated. 
 
Conclusion 6.  In the future energy systems the equipment market is in-
creasing its importance, and the market for electricity is dwindling. 
Therefore, it is of great importance to establish a very competitive 
equipment market. The Danish "political amount-/certificate price 
market" system for renewable energy therefore is a historic mistake, as 
it weakens the competition at the increasing market for equipment, and 
establishes a "price market" at the dwindling market for electricity. 
 
As renewable energy- and conservation technologies have different natural 
resources/conditions from region to region, a common European renewable 
energy certificate market will result in a mono-price system, where, for in-
stance, wind turbines at the best sites will get the price which is necessary 
for wind turbines at inland sites. This will result in an overly expensive re-
newable energy development. 
 
A renewable energy certificate market for Europe is an institutional con-
struction designed to fossil fuel systems, where there is one world market 
price for fuels, and the accessibility of the "resource" therefore equal for 
competing companies all over Europe.  
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Conclusion 7.  Natural resources vary from region to region; a Europe-
an renewable energy governance system should be regionally flexible 
and be based on the principle of site efficiency. 
 
Regarding the introduction of amount quotas and a market for "Green certif-
icates". 
This system can be called a "Political amount-/certificate price market" sys-
tem, where the amount is politically set, and the price is developed at a cer-
tificate market. 
 
The competing system, which is being used, for instance, in Spain, Germany 
and France, is a "political price-/amount market" system, where the price is 
politically set, and the amount of renewable energy decided upon a market. 
 
Interestingly enough the "Political amount---" model has succeeded in be-
coming "THE" market model, whereas "The political price--" is considered 
by for instance the Danish energy administration to be a "non market" mod-
el. Basically it is not possible to call any of the two models "more market 
oriented" than the other. 
 
There are many problems linked especially to the "Political amount---" mod-
el, as it will end up with only two large renewable energy sellers and around 
three to five large buyers at the market. In reality, the market cannot function 
with sufficient competition with so few actors/competitors. 
 
Furthermore, the very fluctuating prices will result in heavy difficulties for 
individuals, when they want to borrow money for investment in renewable 
energy. The investor groups will be the large power companies and poten-
tially large pension funds. Renewable energy, and especially wind power, 
will become unpopular, as people may not like wind turbines in their neigh-
bourhood unless they get some kind of profit or compensation. 
 
Conclusion 8. A "Political price-/market amount" system should be in-
troduced at a European level. In connection to this it is very important 
to establish a system furthering neighbour- and local ownership.  
 
Without establishing a system where the ones having to hear and see the 
wind turbines in their neighbourhood are compensated by having ownership 
shares, local resistance will easily become politically insurmountable. 
 
Regarding CO2 quotas and tradable permits 
The main problem here is that the CO2 quota and a system with tradable 
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permits are giving the economic "carrot" to the "fattest horse". By this it is 
meant that giving a pollution quota to the actors (often for free), which, until 
now, have had a given CO2 emission, is also a way of giving the incitements 
for green technologies to the old fossil fuel companies. But these companies 
have the least motivation for investing in new green technologies, as they are 
economically, and with regard to know-how, embedded in a system of fossil 
fuel technology "sunk costs".  When a fossil fuel company has a coal-fired 
plant, new technologies will have to compete with the short-run marginal 
costs within this company. Consequently, motivating investment in a given 
amount of green technologies will require much higher subsidies and/or 
payment for tradable permits in fossil fuel based companies than in compa-
nies, which are independent of fossil fuel sunk costs. 
 
Conclusion 9. The introduction of a system with a CO2 tax in combina-
tion with a system of price- and investment subsidies to new renewable 
energy technologies is giving the "economic carrot" equally to all poten-
tial investors. In that way, the incitement is also given to companies that 
are totally independent of existing fossil fuel and uranium based energy 
companies.  
 
With regard to technological innovation processes, it should be acknowl-
edged that radical technological changes do not come from old, strong actors 
on the energy scene.  
 
Conclusion 10. The Government should always try, with both financial 
resources and established independent information networks, to obtain 
a strong and well-articulated “second opinion” on development possibil-
ities. Such a system, which, to some extent, is established in Denmark with a 
network of publicly supported energy offices, supplies the Government with 
new policy options, and makes it easier for politicians to make a choice, as 
they will have a number of differentiated and qualified solutions to choose 
from.  
 
 
11.4 The 1999 "liberalization" reform and its effects on 
the goal performance of the Danish electricity supply sys-
tem. 
As shown in Table 22, the Danish electricity supply system has had a very 
good price performance before the electricity reform. This is the result of the 
characteristics below. 
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Country Denmark Finland Sweden UK France Belgium Germany 
(2) Payment 
in DKK 
 160.000 
kWh/year 
consumer 
 59200 66400 75520 104000 100800 141120 148960 
Payment, 
øre/kWh 
     37    41,5    47,2     65      63     88,2      93,1 
 
Table 22. 1997 electricity prices per kWh excluding taxes in some EU coun-
tries 
Source: Statistic in Focus no. 28, Eurostat 1997. 
 
1. A system of consumer profit and consumer ownership system. This 
means that the consumers have ownership control with the distribution 
and transmission technical monopolies as well as with the power plants.  
2. A system of almost total openness of prices and costs. 
3. Cost reductions are transferred to the consumers as lower prices. There-
fore, the consumer representatives have an interest in low prices. 
4. As there is no "third party" ownership, there is no interest in higher pric-
es to any "third party". 
5. Although having area monopoly, the directors and employees of distri-
bution companies are competing against each other because of the price 
and cost openness. A director will get fired if his distribution company 
shows results that are not living up to the standard published in the an-
nual price statistics. 
 
All together, the Danish consumer profit and consumer owned system is 
close to being one of the only really symmetrically liberalized and privatised 
systems in the world, if consumer control is to be regarded as one of the fun-
damental features of a liberalized system. The consumers can maximise their 
utility at a market, where competition between different mutually independ-
ent producers is possible. But where there is a technical monopoly, as when 
dealing with distribution and transmission grid systems, the consumers can 
only maximise their utility function by means of well functioning political 
channels of influence. The result of the Danish consumer profit and consum-
er owned system indicates that this system has had, and still has some quali-
ties that - although not at all perfect - can compete very efficiently with the 
state control governance of grid and transmission systems in the so-called 
"liberalized ", but in reality asymmetrically only "market liberalized" elec-
tricity systems. 
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Conclusion 11. A well functioning consumer profit and consumer own-
ership electricity supply system represent a symmetric liberalization, 
where both buying power at the market, and political power in the deci-
sion processes are liberalized. It therefore is close to the ideal symmetric 
governance model, which is needed, when dealing with electricity sys-
tems with their high value-added percentages within companies with 
technical monopoly. 
 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that when dealing with power plants, 
with their very long lifetime and capital intensive cost structure, consumer 
ownership is a way of securing that some power plants are independent of 
the large North European power company families. 
  
The 1999 electricity reform has not improved the goal performance of the 
Danish electricity supply system. The goal performance of the system can be 
expected to decrease, especially because of the risk of selling the power 
plants to some of the surrounding electricity supply conglomerates. 
 
 
11.5 The 1999 "liberalization" reform, internationalisa-
tion and the ownership structure of the Danish electricity 
supply system 
In chapter 10 we concluded, that the 1999 electricity did not improve the 
goal performance of the Danish electricity system. In chapter 1 we asked the 
following questions: 
 
a. Are the Danish power companies able to compete on the Danish electric-
ity market with foreign companies? 
b. Will the Danish energy companies be able to compete on the market for 
energy capital goods, or will foreign companies, for instance German 
power companies, buy them? Will the Danish consumer ownership 
model survive? 
c. Will the Danish "flat" price structure survive on the future electricity 
market? 
d. Will the 1975-2000 energy technology innovation process survive under 
the new market conditions? How will conditions on the German market 
influence this development? 
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Are the Danish power companies able to compete on the Danish electricity 
market with foreign companies? 
Nothing indicates that the production costs at the Danish coal-fired power 
plants are higher than at coal-fired power plants elsewhere in Northern Eu-
rope. But periods with excess capacity in 1999 and 2000 brought the elec-
tricity price down on the short-run marginal costs of coal-fired plants. Alt-
hough the Danish power companies could be regarded as very well consoli-
dated, the very low price did not allow for paying amortisation costs on capi-
tal equipment. Hence the government entered an agreement with the power 
companies, giving them economic security against prices at the 1999 and 
2000 level. The distribution monopoly companies should pay this security 
payment.  
 
Conclusion 12. The Danish fossil fuel power companies could not, alt-
hough having a very low debt, compete on so-called market conditions 
at the Scandinavian Nordpool market. Public financial support was nec-
essary.  
 
Will the Danish energy companies be able to compete on the market for en-
ergy capital goods, or will foreign companies buy the Danish electricity in-
frastructure? 
Whether someone would buy parts of the Danish electricity infrastructure 
depends upon the profit possibilities of the potential buyers as well as the po-
tential sellers. The distribution and transmission monopoly companies are 
basically non-profit companies, with relatively thorough and bureaucratic 
price control. Furthermore, the 1999 electricity law requires at least 50% 
consumer influence in the distribution monopolies. Regarding the system 
operator, which owns the transmission lines, the state has pre-emptive right 
in case of sale.  
 
Conclusion 13. With the present rules, it is not probable that those for-
eign investors will buy the transmission- and or the distribution monop-
olies. They seem to be rather well grounded, as consumer owned mo-
nopolies. 
 
Regarding the power plants, they are now allowed to earn a profit, and might 
be interesting partners for other power companies around Denmark. So far 
they have not been really interesting investment objects, as the price on elec-
tricity on the Nordpool market has been close to the fuel cost linked to elec-
tricity production. The Danish power companies, nevertheless, are interest-
ing partners in the ongoing process of establishing market control and higher 
and more stable prices.  
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Conclusion 14. There is a latent external interest (E.ON Energy, Vatten-
fall, etc.) in buying the Danish power plants. A scenario, where the Dan-
ish power plants are becoming partners in the oligopolistic power plant 
structure around Denmark is probable. 
 
Will the Danish "flat" price structure survive on the future electricity mar-
ket? 
The monopoly parts, transmission and distribution will probably remain con-
sumer owned companies. It is difficult to localise any motivation indicating 
that these companies should change their "flat price" policy. So regarding the 
transmission and distribution activities, which accounts for more than 60% 
of the value added in the electricity companies, the motivation for a "flat 
price" structure remains. Regarding the power market, there is a possibility 
that larger firms can use their buying power to get better offers at the market. 
This will indicate an increase in the price spread at the power market, seen in 
relation to the policy until the 1999 reform.  
 
Conclusion 15. In general, the future "price spread" will increase, but 
still, due to the consumer ownership of transmission and distribution ac-
tivities, will not reach the level of price spread in our neighbour coun-
tries. 
 
Will the Danish 1975-2000 energy technology innovation process survive 
under the new market conditions? 
The Danish authorities have, through the 1999 introduction of the "Political 
quota-/certificate price market reform”, stopped the implementation of re-
newable energy in Denmark for a while. At present, almost no new wind 
power contracts are signed in Denmark. Nothing really indicates that this 
situation will improve for the coming months, as the Danish administration 
still does not seem to be willing to leave the  "Political quota-/certificate 
price market" model. 
 
The influence from the German, Spanish and French "Political price-/market 
amount " system might convince the Danish politicians that they should 
leave the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system. In 2001, the Dan-
ish wind power industry survives because of sales to the markets in coun-
tries, like Spain and Germany, which did not apply the Danish "Political 
quota-/certificate price market" system. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
“Political quota-/certificate price market" system may not be the best model 
for Denmark, but at present, the situation is still in a political deadlock. 
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